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ABSTRACT
TRANSFORMING THE FOUNDATION: LONERGAN’S TRANSPOSITION OF
AQUINAS’ NOTION OF WISDOM
Juliana Vazquez Krivsky, B.A., M.A.
Marquette University, 2019
Medieval philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas developed a multifaceted
account of wisdom by integrating Aristotelian and Platonic lines of thought with the
truths of Christianity. Bernard J.F. Lonergan, SJ (1904-1984), one of the leading Catholic
systematic theologians of the twentieth century, transplanted the metaphysical insights of
Aquinas into a contemporary philosophy and theology of conscious intentionality
constructed around human experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, and loving.
This dissertation reiterates the deceptively simple question first posed by
Frederick Crowe: Did Lonergan achieve a deliberate, thoroughgoing transposition of the
Thomist metaphysical category of wisdom into a more cognitive-existential context?
Through a chronological and detailed interpretation of primary texts, I conclude that
wisdom, for Lonergan, is the development of fuller authenticity in the subject. This
subjective development is sown in self-appropriation and reaches full bloom only in the
radical shift in horizon that is conversion, especially in the transformation from isolation
to transcendent being-in-love that constitutes religious conversion. Intrinsically
connected to transcendental method, which already implies within its unfolding the
operative (and potentially fourfold) conversion of the subject, the most sapiential
components of Lonergan’s anthropology are self-appropriation and, ultimately, the selfsurrender of completely unqualified love. Self-appropriation and self-surrender serve the

same foundational, consummate, normative, and unifying roles ascribed to wisdom by
Aquinas while also retaining the sapiential tasks of ordering and judging so important to
the Angelic Doctor.
In terms of methodology, I characterize my overall approach as interpretation, the
second step in the process from data to results that is transcendental method. In Chapter
One, I aim to discern exactly what Aquinas means by wisdom; in Chapters Two through
Five, I ascertain what Lonergan means by wisdom in his early work and what his silence
around wisdom means in his later work. And in the Conclusion, I submit a preliminary
position on how the later Lonergan’s notion of wisdom as self-appropriation and selfsurrender helps us imitate and love divine wisdom. This idea is worked out within the
functional specialty of systematics and builds on Lonergan’s and Doran’s own systematic
theology of the Trinity, which seeks further understanding of our share in the innerTrinitarian relations, a central mystery of the Christian faith.
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1
Introduction

In an essay originally published in 1984, Frederick Crowe notes that the Thomist
notion of wisdom played a major role in many of Lonergan’s works prior to 1959, but
wisdom as an explicit theme seems to drop off around this time. 1 Inquiring into what
becomes of Aquinas’ notion of wisdom in the later Lonergan, Crowe looks backward
through the chronology of Lonergan’s works and observes that the idea of the “universal
viewpoint” in Insight (1957) serves some of the same functions explicitly attributed to the
Thomist conception of wisdom in Lonergan’s early works. Crowe also stresses that
wisdom is considered precisely in the context of Lonergan’s search for foundations in his
early Latin theology courses. Indeed, although in both the 1959 course De intellectu et
methodo and the 1962 course De methodo theologiae Lonergan still stressed the
traditional Thomist account of wisdom as an intellectual virtue, he also brings in the
dynamic nature of wisdom as a sort of “moving foundation.”
More specifically, Crowe submits that the Thomist notion of wisdom as a habit of
right judgment residing in the intellect of an individual, preserved in Lonergan’s early
works, gives way to “a collective wisdom gained through dialectic and foundations,” 2
which are, in the language of the 1972 Method in Theology, two (of eight total)
interdependent groups of operations, the two that bring existential decision to bear on the

Frederick E. Crowe, “Lonergan’s Search for Foundations: The Early Years, 1940-1959,” in Developing
the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes, ed. Michael Vertin (Toronto:
University of Toronto, 2004), 164-193, especially 178-179, 190, and 190 n. 144; “The Spectrum of
‘Communication’ in Lonergan” (ibid.), 53-77, especially 68; “Rhyme and Reason: On Lonergan’s
Foundations for Works of the Spirit” (ibid.), 314-331, especially 317; and “The Task of Interpreting
Lonergan,” in Appropriating the Lonergan Idea, ed. Michael Vertin (Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America, 1989), 145-160, especially 148.
2
Crowe, “Lonergan’s Search for Foundations,” 68.
1

2
cumulative process from data to results that is transcendental method. And so if Crowe
were to offer a final answer to the question that he himself posed, it seems that he would
conclude that transcendental method takes the place of the traditional Thomist doctrine
on wisdom in Lonergan’s later works; however, he draws no final conclusions.

1 The Secondary Conversation

Other Lonergan scholars have also shaped discussion on this topic. Agreeing with
Crowe that certain “sapiential functions” are taken over by the idea of the universal
viewpoint in Insight, Ivo Coelho traces Lonergan’s thoughts on wisdom as a middle term
to provide an amazingly thorough account of the development and transmutation of the
universal viewpoint in Lonergan’s corpus. Although his principal task is to render an
interpretation of the universal viewpoint in Lonergan’s work, not to provide an
interpretation of Lonergan on wisdom, Coelho believes that the traditional Thomist
doctrine of wisdom falls out of extensive use in Lonergan’s corpus from 1963 forward
because Lonergan transposes it into the terms of conscious intentionality as
transcendental method. 3
Likewise, in an editorial footnote to The Triune God: Systematics, based on the
systematic portion of Lonergan’s 1964 De Deo Trino, Robert M. Doran, SJ, and H.
Daniel Monsour elaborate on Lonergan’s conception of theology as possessing a
“sapiential function.” Monsour and Doran suggest that this “sapiential function,”
although not explicitly called that or even discussed under the term “wisdom” in the 1972
Ivo Coelho, Hermeneutics and Method: The ‘Universal Viewpoint’ in Bernard Lonergan (Toronto:
University of Toronto, 2001), 203.

3
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Method, is connected with the normative, critical, dialectical, heuristic, foundational, and
unifying functions of transcendental method discussed in that work. 4
In his 2014 article “Lonergan on Wisdom,” John Dadosky takes as his starting
points Crowe’s observation on the pivotal importance of 1959 and both Crowe’s and
Coelho’s theory that transcendental method ultimately takes over the functions of
Thomist wisdom in Lonergan’s later work. Dadosky shows that wisdom is the foundation
and goal of the methodological precepts of 1959 and, later, of the greatly expanded
version of these precepts in the transcendental method of 1972; therefore, the
transposition is fundamentally effected in 1959. While largely congruent with that of
Crowe and Coelho, Dadosky’s interpretation of Lonergan on wisdom is still distinct.
He notes, correctly in my view, that Crowe’s preliminary placement of wisdom in
the functional specialties of dialectic and foundations does not adequately frame the full
picture of Lonergan’s transposition. Dadosky does, however, silhouette the sapiential
capacity for order and integration among different disciplines that is seen in
transcendental method. He argues that the five methodological precepts outlined in De
intellectu et methodo effectively transpose the intellectual facets of Thomist wisdom, but
adds that this transposition is not complete until Lonergan discovers the eightfold order
of functional specialization guiding different theological tasks into a cohesive unity.
From this perspective, then, the date at which Lonergan’s relative “silence” around
wisdom truly goes into effect is after 1965, which archival work has pinpointed as the
time of Lonergan’s breakthrough to functional specialization.

Bernard J.F. Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and
Daniel Monsour, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 12 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2007), 103,
ed. n. 59. Cf. CWL 14: 22-27. Hereafter The Triune God: Systematics is cited as CWL 12.

4
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Equally crucial is Dadosky’s commentary on divine wisdom, spoken of the most
extensively in Lonergan’s 1958 De redemptione as God’s plan to re-order the universe
through the law of the cross—the divine invitation to return good for evil. By restoring
order within human beings, who through grace are empowered to image the innerTrinitarian order, divine wisdom ultimately heals the disordered cultural values that bring
foolishness and destruction to entire societies in a vicious historical cycle of decline.
Dadosky also analyzes supernatural wisdom by observing the implicit connection in
Method between the dynamic state of being in love, which breaks into our consciousness
when the gift of sanctifying grace is given and received, with the gift of wisdom from the
Holy Spirit, which flows from the Holy Spirit as given (that is, from sanctifying grace). 5
More recently, in his 2018 Before Truth: Lonergan, Aquinas, and the Problem of
Wisdom, Jeremy Wilkins characterizes Lonergan’s entire project as the development of
wisdom in the sense of authentic subjectivity, a difficult and largely ignored but still
necessary and viable solution to the Western crisis of normativity. All of Lonergan’s
work is contoured by a grammar of wisdom: “order in the knower (self-appropriation,
conversion, self-surrender in love), order in the known (metaphysics, theology), and
order in the coming to know (method).” 6 Taking the place of classical first principles is
the more radically foundational first principle, the subject as she or he is measured by the
transcendental norms of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, and
love.

John D. Dadosky, “Lonergan on Wisdom,” Irish Theological Journal 79:1 (2014): 51-57 and 61-66..
Before Truth: Lonergan, Aquinas, and the Problem of Wisdom (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of
America, 2018), 10, 61-95, with quote on 10.

5
6

5
2 Wisdom as Conversion and Love

In this dissertation, I will present my own answer to Crowe’s question, an answer
that is in basic continuity with the insights of Crowe, Doran, Monsour, Coelho, and
Dadosky, while giving them greater precision and greater breadth by incorporating
conversion more deeply into the interpretation of Lonergan’s later “silence” around
wisdom. My conclusions are, in fact, extremely similar to Wilkins’, but garnered from an
inductive, chronological, comparative survey of Lonergan’s individual texts rather than
the overall thrust and contemporary implications of his life’s work. I attempt to perform
all of the textual work and extensive argumentation required to definitively demonstrate
not only that Thomist wisdom becomes transcendental method but also, more
fundamentally, the conversion of the subject, especially the subject-in-love. 7 Since it is
love as existential orientation that ultimately undergirds the authenticity of method, I
uphold the acute relevance of Lonergan’s post-Method works for a study of wisdom,
complementing the work of Dadosky, who analyzes wisdom in Lonergan through
Method.

3 A Note on Method

The transition from Aquinas’ metaphysical account to Lonergan’s cognitional
account of wisdom travels down numerous twists and turns, which I will here attempt to
At one point Crowe seems to point in this direction as well, speculating that “the 1959 position on
wisdom is sublated in the role of authentic subjectivity” (“On Lonergan’s Foundations for Works of the
Spirit,” 318). Dadosky also identifies religious authenticity, understood as conformity to the wisdom of the
cross, as the ultimate wisdom (“Lonergan on Wisdom,” 57 and 61).

7

6
simplify with a couple methodological assumptions. First, I intend as the formal object of
my study the common core of meaning that consolidates Lonergan’s various approaches
to wisdom seen over time, and so the genetic elements of Lonergan’s eventual
identification of wisdom with self-appropriation command my attention the most.
Accordingly, special importance is given to Lonergan’s own intertextual references to his
thoughts on wisdom, which often shine a light on this genetic aspect. 8 Second, each
genetic “moment” in Lonergan’s transposition is set against a specific chronological-andthematic stage of development in Lonergan’s overall growth as a thinker. 9
And so Lonergan’s conception of wisdom during the first stage of his
development (1940-1957) will be analyzed through the lens of the interplay among
cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics in Chapter Two, especially as these
pertain to the relationship between the knower and the known; through the lens of the
emergence of method and the ascension of conversion in the second stage in Chapter
Three (1957-1964) and Chapter Four (1964-1972); and through the lens of love as selfsurrender in the third stage and the healing work of love as inverse to the work of
understanding in the fourth stage in Chapter Five (1972-1982).

In addition, I lend more significance to shifts between texts rather than variations within a given text,
although the latter will certainly be highlighted if proven relevant. It should also be noted that all of
Lonergan’s substantive references to wisdom will be analyzed according to date of completion rather than
date of publication, to emphasize shifts in his thought more clearly than the latter might allow.
9
I take these stages from Doran’s Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of Toronto,
1990), 19-33. In Chapter Five I have chosen to merge the last two stages described by Doran (“increasing
centrality of love” and “healing and creating”) into only one phase, which I will simply refer to by the
broader title of Lonergan’s position on love, while still retaining Doran’s helpful distinction of two
connected themes on love.
8
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4 A Note on Transposition

Lonergan’s fundamental stance toward such theological giants of the past as
Augustine and Aquinas can best be characterized as transposition rather than negation or
even a simple “moving beyond.” 10 Lonergan himself defines transposition as a
restatement of an earlier position in a new and broader context. 11 The context of a
statement is the remainder of factors that must be considered if that statement is to be
understood. 12 And so in moving an author’s position forward into a different context, an
effort at transposition must discern the insights and judgments constitutive of the new
context. The fundamental meaning of the author stays the same, although it is enriched
and empowered to speak to the contemporary theological situation.
Different realms of meaning and different horizons are the two types of contexts
that Lonergan mentions the most in regard to the work of transposition. When Lonergan
transposed insights from Aquinas’ psychology and metaphysics into the terms and
relations of conscious intentionality, he was migrating from the realm of theory to the
realm of interiority. Lonergan insists that the intersection of our conscious and intentional
operations with historical circumstances produces four major exigencies—systematic,
critical, methodical, and transcendent—that, in turn, eventually give rise to different
realms of meaning (common sense, theory, interiority, and transcendence). In turn, the
See Matthew Lamb, “Lonergan’s Transposition of Augustine and Aquinas: Exploratory Suggestions,” in
The Importance of Insight: Essays in Honour of Michael Vertin, ed. John J. Liptay, Jr., and David S. Liptay
(Toronto: University of Toronto, 2007), 3-21, especially 5.
11
“Horizons and Transpositions,” in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, ed. Robert C.
Croken and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto,
2004), 410. Hereafter Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980 is cited as CWL 17.
12
See the “Regis College Institute ‘On the Method of Theology,’ 9-20 July 1962,” in Early Works on
Theological Method 1, ed. Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan
22 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2010), 20. Hereafter Early Works on Theological Method 1 is cited as
CWL 22.
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emergence of a novel stage of meaning in history necessitates the transposition of
judgments of fact and judgments of value that have achieved the status of permanent truth
in a prior stage of meaning. And the transposition of a judgment of fact or value from one
realm of meaning to another is a move from one horizon to another genetically related
horizon—a shift from one range of knowledge and interests to another. 13
But how does one go about assuring that a given truth is not lost or distorted in
the process of historical development and ultimately of complete transposition, and what
does the latter process involve? A genuine change of horizon cannot be demonstrated
from a previous horizon in the way of deductive logic. 14 The genuineness of a
transposition, like that of any other product of human subjectivity on Lonergan’s
analysis, proceeds from the self-transcendence of the subject.
If transposition is a genuine change of horizon that critically navigates the passage
from one stage of meaning to another, then it demands a sufficiently differentiated
consciousness to distinguish among the different cognitional processes characteristic of
each realm of meaning and to consciously shift from one realm to another by shifting
one’s own thought patterns. Moreover, the success of a transposition is effectively
verified when the transposed terms and relations produce a fuller or more explanatory
account than the original terms and relations, perhaps answering questions that arise in
the older context but cannot be answered on the basis of that context, allowing for more
creative possibilities. 15 The success of any transposition also stems from the accuracy

13
Bernard J.F. Lonergan, Method in Theology, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, Collected
Works of Bernard Lonergan 14 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017), 143-144. Hereafter Method in
Theology is cited as CWL 14.
14
CWL 17: 410.
15
For instance, Jeremy Wilkins uses the terms and relations afforded by Lonergan’s intentionality analysis
to conceive of the Scholastic category of habitual grace as the role played by being-in-love in the
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with which the original meaning is grasped. And so an investigation into Lonergan’s
transposition of Aquinas’ notion of wisdom vitally relies on the prior task of interpreting
Aquinas’ doctrine on wisdom, the task to which I now turn.

development, orientation, and transformation of skills, and contends that doing so yields distinct
advantages over faculty psychology. See Jeremy D. Wilkins, “Grace and Growth: Aquinas, Lonergan, and
the Problematic of Habitual Grace,” Theological Studies 72 (2011): 723-749, especially 748-749.
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Chapter One: Aquinas on Sapientia

Wisdom is not only an acquired speculative virtue aimed at contemplation of the
Divine, with a concomitant coalescence as metaphysics. It is also prudence, the guiding
light of ethical discernment. The highest manifestations of wisdom, in the infused virtue
of prudence, the gift of the Spirit, and all of the theological practices implied by sacra
doctrina, circle as closely as humanly possible around divine mystery. In what follows,
each type of wisdom will be described, with special emphasis on its functions, local
context in Aquinas, and relation to other terms. 16

1 Wisdom as Speculative Intellectual Virtue

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of wisdom as a category in Aquinas’
thought. It is an idea almost as fundamental as that of being, since it validates the veracity
of what is meant by that most fundamental term; the category of wisdom carries an
ultimate significance. Not surprisingly, Thomas’ notion of wisdom shines with a
multifaceted brilliance, shifting with varied conceptual fields while conserving a unity
throughout.

In what follows I emphasize the Summa theologiae as the most detailed, paradigmatic, and
chronologically final of Aquinas’ central texts addressing wisdom. Other important texts, however, include
(in chronological order) Aquinas’ first treatment of the prologue of In I Sententiarum, Super Boetium De
Trinitate, Summa contra gentiles, and his second treatment of the prologue of In I Sententiarum (called “the
Roman commentary”). He also discusses wisdom in In Meta. pro., In VI Ethicorum, and other more
secondary sources. For a summary of the texts and ideas of Aristotle that Aquinas draws upon the most for
his doctrine on wisdom, see Mark F. Johnson, “The Sapiential Character of Sacra Doctrina in the Thought
of St. Thomas Aquinas: The Appropriation of Aristotle’s Intellectual Virtue of Wisdom,” PhD dissertation
(University of Toronto, 1990), 76-106.
16
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1.1 Intellectus, Scientia, et Sapientia: Some Preliminary Notions

Acquired wisdom, both speculative and practical, is a perfection of intellect or
reason, which is the power of a human being to know things by understanding and
judging. The object of the human intellect in general and in this life is universal being; in
this life, the being and the truth we are properly oriented to is being and truth as
discoverable in material things. The good of the intellect is truth. 17
The speculative and practical intellect are not two distinct powers but the same
power of reason directed to different ends, either to contemplation alone (speculative
intellect) or to operation (practical intellect). The practical intellect apprehends the true
under the aspect of goodness or desirability, while the speculative intellect prescinds
from this aspect. Speculative knowledge is knowledge sought for its own sake, not for the
further end of action, as in practical reason; it is a good of the knower. 18
The subject of all speculative intellectual virtues, including wisdom, is the
speculative intellect in relation to the agent intellect, because all three speculative virtues
revolve in one way or another around the first principles given in the agent intellect.
Aquinas describes the agent intellect as a participation in God’s own understanding, since
it reduces from potency to act the natures of the sensible things we seek to understand,
reflecting participation in the pure act who is God. Speculative knowledge of first
principles is a natural, not acquired, participation of divine wisdom; we naturally and

I-II, 9, 1, reply to 2; I-II, 57, 2, reply to 3; I-II, 60, 1, reply to 1.
I, 79, 11, response; I-II, 9, 1, reply to 2; I-II, 64, 3, response; II-II, 47, reply to 3; I-II, 1, 6, reply to 2;
Super Boetium De Trinitate, 5.1
17
18
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habitually know certain common principles of being. These most fundamental principles
belong to a distinct habit of the intellect called understanding, or intellectus. 19
First principles are indemonstrable insofar as they are per se notum, known by
the intellect at once and without mediation of any other truths. By definition, it is not just
the meaning but also the truth of a first principle that is immediately known to the mind
once the meaning of each term is known. As examples, Aquinas gives two self-evident
principles having to do with quantity: the whole is greater than the part, and things equal
to one and the same are equal to one another. More significantly, St. Thomas remarks that
the very first indemonstrable principle from which all others flow, in agreement with
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, is that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same
time. As the most fundamental principle, the principle of non-contradiction is based on
the notion of being and not-being, but there exist “other notions consequent upon being,”
such as unity, plurality, potency, act, substance and accident, which also function as first
terms. The self-evidence of some first principles, such as the whole is greater than the
part, comes from the fact that the very definition of the predicate is included in the very
essence of the subject. 20
But a much vaster array of our knowledge consists in truths known through other
truths (per aliud notum), acquired by means of reasonable inquiry rather than bestowed
by nature. Such mediated truths are not indemonstrable principles but are rather “like a
limit” (se habet in ratione termini). If they are the limits of a certain genus, they are
known through the habit of scientia, which draws conclusions from principles that are
ultimate only in that genus. But if they are truths that either stand outside or encapsulate
I-II, 56, 3, response; I-II, 65, 1, response; I, 79, 3 and 4; I-II, 91, 3, reply to 1.
Super Boetium De Trinitate, 5.1; I, 2, 1, response; I-II, 66, 5, reply to 4; I-II, 65, 2, response; I, 94, 2,
response.
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the limits of all human knowledge, then they are studied by sapientia, the habit that
studies things that are first in intelligibility but last in our process of coming to know. 21
The proper procedure of science is from knowledge of causes to knowledge of
their effects. In contrast, wisdom reasons about eternal, necessary things by proceeding
from a consideration of the highest causes to judgments about the principles and
conclusions of all other sciences, as well as the validity of terms composing first
principles. In the sense that wisdom draws conclusions both from first causes, which are
the first principles of all of being, and from the first principles of knowledge
(indemonstrable propositions), wisdom is also a science. 22
But it is a more perfect virtue than science simply called, since wisdom’s object,
God as first principle and ultimate end, is more excellent than even the necessary and
eternal things studied by some sciences. In fact, some truths about God lie entirely
outside of the limits of human nature, as God transcends all genera and humanity is
completely and utterly disproportionate to divinity. And yet wisdom’s knowledge of God
as first cause—the existence and essence of the necessary, universal, and eternal First
Principle—allows it to judge the conclusions and principles of other sciences. All
scientific truths, whether they be principles of a given genus or science, or conclusions of
the scientific reasoning process, stand as effects to the first cause known by wisdom. We
judge lower effects by higher causes. Whether cause or effect in its own genus, all
principles and all conclusions—even indemonstrable principles of knowledge—are,
indeed, lower effects in relation to God, who is the highest cause of all creatures, the first
I-II, 57, 2, response.
I, 79, 9, reply to 3. The primary object of wisdom, like that of understanding and science, is the nature of
necessary things, since in the Thomist thought-world, only necessary things are worth knowing for their
own sake. See I-II, 57, 1, sed contra.
21
22
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cause of our power of knowledge, and the proper object of wisdom. In this way sapientia
exercises judgement over the activities and objects of intellectus and scientia. 23
Because the acts associated with prudence are beneath humanity, while
speculative wisdom aims at eternal and necessary realities far exceeding all human
concerns, theoretical wisdom is objectively superior to practical wisdom. 24 Moreover,
speculative wisdom comes closer to complete happiness than prudence, since God is the
very object of happiness, while prudence considers the means toward obtaining that
happiness. As knowledge of God, the object of wisdom far surpasses the objects of all
other knowledge, and so wisdom surpasses any science.

1.2 Wisdom and First Principles: The Heart of the Sapiential Habit

But wisdom judges principles as well as conclusions. On the surface level,
Aquinas tells us that the meaning of some terms is known only to the wise, so the wise
have more self-evident propositions at their disposal than most. So the proposition
“angels are not circumscribed in place” is only a self-evident principle to the wise, since
only the wise know that immateriality is included in the very essence of what it means to
be an angel. At a deeper level, wisdom is also the driving force behind the selection of
the primitive terms composing first principles. Just as the divine first cause is the first
principle of all of being, knowledge of the first cause is fundamental knowledge. 25 The
implication is that all primitive terms deal either directly with being or with what follows
I, 4, 3, reply to 2; 88, 2, reply to 1 and reply to 4; I, 3, 5, response; I-II, 57, 2, reply to 1; I, 79, 9, reply to
3; I-II, 66, 5, response; I, 88, 3, reply to 2; I-II, 66, 5, response.
24
I-II, q. 66, 6, reply to 1.
25
I, 2, 1, response; I, 4, 3, response.
23
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essentially from being, and the wise person’s knowledge of God makes them privy, by
analogy, to the notion of being which all beings participate in—ens commune. 26
Wisdom’s relationship toward indemonstrable principles is threefold, as
evidenced in a passage from the Summa theologiae that Lonergan will rely on heavily: Et
ideo sapientia non solum utitur principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum est intellectus,
concludendo ex eis, sicut aliae scientiae; sed etiam iudicando de eis, et disputando
contra negantes. 27 Perhaps most importantly, wisdom passes judgment on first principles
by resolving them into their component terms and justifying these terms against the most
fundamental term of all, the meaning of being, which it is up to wisdom to validate.
Sapientia grounds ultimate terms by what Aquinas calls the way of resolution.
Wisdom uses knowledge of temporal things to eventually ascend to a knowledge
of the absolutely ultimate and unchanging things. In the way of resolution, wisdom
grounds ultimate terms by testing them against both experience and reason in the reverseinductive process essential to judgment, by way of resolution to the senses and to the
intellectual light that makes intellectus possible. The truths stemming from wisdom form
the basis upon which we can judge all things rightly, the principles grasped by
understanding as well as the conclusions reached by science. 28

Lonergan helpfully explains this same connection between knowledge of God and metaphysics: “God
alone is being by essence, and it is only on a being that exists by its very essence that the science of all
being, considered in itself, is founded.” See Bernard J.F. Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological
Constitution of Christ, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected
Works of Bernard Lonergan 7 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2002), 39.
27
I-II, 66, 5, reply to 4.
28
I, 88, 2; I-II, 3, 6. Primary terms and the indemonstrable propositions (or principles) composed of them
are also determined by sensory knowledge. It seems that it would be wisdom that guides the way of
resolution in which reason validates the meaning of being (an essentially analogous concept) by resolving it
to sensation and (more importantly in this context) to intellectual light. See I-II, 3, 6, response; I-II, 51, 1,
response.
26
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Next, in the way of synthesis, wisdom draws conclusions from the first principles
of being grasped by intellectus in a manner parallel to the way the other sciences draw
conclusions from their more particular principles. In its relationship to principles, wisdom
can be thought of as the “understanding (intellect) of eternal and divine things”; insofar
as it draws conclusions from such principles, it can be thought of as the “science of
eternal and divine things.” Finally, although it cannot prove its principles, since then they
would not be ultimate, it can dispute with those who would deny them by showing their
objections to be false.
As profound as wisdom’s relationship to first principles may be, it is worth noting
that it hinges upon the more original understanding of indemonstrable principles given in
intellectus, and intellectus is present in us by nature only by way of a beginning that
stands in need of further development. It is on account of the very nature of the
intellectual soul that once we grasp the definition of a whole and the definition of a part,
we immediately grasp that the whole is greater than the part. But the natural habit of
understanding is not sufficient, in and of itself, to know what the correct definition of a
whole is, and what the correct definition of a part is; such definitions stem from the
intelligible species abstracted from phantasms and thus partly from sensation. And so
Aristotle remarks in his Metaphysics and Posterior Analytics that knowledge of
principles comes to us from the senses, through induction. 29
Having reviewed wisdom’s threefold intersection with first principles, we can
now cast the interconnections among sapientia, intellectus, and scientia in a new light.
Aquinas depicts sapientia’s relationship to intellectus and scientia in at least two ways,

29

I-II, 3, 6, response; I-II, 51, 1, response.
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all of which closely follow upon its critical relationship with first principles and the
notion of being. First, wisdom exercises judgment over intellectus and scientia inasmuch
as it grounds the veracity of first terms composing first principles, on which intellectus
and scientia intimately depend (albeit in two different ways).
Next, sapientia directs intellectus and scientia inasmuch as the latter two
intellectual virtues are ordered to the right judgment of wisdom. Intellectus is only the
remote and derivative source of principles for scientia but is the proximate and primary
source of first principles for sapientia. Scientia gives us knowledge of causes that are
ultimate in a particular genus, and since all particular causes are ordered to the most
universal, divine cause, the wise are led on by the sciences to know the ultimate Being
who transcends all genera, the Being who is being essentially. 30

1.3 Functions of Wisdom

If the proper object of wisdom is divine truth, then Aquinas identifies at least
three central functions of wisdom, and all center around divine truth: wisdom considers,
judges, and orders. 31 We find these highlighted in the Summa: ad sapientem pertinet
considerare causam altissimam, per quam de aliis certissime iudicatur, et secundum
quam omnia ordinari oportet. 32 The highest truths are those regarding the highest object:

I-II, 9, 1, response; I, 4, 3, reply to 2; 88, 2, reply to 1 and reply to 4; I, 3, 5, response; SCG, ch. 1, no. 1.
For commentary on this triad, see Eric Mabry, “Officium Sapientis: Sapiential Moorings of Lonergan’s
Notion of Method and Interiority in Thomas Aquinas,” paper presented at the West Coast Methods Institute
at the Lonergan Center, Loyola Marymount University, April 2013.
32
II-II, 45, 1, response.
30
31
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that God is, and that God is characterized by such and such an attribute. 33 Wisdom
considers, or contemplates, God. Put simply, to reason to a truth about God, to
understand a truth about God, and to consider a truth about God are all proper acts of
wisdom.
Just as all particular causes are ordered to the universal cause, intellectus and
scientia are ordered to sapientia. God is both ultimate end and first principle of being,
and so the principles that are understood without mediation by the habit of understanding
and that are taken as starting points by the habit of science, are intimately dependent on
wisdom, the habit that strives to know God. In the Aristotelian-Thomist anthropology,
humanity’s highest power is our speculative intellect, and happiness resides in an activity
of our highest power with respect to our highest object, and so our greatest happiness
consists in contemplation of God. Because its action is the contemplation of God,
wisdom is a beginning or foretaste of the saints’ beatitude in eternity; in this life,
however, wisdom knows God only imperfectly. 34
Reasoning about God does not consist merely in ideas about God but in actual
interior assents and dissents of judgment. Wisdom’s consideration or contemplation of
God comes after and is a direct result of right judgment about divine truths. 35 Judgment is
the act of reason whereby truth and falsity first enter into the mind; it is an interior act of
the intellect putting things together, as in composition, or separating them, as in division.
Of course it is Aquinas’ position that God’s essence can never be comprehended by us—neither on earth
nor in heaven. I, 12, 7.
34
I-II, 66, 5, response; I-II, 2, 5, reply to 3; I-II, 66, 5, replies to 2, 3, and 4; I-II, 66, 3, reply to 1; I-II, 3, 6
and 7. Cf. SCG ch. 2, no. 1
35
“After” need not be taken here in a temporal sense, as it seems possible to me that the act of judgment
affirming a divine truth may be practically simultaneous with the contemplative insight that rests in the
truth of the reality assented to in judgment. Cf. the mention of contemplative insight in the notes taken by
Martin O’Hara on Lonergan’s 1945-1946 course at the Thomas More Institute entitled “Thought and
Reality,” Archive Entry 10034DTE040, 4. See https://www.bernardlonergan.com/pdf/10034DTE040.pdf.
Accessed on November 7, 2018.
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Judgment is always made in light of principles, in a process of resolving one’s initial
understanding (concept or definition) back to its dual sources in sense and in first
principles, all in order to affirm or deny that initial understanding.
In Boethius’ schema of the sciences, which Aquinas investigates in his unfinished
commentary on the former’s De Trinitate, the sciences are distinguished not only
according to the degree of abstraction but also according to their resolution (or nonresolution) of judgment back to sensory knowledge. The primary and proximate kind of
judgment about God that has wisdom as its habitual source can be described as a negative
judgment, in the sense that judgments about God’s existence and God’s attributes do not
terminate in sensory knowledge, as other judgments do. 36
While wisdom is first and foremost right judgment about divine truths, it is also
right judgment about everything else in light of divine truth. Because all particular causes
are ordered to the universal, divine cause, and are, in fact, effects of the highest cause,
consideration of the highest cause empowers us to judge rightly about all other causes.
The relationship between right judgment of divine truths and right judgment of
everything else pivots around causation: the order of judgment follows the order of
causation. 37
Order to a right end and to the divine law is common to all the virtues, but
speculative wisdom has a special connection to order, as one of its central functions is the
very act of ordering all things. As is true for much of Aquinas’ claims about wisdom, one
of his most treasured sources is Aristotle, who describes the “wise man” as one who
orders because he “knows that for the sake of which each thing must be done, and this is
The same can be said about knowledge of angels, who, like God, not only do not exist in matter and
motion but can in no way exist in matter and motion.
37
SCG, ch. 1, no. 2.
36
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the good in each case, and, in general, the highest good in the whole of nature.” 38 The
notion of order is connected with that of relation or proportion; to grasp the order of
something is to understand its relation to the whole of which it is a part, or to its causes,
or, as Aristotle and Aquinas stress, to its end (final cause). 39 In the Summa contra
Gentiles, Aquinas threads together God’s intellectual nature, the nature of our end, and
the good of the universe. It is fitting that wisdom, which is knowledge of the highest
cause, is a perfection of intellect, because the first author and mover of the universe is an
intellect. Therefore the ultimate end of the universe is truth, which is the good of the
intellect. The purpose of the universe is to realize the very goodness of God as Truth; the
highest goodness of our intellect is conformity with the Truth through the pursuit of
wisdom. 40
The ability of wisdom to order all things would seem to depend on and follow
directly from its ability to rightly judge of divine truth. Speaking of the gift of wisdom’s
twofold types of activity, which we can reasonably apply to its virtuous counterpart,
Aquinas explains that “A thing is considered in itself before being compared with
something else.” 41 Similar to the first activity of the gift of wisdom, wisdom understood
as a virtue aims at contemplation of God for the sake of that contemplation itself, but
flowing from that contemplation is the activity of ordering, of relating all things to God.
To understand the order of many things among themselves is to grasp their relation to one
another and, more importantly, to something higher, since the interrelations of diverse
things are characterized by a telos to a common end. In the case of wisdom’s object, one
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1.2, 982a17-20 and 982b5-7.
I-II, 55, 4, reply to 4. In I Eth., Lect. 1. Aquinas emphasizes that the order to the end is the more primary
order in things, since often the order of parts to their whole relies on the order of the whole to its end.
40
SCG, book 1, ch. 1., no. 2.
41
II-II, 45, 3, reply to 3.
38
39
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and the same Deity is both first cause and final end (final cause), and so wisdom orders
all things to God as principle and end. To judge rightly about creatures is to understand
their true relation to God: not only to judge rightly about their due order to God as
principle and end, but to understand the details of that order, including the hierarchy of
beings.

2 Wisdom as Metaphysics

While we are not capable of receiving the divine essence as an inhering form in
our intellect in this life, we are capable of a natural and imperfect union with God, as the
known in the knower, through the virtue of wisdom, which considers the highest causes,
and through its extension into the science of metaphysics. When wisdom draws
conclusions from the principles that pertain to natural knowledge of God, to other
primary causes besides God, and to being as such, it is practicing the science of
metaphysics. The wise are believed by all to have knowledge of first causes and
principles, and God is the highest and absolute first cause and principle of all other
beings, so the primary object of metaphysics is the Divine Being. But as metaphysics
treats all that is free from both motion and matter, it also studies angels. As secondary
objects after separate substances, metaphysics studies the four primary causes, being qua
being (ens inquantum ens, or ens commune), and the essential properties of being qua
being. 42

Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1.1-1.2, especially 981b-982a982b10; Super Boetium De Trinitate 5.4, reply to 3
and reply to 4; ST, I, 50, 3; Aristotle, Metaphysics, 12.8, 1073a32ff; In Post. Anal., Book 1, Lectio 5, Caput
2, 72a8-24.
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The meaning of “being qua being,” which is, admittedly, an extremely abstract
and elusive turn of phrase, is clarified by Aquinas in terms of principles: all beings,
inasmuch as they share in being, have certain principles in common. Such principles are
universal either by predication or causality. Esse is not predicated of God in the same
way that it is predicated of creatures, but God is the cause of all creatures, so God is the
principle of all things and also has a complete nature in and of God’s self. While God’s
essence cannot be comprehended in this life or the next, it can be known through a
relationship of non-univocal (but not entirely equivocal) predication with creatures.
Inasmuch as the effects of God and the angels can be traced back to their divine
causes, and these divine causes are the common principles of all things, 43 they are
investigated by the science studied by philosophers, who call it divine science, theology,
first philosophy, or metaphysics. But a different type of divine science, the theology that
studies sacred scripture, considers the nature of divine beings in and of themselves, and
as they are revealed to humanity. 44 The divine science of the philosophers and the sacra
doctrina of the magister in sacra pagina approach the study of being in dramatically
different ways. Their subject-matter may be the same in a general kind of way, but it is
their subject (subiectum)—the formal ratio under which it knows its subject-matter—that
differs substantially. The subject-matter is that which the science concerns; from this
perspective, faith-based theology, for instance, understands God as revealed. But the
subject of a science is that whose causes and properties we hope to examine, while
knowledge of the causes themselves is the terminus achieved by that scientist’s efforts.
Aquinas was of the view that angels moved the heavenly bodies. See ST, 1, 70, 3; SCG 2.70, 3.23, 3.24.
Theology studies God in God’s self—ens divinum—as its primary subject, while metaphysics studies
God insofar as God is the cause of ens commune. See Johnson, “The Sapiential Character of Sacra
Doctrina in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,” 76-79.
43
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The subject-matter of all of metaphysics is the separate substances, that which is
separate from matter and motion both in existence and in thought—God and the angels.
In contrast, ens commune, substance, potency, and act are sometimes found existing in
matter and motion, although according to their nature they do not exist in matter and
motion. Faith-based theology has separated substances themselves as its subject, since it
considers everything under the formality of being related to the God of revelation, while
philosophical theology has ens commune (“being-in-general”) and its affiliated terms as
its subject. 45 Another way of stating this distinction is to say that although both concern
divine things as their subject-matter, faith-based theology seeks to know divine things for
the sake of this knowledge itself, while philosophical theology seeks to know divine
things insofar as they are the principles of other beings.
Most importantly, the foregoing distinction is the basis of Aquinas’ threefold
distinction in the objects of metaphysics, the various monikers used for metaphysics, and
the crucial way that he protects divine transcendence, even at the level of natural
metaphysics. In his commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, Aquinas lays out the three objects
of metaphysics as the first and universal causes of being (as in the four causes from
Aristotle’s Physics), being-in-general and its attendant properties (like unity), and the
separate substances (especially God). Because God completely transcends all other being,
God is not the subject of metaphysics in the same way that being-in-general, primary
causes and principles, or even the angels are. In fact, in the metaphysics that is
philosophical theology, only being-in-general is the subject, since everything in
philosophical theology is apprehended under the formality of being and its attendant
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Super Boetium De Trinitate 5.1, reply to 9, and 5.4; 6.1, reply to the third question.
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properties. 46 Knowledge of God is the term of philosophical theology, and is acquired
through the ways of causation, negation, and eminence.
Metaphysics is called first philosophy because the principles of all other sciences
can all be resolved into metaphysical principles and causes, and it studies those things
that are first in being by their very nature, although our knowledge of them is last. It is
called divine science or theology because it treats separate substances, which are the most
excellent things we can ever hope to know. And, last but not least, it is properly called
metaphysics because its objects—being and the essential traits of being—go beyond what
is known in physics, since the more universal concepts of being and its attributes, which
are not sensible in and of themselves, are learned after the more particular concepts of
natural principles, which are closer to our sensory powers. 47
Aquinas claims that metaphysics should be learned after physics, since in the
tripartite division of the speculative sciences into physics-mathematics-metaphysics, the
type of thinking characteristic of the natural sciences in the way of analysis—discursive
or “rational thinking”—comes before “intellectual thinking.” “Intellectual thinking” is the
type of thinking most proper to the separate substances, especially God, who in one act of
understanding understands all that there is to be understood, including God’s self.
But humans also share in this type of cognition, analogously, in the direct grasp of
simple unity that rests in its knowledge as in an end. Unlike the intellects of the separate
substances, the human intellect always moves from a consideration of many things to a
comprehension of unity (the movement of rational thought), and from a consideration of
unity to a comprehension of many things in that unity (the movement of intellectual
More specifically, the formality in question here seems to be independence from matter and motion,
although things included under this subject are, sometimes, found in matter and motion.
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thought). It is this type of thinking, similar to the habit of intellectus that grasps first
principles but that here represents the term of a science instead, that metaphysics
approaches more closely than mathematics or physics. 48 The understanding that is the
term of metaphysics holds priority over the understanding that is the term not only of
mathematics and physics but of all the sciences, since in the way of analysis the most
universal causes ultimately reached in these sciences can be traced back even further,
beyond the bounds of those sciences themselves, to the most universal and first cause,
which is the object of metaphysics. 49
Moreover, at the term of its inquiry, metaphysics understands principles in
conclusions, just as any other science does in the way of synthesis. But it reflects the
divine unity more powerfully because its conclusions about divine being are closer to its
principles, which also pertain to being, although not in the exact same way, since being is
an analogous concept. And so in both regards—method and terminus—divine science
beautifully imitates its sacred objects: as with theology, metaphysics strives for a unity of
knowledge that mirrors the unity of God. 50
In the way of analysis, by rationally and discursively tracing multiple effects back
to causes in the order of things and the more particular to the more universal in the order

48
Of course, divine science or metaphysics depends on intellectus just as much if not more so than any
other science, since its principles are the first principles of all being.
49
Aquinas clarifies that this relationship between metaphysics and other sciences applies regardless of
whether we are speaking about the order of reality, which proceeds by analysis from effects to causes, or
about things in the intentional order, which we know by analysis from the more particular to the more
universal. The terminus of analysis in divine science in the order of reality is knowledge of the separate
substances, God and the angels. Super Boetium De Trinitate, 6.1, reply to the third question. For Aquinas,
reason and intellect (understanding) are distinct acts of one and the same power, and their interrelationship
is one of movement to rest. Reason starts from a more certain understanding of something and advances to
a knowledge of something that was grasped, in the beginning, with less certainty. Intellect apprehends
absolutely; it is the possession of intelligible truth. I, 79, 8, response; Super Boetium De Trinitate, 6.1, reply
to the first question and reply to the third question.
50
Super Boetium De Trinitate, 6.1.
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of intention, we come to metaphysics, knowledge of the highest cause. At the term of
metaphysical knowledge, our intellect contemplates many different truths about the
divine attributes, which are in reality one and undivided in God. And then we proceed by
way of synthesis to rationally and discursively come to an understanding of the multitude
of creatures, understood, as much as is humanly possible, in the simple light of divine
truth. The knowledge procured by wisdom is more certain than any other naturally
proportionate knowledge, since what is simple and unchangeable is more certain than
what is changing and multiple, and the act who is God is eternally one and eternally the
same. 51

3 Wisdom as Prudence

Prudence is right reasoning about things to be done, the ethical powerhouse of
Thomist virtue theory. Right reason concerning things to be done requires due inclination
of the will to a due end. Despite its nobility, the possession of wisdom or any other
speculative virtue does not make its possessor good, since it does not prompt a person to
use it well (that requires virtues informing the will, as charity and justice) or even to use
it at all (that requires a motion of the will). The principles of speculative truth given by
the natural light of the agent intellect are present and operative regardless of the will’s
disposition. And so the wisdom discussed above merely gives the possessor the capacity
to consider truths about God. In contrast, the goodness of the practical intellect, which
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prudence perfects, is a truth that is in conformity with right appetite, and so prudence
presupposes rectitude of will.
Prudence has a special relationship to the moral virtues as well as its speculative
counterpart. In itself prudence is a perfection of the practical intellect, but is located in
close affinity to moral virtue because of its relation to the will. Moral virtue functions to
moderate either our operations (as in the case of justice) or our passions (as in the case of
all the other moral virtues) in conformity with a proper mean, but that mean is determined
by right reasoning, which is prudence. The end of each moral virtue is to attain the
mean—the good that is in conformity with reason in the matter that particular virtue
regards 52—but it is prudence that determines what exactly that concrete good is in the
particular situation at hand, and which means should be taken to achieve that concrete
good. It is in this vein that Aquinas references Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue as
quod est habitus electivus in medietate consistens determinata ratione, prout sapiens
determinabit. 53 Prudence speaks to the “how” of an action, as well as to its where, when,
with whom, and so on.
For reaching the end of human life that is proportionate to our nature, the moral
virtue and practical wisdom that are acquired through repeated actions suffice. But for the
purpose of ultimately reaching perfect union with the Divine, charity and infused
prudence work together hand-in-hand: the theological virtue of charity conforms us to
God as the object of supernatural happiness, and infused prudence discerns the best
means to cling to and deepen this human-divine union. Thus in the life of grace, charity
disposes and directs us to God as ultimate end; the infused moral virtues dispose and
52
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direct us to all other ends, but in relation to God; and infused prudence disposes us to
choose, in the concrete situations of our lives, the best means for attaining the ends of the
other infused virtues, and for ordering all these ends to the ultimate end. 54
Theoretical and practical wisdom share a similarity of proportion. Reason and
will, in their raw power and in their formation by various virtues, are the twin sources of
human morality. The subject of all speculative intellectual virtues, including wisdom, is
the speculative intellect in relation to the agent intellect. The subject of prudence is the
practical intellect in relation to righteous will, since to have right reasoning concerning
things to be done requires proper inclination of the will to a good end. Or, in starker
terms, right judgment of a moral action depends on the will. And because a righteous will
orders all particular goods to the universal good, and prudence is right reason regarding
the due proportion of a particular good and the ordering of all particular goods to the
universal good, prudence wisely directs the other virtues insofar as it is informed by a
good will. 55
Through correct choice of the means, prudence helps direct all of our powers and
their perfections to the attainment of their proper ends as well as to the ultimate end,
happiness in God. In this way practical wisdom, which discerns the best means to
accomplish a given end and orders various ends to our ultimate end, helps us determine

Attention to the concrete, practical, particular conditions of virtuous decision and action is a hallmark of
Aquinas’ prudentia (which draws heavily on Aristotle’s phronesis) as well as Lonergan’s commonsense
judgments and judgments of value. For a fascinating sketch of how Lonergan’s account of commonsense
judgments (and their relation to judgments of value) might help clarify Aristotle’s phronesis, see Patrick H.
Byrne, “Phronesis and Commonsense Judgment: Aristotle and Lonergan on Moral Wisdom,” American
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71 (Supp. 1997): 163-177.
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the best way to acquire speculative wisdom in our particular circumstances. Prudence is
the servant of speculative wisdom, which contemplates our ultimate divine end. 56
The discernment of prudence, however, begins at a point further removed from
the first means chosen. As actions are contingent, singular events, the exercise of
prudence demands both particular principles in addition to universal ones. Parallel to the
natural habit of intellectus that furnishes us with the first principles used by reason in
speculative matters, the natural habit of intellect called synderesis is presupposed by
prudence and consists in universal principles of practical action.
As the first thing apprehended by speculative reason is being, the first thing
apprehended by practical reason is the good. And so the core of synderesis is the very
first, and remarkably simple, universal principle in ethical reasoning: do good and avoid
evil. 57 We have already seen that in speculative reason first principles are naturally
known and naturally given. But in the practical reason, principles are ends. The ends of
the moral virtues are naturally known and naturally given as the first principles of
practical reason in synderesis, analogous to the habit of intellectus. Just as science draws
conclusions from the first principles of the speculative intellect (intellectus), prudence
draws conclusions about the proper means from the first principles of the practical
reason, which are the ends of the moral virtues as appointed by the habit of synderesis.
Just as scientia is presupposed by intellectus, prudence presupposes synderesis, and
synderesis moves prudence. As a perfection of practical reason, prudence applies the

I-II, 66, 5, reply to 1; I-II, 57, 4, reply to 3.
Equally fundamental and practical is the particular principle of prudence, which is whatever particular
end is desired by the will at a given time.
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universal principles furnished by synderesis to practical matters, forming conclusions
about the best means to enact, here and now, toward the end willed. 58
Insofar as prudence guides the human self-governance that images God’s own self
and God commands the order of all things to God’s self, Aquinas thinks of human
prudence as providential and divine providence as (analogously) prudential. In God,
providence is the ratio of the good of order that is foreordained (and executed in God’s
wise governance) to obtain among created things. Because it is the function of prudence
to order things toward their proper ends and the ratio of this order is, in God, providence,
both prudence and providence can be appropriately said of God, as long as what is
uniquely human is stripped away from the divine predication. 59

4 Wisdom as Sacra Doctrina

Put simply, sacra doctrina treats the truths of revelation. Its subject-matter is first
and foremost God, but also includes creatures insofar as they are ordered to God as to
their original beginning and final end. The formal aspect or subject under which sacred
doctrine studies God is the divine light of revelation. So sacred doctrine covers not only
those truths that can in no manner be learned by human reason but also those
proportionate to natural inquiries. All are known in this science under the ratio of having
been revealed by God.

I-II, 58, 4, response; II-II, 47, 6, response, reply to 1 and reply to 3; I, 79, 12; II-II, 47, 6, response.
I, 22, 1 and I-II, 91, 2. For an interesting and perhaps urgent application of the Thomist notion of
prudence as providential, see Mary L. Hirschfeld, Aquinas on the Market: Toward a Humane Economy
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2018), 113-117.
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Sacred doctrine also diverges from other sciences insofar as its principles, while
not against reason, do not spring from reason as an ultimate source, as they do in all other
sciences. As there are many truths about God that God has revealed that are not
susceptible to proofs from reason, and the divine intervention of revelation casts a
different, transcendent light over even those truths that we can also know by reason, the
foundation of theology belongs to faith, the habit by which we assent to what transcends
our comprehension. Its principles are the articles of faith—distinct truths about God that
fit together into a whole. Some articles of faith, such as the mystery of the Trinity and the
Incarnation, are primary objects of faith, since they order us to eternal life directly.
Secondary objects of faith, which do not congeal into distinct articles, exist for the sake
of manifesting the primary objects. 60
The habit of science comes to be in us insofar as we draw true conclusions from
principles, and for Aquinas theology still does this. 61 Although believers do not see or
know the articles of faith in themselves in the way one knows that the whole is greater
than the part, they truly know them through an intellectual act of choice that assents to
them through the light of faith, which makes them “see” that they ought to believe them.
Thus Aquinas insists that whatever is based on these principles is as well-proved in the
II-II, 1, 5 and 6.
Aquinas’ classification of theology as scientia has, of course, been considerably amplified by Chenu’s La
Théologie comme science au XIII siècle, although the sixth chapter of the third edition does discuss
theology as wisdom (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957, 93-100). More recent discussions of sacra doctrina have also
shed brighter light on theology as sapientia. As examples, see Kieran Conley, A Theology of Wisdom
(Dubuque, IA: The Priory Press, 1963), 59-104; Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas
and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 27-34, 239-241, 139140; and Gilles Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom: The Summa theologiae as Spiritual Pedagogy (Toronto:
Pontificial Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2015); and Tomáš Machula, “Theology as Wisdom: Renaissance
and Modern Scholastic Commentaries on Aquinas,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 93:2
(2019): 211-225. This recognition of wisdom as a trademark of Aquinas’ theological framework seems to
be one moment within the larger movement of scholarship to reframe Aquinas as a theologian, a
Dominican, a saint rather than simply a philosophical genius: to read his vision of theology as an exercise
of faith accompanied by the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the infused moral virtues, for instance.
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eyes of the faithful as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in the eyes of
all.
A subalternated science borrows principles from a higher science but is ignorant
of their justification; it merely accepts these principles as facts, while the higher science
knows the reasons behind its principles. Sacred doctrine is a subalternated science par
excellence, since its principles are properly and fully known only in the light of the
science (knowledge) that God has of God’s self, and of the angels and saints, who see
God in God’s essence. 62
Among knowledge that can be gained through human effort, sacred doctrine is the
highest form of wisdom and wonderfully satisfies the three sapiential functions outlined
above: contemplate, judge, and order. From its contemplation of divinely revealed truth,
sacred doctrine judges and orders all other truths. As the First Truth is the cause of all
other truths, theology’s contemplation of God grounds judgments of all lesser truths. 63
Included in these lesser truths are the principles of the other sciences, which theology
judges but does not prove. As wisdom, sacra doctrina perceives the relation of all beings
of the universe to the Perfect Cause, and it sets everything in order to God as beginning
and end, especially the internal order of the articles of faith themselves (recall Thomas’
lament in the Prologue about the current disarray of theological teaching). 64

II-II, 1, 5, reply to 2; also see I, 1, 7, response; Super Boetium De Trinitate, 5.1, reply to 5.I, 1, article 2
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Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl, OP, Papers in Mediaeval
Studies 12 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1991), 85-98, especially 92-96.
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In sacra doctrina we contemplate the interconnections of revelation through the
lens of an “ordered simplicity,” 65 although we begin from the multiplicity of our senses
and only progressively grasp this unity. Like metaphysics, theological knowledge strives
to imitate the profound unity of its subject. But theology strives for a unified vision more
ardently, as it is, in us, quaedam impressio of the seamlessly one and ultimately simple
divine science, the self-knowledge of a deity whose knowledge is absolutely identical to
his self. 66
Teaching is also an indispensable dimension of theology understood as wisdom.
In the prologue to the Prima Pars, emblematic of the entire program of the Summa
theologiae, the Angelic Doctor sets his aim as the “instruction of beginners,” which
requires that truths about God be set in the order called for by divine truth itself. 67 And so
in the Summa’s schema, the consideration of God comes first, before the procession of
creatures from God; the divine processions are spoken of before the divine missions; the
discussion of who man is comes before the discussion of all the ways God reconciles us
to Herself.
Last but not last, rather than referring defense of its truth to a higher science, as do
the other sciences in relation to metaphysics, sacred doctrine directly fulfills the
defensive function of wisdom. Against those who would deny its principles, the
theologian does not demonstrate their truth as through a proof. But if the disputer admits
any truth in revelation, the sacred scientist can offer a persuasive argument in its defense
Kieran Conley, A Theology of Wisdom, 97.
I, 1, 3, reply to 2; SCG, book 2, ch. 4, no. 5.
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Recall that to proclaim the truth and to refute error constitute the dual mission of the “wise man” in the
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by arguing from scripture or from an article of faith that is accepted. If the disputer does
not accept revelation, then the theologian can at least show that the objection is false. 68
One who contemplates the order of the universe and its ultimate end is in a
privileged position to lead others to God. It is incumbent upon the “wise man” to teach
these ultimate truths and to defend them against errors, 69 since the very reality of world
order—in which we must labor for the salvation of our neighbors—calls for our
contemplation to overflow into action. Christ himself gave to us, through teaching and
preaching, the fruits of his contemplation. While wisdom’s act of contemplation may be
superior to the corporality of more active gestures, a whole life lived in imitation of
Christ and out of love for others reshapes the office of sapientia to include teaching,
preaching, and correcting. 70

I, 1, 8. Again, as Aquinas makes clear in his assertion of the superiority of sapientia vis-à-vis intellectus
and scientia, it is precisely wisdom’s relationship to principles that makes it almost intrinsically
transcendent, even in its “natural” form. This unique relationship is doubly so in the case of sacra doctrina.
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5 Wisdom as Gift of the Spirt

Theoretically, in terms of human nature itself, we can approach naturally
proportionate happiness through the natural virtues. But we need grace, infused virtues,
the theological virtues, and the gifts of the Spirit in this life to approach the
disproportionate end of supernatural beatitude, even if it will be realized fully only in the
next life.
To be moved by God requires that we be in union with God, just as the movement
of an instrument by an artist requires some sort of contact with that instrument. We are
created for the sake of perfect union with God but cannot attain it without the healing and
elevating action of sanctifying grace. Consequent upon grace are the theological virtues
of faith, hope, and charity, which achieve this primal union of humanity and God, and out
of this union spring the gifts.
Aquinas holds that all human action, whether internal or external, flow from two
principles: human reason and divine goodness. The moral virtues perfect our appetites in
such a way that they become obediently receptive to the motions of our reason, but we
stand in need of a completely distinct and independent habit to perfect all of our powers
in obediential receptivity to the motions of the Spirit. If we are to become receptive,
sensitive, and responsive to God, natural virtues do not suffice, since a more perfect
mover requires a more perfect disposition to connect divine agent and human patient.
Surprisingly, even reason informed by the theological virtues—which have God
in God’s self as their end—is insufficient for the perfection of the life of grace. For the
and infused wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit, and their similarities and differences (38-47; 81-89-121128, respectively).
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full abundance of salvation, the acts of the theological virtues must be supported by the
gifts of the Spirit, which are dispositions that correspond to direct, perfect, unique
“promptings” of God. These dispositions are called “divine virtues” not because they
direct us to our supernatural end, since the theological virtues achieve this as well, but
because they direct us to our supernatural end in a perfect and divine manner. 71
In the life of grace, our faculties are not merely or solely passive, even if the
connaturality induced by charity and joined to judgment in the gift of wisdom empowers
us to suffer divine things. 72 The gifts are habits within us, disposing us to divine motion
from without. While bearing a direct telos to divine inspiration, they are still our own
dispositions, just as through the theological virtue of charity the will is moved by the
Spirit to an act of love in such a way that the will remains the efficient cause of the act.
And just as the infused virtues regard the same general matters as their natural
counterpart, the gifts of the Spirit perfect our faculties in all the same spheres of being
and action in which the virtues perfect us, but according to a supernatural end and (more
critically) according to a supernatural motion—“the divine instinct” (instinctus Spiritus
Sancti). 73
Aquinas holds that these same spheres of being and action, focused around the
various faculties, lend proper material to the various gifts as they are laid out in Isaiah 11:
2-3. The two activities of reason are understanding and judgment, and each pertains to
both speculative and practical reason. The speculative gift of understanding penetrates
into the hidden heart of divine things in accord with a supernatural light (“the light of
71
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grace”), just as the natural light of the agent intellect grounds the habit of intellectus.
Faith assents to the divine truth while the gift of understanding grasps the meaning of
divine truth, through being enlightened by a motion of the Spirit. The gifts of wisdom and
science (knowledge) complete the intellectual trifecta of speculative gifts of the Spirit,
because the gift of science helps us judge human things under direct inspiration of the
Spirit, and wisdom helps us judge divine things not just by direct inspiration of the Spirit
but also by connaturality with divine things. 74
As with all other gifts, the gift of wisdom emanates from the union with God
made possible by grace and solidified by the theological virtues. But Aquinas describes
the gift of wisdom in unique terms, contending that it exercises judgment according to
connaturality with divine things. From a union of connaturality it reaches speculative
aims—a contemplation of the truth of God’s being and right judgment about divine
things—as well as practical aims—the application of “divine rules” to temporal matters, a
reference to the ordering function of wisdom. Taken as a whole, the gift of wisdom
empowers us to judge rightly about divine things by connaturality with the divine, and to
judge rightly about other things by ordering them to the knowledge born of this union.
If wisdom judges rightly about divine things by connaturality, it only achieves this
connaturality through the theological virtue of charity. Faith is belief in what is not seen
and hope is desire for that which is not yet fully possessed. In contrast, the very presence
of God is given to us in the gift of charity: caritas autem semper habet praesentem Deum,
quem amat. 75 By informing our will with a supernatural alignment to God’s own will, the
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habit of charity is the formal principle of a supernatural act of love that clings to God for
God’s sake. 76
While charity is an effect of the Triune God as united, charity can be appropriated
to the Third Person of the Trinity, since the Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son as
Love. In addition to Love, the Third Person of the Trinity is given the personal and
proper name of Gift. The Spirit is the absolute first love, through which all other gifts are
given; “Gift” denotes the Spirit’s relation to the Father and the Son as to an origin.
Appropriately, the Gift of the Spirit overflows, into us, as the gifts of the Spirit. And so
whoever has charity, by which the Holy Spirit dwells in us, has all of the gifts. 77
Since connaturality with divine things comes from charity, which is in the will, the gift of
wisdom has its cause in the will but its essence in the intellect, which is made
sympathetic to the mind of God through this “divine virtue” of judgment. 78 For all of
these reasons, Aquinas chooses to align the gift of wisdom with the theological virtue of
charity: scire autem ipsas res creditas secundum seipsas per quandam unionem ad ipsas
pertinet ad donum sapientiae, so that donum sapientiae magis respondet caritati, quae
unit mentem hominis Deo. 79
While speculative wisdom and the gift of wisdom both enable judgment about
divine things, one is acquired through human effort, while the other is received as a gift
from God. But speculative wisdom and charity are alike in their preeminence respective
to other virtues in the same genus: wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues, and
I, 1, 6, reply to 3; II-II, 45, 4, response; II-II, 23, 2.
I, 37, 1, response; II-II, 1, 8, reply to 5; II-II, 23, 3, reply to 3; I, 38, 1; I-II, 68, 5, reply. Here, as in other
places in which he discusses the gifts, Aquinas quotes Romans 5:5, a passage that will become equally
important in Lonergan’s theology of grace: “And hope does not disappoint us, because God’s love has been
poured out into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who was given to us.”
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charity is the greatest of the theological virtues. As knowledge of the highest causes,
wisdom directs the other intellectual virtues and is superior to all of the other natural
virtues in its object. Likewise, charity directs all the other virtues to its own end, which is
union with the divine. Because the form of an act is taken from its end, and charity moves
all virtuous activity to a friendship-communion of love between the soul and God, charity
is the form of all virtuous acts.
Aquinas links the gift of wisdom not only with charity but also with the virtue of
faith, the fruit of faith, the seventh beatitude, and the gift of fear. All four of these
connections are forged through either the considering, judging, or ordering functions of
the sapiential gift. Faith assents to the divine truth while the gift of wisdom judges
according to divine truth. 80 Since certitude belongs to the perfection of the intellect, and
wisdom is the utmost perfection of the intellect, he designates the certitude of faith as the
fruit of the Spirit’s gift of wisdom. Aquinas defines a “fruit of the Spirit” as an ultimate
and delightful virtuous deed which the Divine Gift kindles within us, and whatever is
ultimate and delightful has the character of an end. The practical task of the gift of
wisdom—direction of human life according to “divine reasons”—exists for the sake of its
speculative task, the contemplation of God as Eternal Law and the judgment of divine
things according to the connaturality born of charity. Thus the fruit of wisdom, which is
the certitude of the divine things known through this sapiential gift, aligns with its own
end as a perfection of the intellect. The virtue of faith precedes the gift of wisdom, but the

80

II-II, 45, 1, reply to 2.
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gift of wisdom, in turn, germinates in the intellect a heightened sense of certitude (the
fruit of faith) about the articles of faith grasped by the theological virtue. 81
According to Aquinas, “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called
children of God” is a perfect fulfillment of the gift of wisdom. The first part of the
beatitude depends on the ordering function of wisdom—peace is the result of due order.
And since it pertains to the treatment of ourselves and others, it epitomizes the blessing of
the active life. Because the wise live their relationship with themselves and with others in
a rightly ordered way, and peace is “the tranquility of order” according to Augustine, the
wise create peace and are made happy by it, since peace is inevitably coupled with joy. 82
To make peace in oneself or among others manifests our divine calling, since the Father
is a God of unity and peace.
Such a Father promises us, as a reward, the glory of becoming children of God,
because divine filiation consists in the perfect union with God that is the charityenflamed gift of “consummate wisdom,” 83 because we become more and more like
children of God by participating in the likeness of the only-begotten and natural Son of
God, who is Wisdom Begotten. This likeness reaches all the way back to creation and is
recapitulated by grace. 84 As the Word expresses the Father’s knowledge not only of
God’s self but of all creatures, this Wisdom that is conceived from the Father is

II-II, 112, 5, reply to 2; II-II, 8, 8, reply to 3; I-II, 70, 1, 2, and 3; II-II, 8, 8, response; II-II, 8, 8, reply to
3; I-II, 70, 3, reply to 3.
82
I-II, 70, 3, response; II-II, 45, 6, response.
83
I-II, 69, 4, response.
84
III, 3, 8, response. This same relationship between God’s wisdom and creatures is expressed by the
notion of ars as well as lex. God’s wisdom is the art from which creatures proceed and by which creatures
are ordered to God and to one another; eternal law is Divine Wisdom’s governance of all created things,
and the Son is eternal law by appropriation. See I, 22, 2 and 3; I-II, 91, 1; I-II, 93, 1; I-II, 93, 4, reply to 2.
For more on how the Word as God’s Wisdom Incarnate is the structuring principle of the content of sacra
doctrina and the pedagogical program of the Summa, see Mongeau, Embracing Wisdom, 116-117, 132-133,
and 141-143.
81
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similitudo exemplaris totius creaturae. 85 And it by this Word’s union with humanity in
the Incarnation that the rational creature is re-ordered toward its participation in divine
perfection, for the Word is conceptus aeternae sapientiae from whom human wisdom
(the perfection of the rational creature) is derived.
It is Uncreated Wisdom that reaches out to us in gift, first uniting us with itself in
the gift of charity and then revealing to us divine mysteries in the gift of wisdom. The gift
of wisdom places us at the very center, beautiful and magnificent, of the relationship
between Son and Spirit. The gift of wisdom is initiated in charity, which makes us share
in the likeness of the Spirit, but this is the Spirit of Christ and the Spirit of our adoption,
who gives us the likeness of Begotten Wisdom, the natural Son. 86 This likeness goes
beyond the invisible missions of the Son and Spirit to encompass the visible mission of
the Son as well, for in revealing to us what he has known from the Father (John 15:15),
Jesus shares his wisdom with us and thereby makes us his friends. 87
And so the Spirit’s gift of wisdom, while a motion from the Spirit within us, is
appropriated to the Son. Again, by sharing in the divine filiation of the Son, we become
sons and daughters of God and thereby approach to a glorious likeness of God. Because it
moves us closer to the “consummation by glory,” the gift of wisdom is associated more
closely with the contemplative life, although its guidance of human actions by the divine

Notice the reference in III, 3, 8 to 1 Cor. 1:18-25 and see Super Epistolas Sancti Pauli Lectura, 243.
Aquinas even goes so far as to describe the virtue of charity as a created likeness of the Holy Spirit and
the gift of wisdom as a created likeness of the Son, whose is naturally Begotten Wisdom. But because we
share in the Spirit in a special way by charity, and charity gives rises to the gift of wisdom, it is from the
Spirit that we receive the likeness of Begotten Wisdom. See II-II, 23, 3, reply to three; II-II, 24, 5, reply to
three; and II-II, 45, 6 reply to 1.
87
Lectura super Ioannem, ch. 15, lect. 3 (no. 2016). Cf. SCG book 1, ch. 2, no. 1, where Aquinas says that
wisdom makes us more like God, drawing us closer to God in friendship.
85
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motions of the Spirit, who helps us refer all of our actions to Divine Wisdom, can still be
considered a practical aim. 88
Perhaps because the gift of wisdom has its cause in the union of lover and beloved
effected by charity, and love is the harbinger of joy, peace, and delight, the gift of
wisdom has an intrinsic relation to the will, the emotions, and the senses, unlike the
intellectual virtue. Aquinas affirms the etymological Latin tradition around sapientia as
being connected with sapor, sweetness, because wisdom is caused by charity and thus
imbued with the sweetness of love. The saturation of wisdom with love makes all of our
labors on behalf of Divine Wisdom sweet. 89

6 Divine Wisdom

The way sacred doctrine goes about naming God is inseparable from its
knowledge of God, since our ability to name only goes so far as our ability to understand.
Aquinas insists that we cannot know the essence of God in this life, but that ignorance
does not exclude any positive knowledge at all. Although what God is not is clearer to us
than what God is, we can still know some things concerning what God is, both through
natural reason and through revelation. Aquinas is altogether clear on the fact that we
know God in at least three ways (triplex via): from causation, which signifies the relation
of creature as effects to God; from negation, which signifies creatures’ distance from God

II-II, 1, 8, reply to 5; I-II, 69, 3; II-II, 45, 6, response, reply to 1 and reply to 2.
II-II, 45, 6, reply to 2; II-II, 45, 8, reply to 3; II-II, 45, 2, reply to 1 and reply to 2; II-II, 45, 3, reply to 3.
For commentary on the uniquely affective elements of infused wisdom, see Conley, A Theology of Wisdom,
124-126; Francis Cunningham, The Indwelling of the Trinity (Dubuque, IA: Priory Press, 1955), 202, 352354; and Jacques Maritain, Distinguer pour unir ou Les degrés du savoir (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer,
1932), 24-25, 484, 512, 517, 521, 863.
88
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and God’s transcendence above the order of creation; and from excellence, which
signifies the higher way that creaturely perfections preexist in God. 90
Since God is absolutely and universally perfect, God preposseses all creaturely
perfections in God’s self. In the act of creation, God communicates divinely infinite
perfections to creation, but each being receives the effect of this communication
according to its own imperfect mode and capacity. Each creature represents God through
its perfections, which are like God in some way, but are inadequate to anything remotely
approaching a complete or perfect representation. 91 Predication by preeminence truly
signifies the divine substance, but does so imperfectly because of the imperfect way
creatures participate the perfections of the Deity.
We know from scripture that God is wise, but we can interpret this proposition in
different ways. The way of causation would tell us that God causes wisdom in his rational
creatures; while this is true, it does not tell us much about God’s own wisdom. And since
nothing is predicated of God and creatures univocally, our own wisdom may not
adequately reflect God’s. In turn, the way of negation might instruct us that God is not
wise in the way that we are wise, or that no foolishness exists in God. While these things
are true, they do not solidify into much of a starting point for further discursive reasoning
on God’s attributes. But the way of excellence tells us that God’s wisdom is absolutely
perfect; all creaturely wisdom is a participated wisdom. The way of eminence opens up

I, 13, 1, reply to 2; I, 13, 3; I, 1, 9, reply to 3. Aquinas argues that the third way of naming God, from the
excellence of things, most closely aligns with substantial predication, since it tells us most about what God
is like, although with an element of unlikeness as well.
91
I, 4, 3; I, 6, 1, reply to 2.
90
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further discussion, inviting us to ask in what ways exactly God’s wisdom exceeds
creatures’, and in what ways we fall short of divine wisdom. 92
With these different kinds of predication in mind, we can better understand why
Aquinas holds that wisdom is an essential attribute in God rather than a notional one,
whereby we predicate something of one Person of the Trinity in oppositional-relational
distinction from another Person. Absolute properties or essential attributes pertain to the
essence of God. But because the Persons of the Holy Trinity are distinguished only by
opposed relations of origin, and the relations are truly identical with the divine essence,
only those attributes which do not pertain to a relation of origin are absolute properties in
distinction from proper attributes or personal notions. 93 Essential attributes express
absolutely the divine essence, the one nature in which all three Persons share. A proper
attribute (also called a personal notion) belongs only to one Person.
Everything that does not denote a relation in God is said absolutely of the divine
essence. Wisdom is not one of the relations in God; it is an essential attribute. Since in
God essence and existence and attributes are all one and the same divine act, the divine
essence itself is preeminent wisdom, and the wisdom which makes us formally wise is a
share in God’s own wisdom. 94

I, 13, 2, response; I, 13, 5. In all of its forms, including divine, wisdom is a perfection of the intellect, but
intellect is not in us and in God univocally (I, 32, 1, reply to 2). Additionally, any predication involving
wisdom is liable to the same imperfection that Aquinas admits for divine predication at large: what we are
seeking to understand surpasses our language (excedentem nominis significationem). As Rudi Te Velde
writes, “The name ‘wise’, when applied to God, leaves the thing signified (that is, God’s wisdom)
uncomprehended.” See Aquinas on God: The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae (Hants, England:
Ashgate, 2006), 105.
93
Of course, since the divine essence is really the same as the divine relations, it is perfectly acceptable
(and necessary, for the sake of our knowledge) to predicate essential attributes of the three Persons, as
mentioned below (I, 39, 3, 4 and 5).
94
II-II, 23, 2, reply to 1.
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While wisdom is an essential attribute of God, it can also be appropriated, without
any contradiction or confusion, to each of the Persons of the Holy Trinity. 95
Appropriation is the manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the essential
attributes. Thus moving from knowledge of essential attributes to a knowledge of
personal properties is made possible by revelation, which initially discloses Triune
mystery.
In addition, we also look to the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures
for knowledge of the three Persons. 96 Predicated as a concrete name, the Father, Son, and
Spirit are each said to be wise; predicated as an abstract name, the Father is wisdom, the
Son is wisdom, and the Spirit is wisdom. We can even say that the Son, who is essence
and wisdom, is from the Father, who is essence and wisdom. 97
But Aquinas must account for St. Paul’s declaration that “Christ is the wisdom of
God” (1 Cor. 1:24), as well as for various other authorities in Christian tradition that
appropriate wisdom to the Son in a special way. Aquinas explicates this traditional
appropriation thus: sapientia vero similitudinem habet cum filio caelesti, inquantum est
verbum, quod nihil aliud est quam conceptus sapientiae. 98 The distinction of Three
Persons is grounded in only two processions: one by way of the intellect, which is the
procession of the Word or Son, and another by way of the will, which is the procession of
I, 32, 1, reply to 1. This is not the same, however, as something being both an essential and a notional
attribute in God, which does obtain in the case of “to love,” which is said of God both essentially and
notionally. Wisdom is said of each of the Persons of the Trinity, and especially of the Son, through
appropriation, not by notional attribution.
96
I, 39, 8, response.
97
The statement that the Son proceeds as “wisdom from wisdom,” however, could potentially be
misleading, since the wisdom of God is God’s essence, and it is false to say that “Essence begot essence.”
For this reason, Aquinas suggests that in cases of confusion, abstract names should be explained by
concrete names, or preferably even by personal names (I, 39, 5, response and reply to 1). Interestingly,
Lonergan indirectly comments on the possibility of sapientia genita existing in the Godhead but quickly
qualifies this expression for the same reasons just mentioned. See CWL 2: 99 and n. 201.
98
I, 39, 8, response.
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Love or Spirit. In the intelligible emanation of the word, from an act of understanding a
conception of the thing understood proceeds, and this conception is called a word. 99
In the Father’s speaking of the Word, there is the relation of the principle of the
Word to the Word Himself. So “to speak” is a notional term as to speak is to produce a
Word, but to understand is an essential attribute in God, because it does not signify
relation to the Word that proceeds. By the Word, or the Son, the Father speaks Himself
and all God’s creatures. The personal notion of the Word is to be spoken by the Father.
Inherent also in the Word is the relation of the Word to the thing expressed by the Word,
which is the Father and all that the Father understands, including the Word. In one simple
act God understands all things, including God’s self; all that is understood by God is
expressed in the begotten Word. 100
If the essence of wisdom is knowledge of the highest cause, and there can be no
cause higher than God’s own self, then God’s knowledge of God’s self, which is spoken
by the Father as a Word, is wisdom in a preeminent way. In this way the Son can be
called “wisdom begotten.” 101 This special appropriation of divine wisdom to the Son
carries over into His invisible mission in those who come to know and love Him. Both
the Son and the Spirit are sent in and by the gift of grace, which both kindles our love and
illuminates our intellect. As an effect of grace, we are assimilated to the Spirit by the
ardor of charity and participate in this property of the Spirit. In yet another effect of

I, 27, 1, response; I, 37, 1, response; I, 27, I, 3 and 5.
I, 37, 1, response; I, 37, 1, reply to 2; I, 14, 7, response.
101
I, 37, 1, response. Cf. the prologue of Super Boetium De Trinitate.
99
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grace, we are assimilated to the Son by the illumination of wisdom and participate in this
property of the Son. 102
Despite the appropriation of divine wisdom to the Son, “to be wise” is still taken
essentially, not notionally, for wisdom in itself does not necessarily imply either
begetting or speaking, or even being begotten or being spoken. Wisdom is not an
essential act of God. And because “to be wise” is not said notionally, it is not true that the
Father is wise by the Son. 103

7 Summary: Wisdom in Aquinas as Foundational, Consummate, Normative, and
Unitive

When all variations of Thomist wisdom are taken into account, a common core of
meaning surfaces: in each instance, sapientia seems to bear foundational, consummate,
normative, and unifying roles in Thomas’ account of knowledge. Without repeating
details about each type of wisdom, the common core of meaning that belongs to each can
be outlined in broad form as follows. In its foundational objective, Thomist wisdom
considers God as the ontological principle of all reality and selects the meaning of the
basic terms that compose the first principles of knowledge. Wisdom is consummate, since
its grasp of highest causes is the highest actuation of human knowledge and union with
its divine object is the final end of humanity. In its normative objective, the wisdom of
the philosopher defends first principles against objections and judges the conclusions of
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See I, 43, 5, replies to 1 and 2; I, 93, 7 and 8; and For commentary on this “assimilation” in relation to
the Father as well, see Gilles Emery’s Trinity in Aquinas (Ypsilanti, MI: Sapientia Press, 2003), 161-163.
103
In contrast, we can say that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, because in God
“to love” is taken both essentially and notionally. Taken essentially, we say that the Father and the Son love
each other by their divine essence (I, 37, 2, response).
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all other sciences as lower effects of the highest cause; the wisdom of the theologian
judges the authenticity of other truth claims against the truths of the faith which it
contemplates. In its unifying objective, wisdom orders all beings and truths within a
cogent universe where the Highest Cause (in the case of metaphysics) and the loving and
merciful Triune God (in the case of theology) is regarded as principle and end of all
things.
As will be seen in Chapter Two, the early transposition of Thomist wisdom into
Lonergan’s cognitional anthropology is relatively straightforward, as he makes explicit
mention of wisdom in both Verbum and Insight. In later works, however, it is more
difficult to substantiate further transposition, as prolonged reflection on wisdom begins to
subside. But by searching out the fourfold rubric of Aquinas’ original “sapiential
functionality” explained above, the basic contours of Thomist wisdom can still be clearly
detected in Method (Chapter Four) as well as post-Method works (Chapter Five).
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Chapter Two: Sapientia in the Quest for Cognitional Foundations: Epistemological
and Metaphysical Dimensions of Wisdom in Verbum and Insight (1940-1957)
It is an understatement to say that the first stage of Lonergan’s intellectual
development, which Doran sets from 1940 (the completion of Lonergan’s dissertation,
Gratia operans) 104 to 1957 (the date of publication of Insight), is more straightforward to
identify than to master. The one major theme tying all of Lonergan’s publications
together during this period is the formation and clarification of his position on “the
subject as knower.” Yet this subject wears quite different colors in 1940 than even in
1953, when Insight for all practical purposes was finished. The first portion of this period
is dominated by what Lonergan himself describes as his eleven-year apprenticeship to
Aquinas, and the two major works of the 1940s, Gratia operans (1940) and the Verbum
articles (1946-1949), have him producing deeply theological primary interpretations of
Aquinas. But in the very last sentence of the Epilogue of Insight, Lonergan gives a
startling piece of advice for anyone hoping to accurately interpret the Angelic Doctor:

104

The relatively straightforward Aristotelian metaphysics and correspondent faculty psychology
surrounding wisdom in this early text are clearly lifted straight from Aquinas’ integration of Aristotle.
Emphasized throughout is the role of divine wisdom as the rule of human righteousness. Here Lonergan
raises the question of how we can live up to this measure without an externally violent and, because only
external, ultimately superficial intervention by God. The metaphysical notion of habit comes to the rescue.
The potency in us most in need of determination and perfection by divine wisdom is the will, and with
grace received in this faculty as habit, the external rule of rectitude that is divine wisdom becomes the
“inherent form” empowering the will’s right operation. In Lonergan’s estimation, later development in
Aquinas’ theory of operative grace sees the need “to add divine motions to infused grace,” for our highest
perfection cannot be immanent habits like moral virtues or even infused grace (CWL 1: 46). Rather,
ultimate righteousness consists in connaturality with such divine motions, a connaturality endowed through
the gifts of the Holy Spirit that elevate us to the level of the Spirit’s own wisdom. Interestingly, there is no
hint in 1940 that the traditional Thomist conception of wisdom is about to undergo a radical revision as it
keeps pace with Lonergan’s quickening steps toward interiority.
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“…I would say that it is only through a personal appropriation of one’s own rational selfconsciousness that one can hope to reach the mind of Aquinas.” 105
In the 1940 texts Lonergan seems like a metaphysical fish in medieval waters,
completely immersed in the metaphysical technicalities of object, potency, habit, act,
essence, and so on. Not surprisingly then, in these two early works wisdom is
predominantly spoken of as a perfection of the speculative intellect, enabling us to judge
rightly the order of the whole universe by reducing all truths to their ultimate cause and
through this cause, to know universal reality. 106
By the completion of Insight in 1953, however, Lonergan’s account of knowledge
expressly begins with knowing considered as a rationally conscious activity whose
phenomenon, at least in the beginning, can be bracketed from metaphysical positions and
whose validity, from beginning to end, is ultimately anchored in self-appropriation. When
objectified, self-appropriation yields a cognitional theory, and in later chapters of Insight
cognitional theory is opened further to reveal a metaphysics of proportionate being.
But exactly how does wisdom emerge in a more cognitional light in 1953
compared to its more traditional metaphysical account in the 1940s? This particular
question cannot be answered sufficiently apart from the more general question of
Lonergan’s position on the subject as a knower. As the representative culmination of
Lonergan’s quest to know “the subject as knower” and to invite his readers to know
themselves as knowers, it is Insight’s vision of the subject as an experiencing,
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See Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected
Works of Bernard Lonergan 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1992), 770. Hereafter Insight is cited as
CWL 3.
106
See Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works
of Bernard Lonergan 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1997), 78-82. Hereafter Verbum is cited as CWL
2.
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understanding, judging seeker of truth that serves as the retrospective keystone by which
we must judge the developmental thrust of earlier works. 107

1 Verbum

The Verbum articles, composed from 1946 through 1949, marks the formal
initiation of Lonergan’s ongoing transposition of Thomist wisdom as self-appropriation.
In keeping with the metaphysical framework, 108 Lonergan analyzes the habit of wisdom
by studying its act—the act of judgment (also called compositio vel divisio, or assent)
proceeding from the act of reflective understanding. Accordingly, Lonergan understands
the habit of wisdom, the act of reflective understanding, and the act of judgment as the
relationship among habit (first act), second act, and the act that proceeds from act. 109
Henceforth everything that Lonergan says about wisdom in Verbum dovetails with

Considered from the opposite direction, then, we read Lonergan’s pre-1953 philosophical and
theological positions as all bearing a certain telos toward a more comprehensive and nuanced treatment in
Insight. And so because Insight does contain an explicitly acknowledged and developed cognitional theory,
epistemology, and metaphysics, we read the earlier texts with an eye toward these interrelations to better
understand how Lonergan’s thought developed on these topics in relation to wisdom, not necessarily
because those exact distinctions among the three can be found in earlier texts like Verbum. As the analysis
proceeds, it will become more and more clear why these three categories are so important in any discussion
of Lonergan’s conception of wisdom.
108
It bears noting that Lonergan insists that what Aquinas really meant by intelligere and the verbum that
proceeds from it can only be properly understood by adverting to our own acts of understanding and
judgment, and so he starts his study of word in Aquinas “not from the metaphysical framework, but from
the psychological content of Thomist theory of intellect” (59), which would seem to contradict my
contention. However, the fact that Lonergan begins with “introspective psychological data” (60)—
represented here by two specific types of cognitional acts, the act of definition from direct act of
understanding (Chapter One) and the act of judgment from reflective act of understanding (Chapter Two)—
does not mean that he prioritizes cognitional theory over metaphysics in Verbum in the way that he does in
later works, such as Insight, or even that his analysis of these two types of inner word in Verbum is
primarily cognitional rather than metaphysical. The relationship between cognitional theory and
metaphysics in Verbum is one of tight interdependence (see CWL 2: 105).
109
CWL 2: 78.
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judgment, beginning with a close analysis of the link between wisdom and judgment in
Aquinas.

1.1 Wisdom as Metaphysics

As already witnessed, Aquinas’ notion of wisdom primarily regards the objective
order of reality, for wisdom is the virtue of right judgment, and it is only through accurate
judgments that we properly know reality. Aquinas’ very definition of wisdom links it
with metaphysics, since it belongs to the speculative science of metaphysics to study the
real as real, and it is through judgment that we reach the real. First principles and ultimate
causes are the object of wisdom; as metaphysics, wisdom studies “something of which
the reality is most real and the truth most true.” 110
It also belongs to the habit of wisdom to choose and validate the correct concept
of ens—the foundational concept of metaphysics. The habit of understanding grasps the
first principles of demonstrations. 111 But these first principles of demonstrations are only
as valid as their component terms. 112 In turn, these component terms are, in fact, the first
principles of reality—the concept of being and directly related concepts—and as such are

CWL 2: 82. Taken together, all of the characteristics of wisdom mentioned in this paragraph are what
Coelho calls the “metaphysical aspect of wisdom” or simply “metaphysical wisdom,”110 and in the
summary of Verbum that follows I use his shorthand.
111
CWL 2: 80: “Where Aquinas spoke of the habits of intellect, science, and wisdom, we were led to
distinguish between direct understanding, the development of direct understanding, and reflective
understanding.”
112
Remember that in Aquinas’ triadic scheme of the speculative intellectual virtues (understandingscience-wisdom), which Lonergan follows closely throughout Verbum, it is by the habit of science that we
are able to properly draw conclusions from premises and thus generate knowledge. But demonstrations
cannot be traced back in infinite regress. Thus there exist two habits that deal with first principles: intellect
(understanding), which grasps the first principles of demonstrations, and wisdom, which grasps the first
principles of reality (CWL 2: 78-80 and 82).
110
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chosen and validated by the habit of wisdom. 113 Wisdom as a science is first and
foremost metaphysical, identical with what Aristotle called first philosophy: “the wise
man contemplates the universal scheme of things and sees each in the perspective of its
causes right up to the ultimate cause.” 114

1.2 Wisdom as Epistemology

Sapientia also passes judgment on the validity of the connections between
principles and conclusions drawn in demonstrations by the development of direct
understanding in science (scientia). In this way, reflective understanding (sapientia) also
regards the transition from the order of thought to the order of reality, and so Lonergan
argues that wisdom is not solely metaphysical; it also possesses “some of the
characteristics of an epistemology.” 115 It will soon be clear that Lonergan’s discovery of
the epistemological moment within wisdom marks a shift in Verbum from the
metaphysical Thomist account of wisdom as habit of right judgment to a more
psychological 116 account of wisdom as a method of psychological introspection that
culminates in normative self-knowledge (what Lonergan summarizes as “wisdom
through self-knowledge” 117).

Lonergan gives the concepts of not-being and whole and part as examples of the “other concepts that
flow from the concept of being.” CWL 2: 97; also 82, n. 113.
114
CWL 2: 79. Also 78 n. 81, 80-81, 83, 99.
115
CWL 2: 79. Taken together, these characteristics are what Coelho calls the “epistemological aspect” of
wisdom or simply “epistemological wisdom,”115 and in the summary of Verbum that follows I will use his
shorthand. See Hermeneutics and Method, 21, 23, 26-28, 40-43, 47, 74, 77, 95, 132, 203, 208, 212.
116
In the context of Verbum, Lonergan defines “psychological” as being “derived from the character of acts
of understanding” (CWL 2: 56).
117
CWL 2: 101.
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The epistemological aspect of wisdom, which Lonergan finds embedded
underneath the metaphysical aspect in both Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ accounts, comes to
light in his identification of judgment (and thus wisdom) as rationally reflective
understanding. “Rational” and “reflective” might be read as trademarks of Lonergan’s
conception of both understanding and judgment—the twin hearts of his cognitional
foundations in Verbum and all subsequent works. Lonergan’s exploration of the rational
and reflective nature of judgment will become the linchpin of his eventual identification
of wisdom with self-appropriation. The reflective and rational nature of judgment is seen
most clearly in relation to the act of direct understanding.
It is the act of direct understanding that generates the inner word of definition,
grasping and expressing the quod quid est of which the spirit wonders and inquires.
Pulling from its external source in sensitive impressions and its internal source in
intellectual light, the act of insight effects a synthesis of intelligibilities, a mental unity
that may or may not correspond to a real unity. We need judgment to know whether the
mental composition effected by insight corresponds to real composition in the thing.
Reflective understanding asks critical questions about these compositions, leading to the
resolutio in principia, the process by which the mind returns—that is, reflects—from
mental syntheses to their sources in sense and in intellectual light. 118 This resolution is
the reflective and critical act of understanding (intelligere) from which proceeds the
speaking of the inner word (dicere verbum) of compositio vel diviso (judgment). 119
Inasmuch as the inner word of assent proceeds from sufficient grounds precisely
because they are known to be sufficient, the verbum of judgment is an act of rational
CWL 2: 76-77 and 79-87.
CWL 2: 60. Interestingly, both direct understanding (the act of insight) and reflective understanding (the
act of judgment) are characterized by Lonergan as reflective.
118
119
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consciousness. Lonergan tells us that “the reflective act generates in judgment the
expression of consciously possessed truth through which reality is both known and
known to be known.” 120
If judgment is both reflective and rational, acting as the “gate” through which we
know reality, then wisdom as the greatest perfection of judgment constitutes the highest
point of rational reflection. 121 By extension, wisdom can be considered as identical to
what Lonergan calls “epistemological reflection.” 122 At this juncture a tangle of questions
regarding Thomist epistemology suddenly enters the scene. We might summarize this
epistemological conundrum in the form of three questions: what exactly is the basis of
judgment’s awareness of its own sufficiency; how exactly does this awareness of
sufficiency come about; how is it that judgment effectively makes the transition from
knowledge as a perfection to knowledge as of the other and from the order of thought to
the order of reality? 123 Lonergan’s answer, as interpreted from a variety of Aquinas’ texts
but especially De veritate, solves all of these problems in terms of intellectual light.
Intellectual light is a crucial category that serves ontological, psychological, and
epistemological roles all in service to Lonergan’s emerging foundations. Intellectual light
is interpreted from an ontological angle to answer the first question; from a psychological
angle to answer the second question; and from an epistemological angle to answer the
third question.
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First, what exactly is the basis of judgment’s awareness of its own sufficiency? In
Lonergan’s reading of Aquinas on judgment, it is intellectual light—interpreted here as
an ontological category—that underlies the reflectively rational nature of judgment. If it
is intellectual light that provides the evidence and motive by which intellectus grasps first
principles and by which all knowledge unfolding from scientia is already ours in seminal
form, then even more so does intellectual light shine forth in sapientia, whose most
fundamental function is to know being from not-being. 124 In his reading of Aquinas’ De
malo, Lonergan finds that intelligible species brings to perfection our power of direct
understanding, by which we come to possess “apprehensions of things” 125 (insights). But
our power of reflective understanding (judgment) is brought to perfection by intellectual
light itself, by which we resolve insights into first principles and then pass judgment upon
such insights. 126
But for Lonergan, judgment is also a rational act of consciousness inasmuch as it
proceeds from and in virtue of intellectual light. As rational, it is “the self-expression of
the self-possessed act of [reflective] understanding” 127 that grasps its own conditions as
judgment. The inner word of judgment proceeds not just as a proportionate effect from a
sufficient cause (a reflective act of understanding) but also from sufficient grounds of
evidence known to be sufficient. In other words, judgment includes knowledge of truth
within itself.

In fact, naturally known first principles themselves are a direct effect of intellectual light (CWL 2: 77).
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Staying true to Aquinas, however, Lonergan concedes that not every judgment
returns upon itself so completely as to understand its own nature as rooted in intellectual
light. But he does finds in De veritate the position that our knowledge of truth as truth,
reached through judgment, is in some way operative in and through our knowledge of
ourselves. 128 Knowledge of ourselves, however, is gained simply through reflecting on
our own acts of understanding. It is wisdom, as the very highest perfection of judgment,
that empowers this uniquely penetrating type of rational reflection (“epistemological
reflection”) in which the intellect comes to understand itself. In turn, wisdom considered
as epistemological reflection is the rationally reflective “act by which intellectual light
reflects by intellectual light upon intellectual light” in order to “grasp its own nature and
the commensuration of that nature to the universe of reality.” 129
Can we further specify this unique act of judgment, this actuation of wisdom as
epistemological reflection? On this point Lonergan is interestingly (and perhaps
uncharacteristically) short-winded. He says that the precise content of this act is a grasp
of the native infinity of intellect, which then leads to a further grasp of its capacity to
know reality. Moreover, this type of act can be called epistemological reflection
inasmuch as it explains not only how we know but how we know that we know: “We
know by what we are; we know we know by knowing what we are.” 130 Just as this short
anthem can be considered a summation of Lonergan’s epistemology in Verbum, 131 the act

CWL 2: 86-88; 91. Lonergan makes this particular interpretation of Aquinas quite carefully, with a
variety of complex qualifications. Among them is the fact that intellectual light is not known as an object
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its own essence by its own essence, which is impossible for creatures.
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of judgment that reflects upon its nature and its proportion to reality can aptly be called
epistemological wisdom. As the first step in Lonergan’s ongoing reconception of Thomist
wisdom in Verbum, we might say that epistemological wisdom is the “act by which
intellectual light reflects by intellectual light upon intellectual light to understand itself
and pronounce its universal validity.” 132
Lonergan tracks back the ontological validation of epistemological wisdom by
sketching what he sees as an ontology of knowledge within Thomist thought. The
ultimate ground of our knowing is God; although we know by the light within us, this
created light which reflects by itself and on itself to know truth as truth, is in itself a
participation of Uncreated Light. 133 When linked to its ontological validation,
epistemological wisdom can be described as follows:
Inasmuch as the act of understanding grasps its own transcendence-in-immanence,
its quality of intellectual light as a participation of the divine and uncreated Light,
it expresses itself in judgment, in a positing of truth, in the affirmation or negation
of reality. 134
As a metaphysical and Thomist construal of judgment, Lonergan says this position
satisfies; as an epistemology, however, “it is null and void,” since it assumes that we
already validly know both ourselves and God. 135

1.3 Wisdom as Psychological Introspection

The knotty problem of how to validate epistemological wisdom apart from a
preconceived metaphysics will not be fully untangled until Insight, but in Verbum
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CWL 2: 85, 92, 95, 98.
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Lonergan gives a partial solution. As abbreviated as the solution may be, it adequately
addresses our second question—how does epistemological wisdom’s awareness of its
own sufficiency come about? In other words, can judgment’s own powers of validation
be validated apart from its ontological specification as a share in Uncreated Light? The
answer is that wisdom in its epistemological aspect, as it connects thought with reality,
can only be validated through the process of psychological introspection.
Lonergan proposes that the method of psychological introspection is a certain
“development of understanding by which we come to grasp just how it is that our minds
are proportionate to knowledge of reality.” 136 In fact, wisdom in its epistemological
aspect—the act by which intellectual light reflects by intellectual light upon intellectual
light to understand its own nature and the commensuration of that nature to the universe
of reality—is just such a cognitional process, 137 precisely because there exist certain
“experienced effects” of intellectual light that break into our “range of introspective
observation.” 138 Here intellectual light also operates as a psychological category
inasmuch as its implications can be discerned in our own experience of coming to know.
Yet Lonergan warns us that the exact procedure of psychological introspection is
“somewhat hazardous” to try to identify in Aquinas. 139 Although Lonergan contends that
Aquinas practiced psychological introspection and that such a practice was essential in
forming his profound Trinitarian theory, he insists that Aquinas did not objectify and
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translate such a practice into a descriptive psychology. 140 Lonergan goes on to warn us
that any greater specification of the introspective process from Aquinas can only be
patched together roughly, and the final result may even run the danger of being more
Thomistic than Thomist.141
And yet Lonergan still comes through with an impressive list of cognitional
elements that we can locate in our experience of our own acts of understanding, both
direct (insights) and reflective (judgments). These include evidence of first principles; the
rational motive of our assent to such principles; immanent ground of certitude; the
exigence of critical reflection to leave aside probability and only assent in judgment if the
possibility of the contradictory proposition is excluded; the entire dynamism behind our
spiritual wonder, inquiry, critical reflection, and natural desire for God, all of which
incessantly drive us to discover the causes of things, ceasing only with its final rest in a
supernatural vision of and union with God. 142 Insofar as all of these different elements of
rational consciousness fall within our awareness, they can be considered the foremost
fruits of Lonergan’s first foray into what he calls “psychological introspection” here in
Verbum but will later call interiority analysis.

CWL 2: 58 and 104.
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1.4 Wisdom as Normative Self-Knowledge

There remains a third and final step in Lonergan’s reconception of Thomist
wisdom in Verbum, which ultimately rewrites Thomist wisdom as introspective,
normative self-knowledge. It comes, as might be expected, in Lonergan’s reading of De
veritate, in which Aquinas distinguishes among three types of self-knowledge. At the
most basic level, at which we need not assume more than the existence of the soul itself,
we find that the soul is habitually present to itself. The soul’s presence to itself constitutes
“the habitual possession of empirical self-knowledge.” 143 Similarly, the soul in its very
presence to itself generates acts which are also empirically aware; thus, empirical selfknowledge can also be considered as actual, not merely habitual. When considered as
actual, empirical self-knowledge consists in the simple fact that we know ourselves as in
act by our acts. But Lonergan contends that empirical self-knowledge is in fact the basis
of a second type of self-knowledge—the scientific self-knowledge of objects, acts,
potencies, and essence that we find in Aristotle and, in a more refined form, in
Aquinas. 144
But wisdom cannot be completely coincident with either of these two types of
self-knowledge. Habitual or actual, empirical self-knowledge appears to be closer to
experience or perhaps consciousness itself than to science. And if we take seriously what
Lonergan says about the necessary basis of scientific self-knowledge in empirical selfknowledge, then it belongs to judgment to say whether or not the Aristotelian-Thomist
conception of the soul corresponds to the reality of the soul’s empirical self-knowledge.
CWL 2: 89.
CWL 2: 88-89; 101. Of course, what Lonergan identifies as the habit of empirical self-knowledge is not
the only habit necessary to produce a given act.
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For this task there is a third type of self-knowledge, what Lonergan designates as merely
“the act of judgment which passes from the conception of essence to the affirmation of
reality.” 145 For this final type of self-knowledge to be normative, however, its object must
be the “dynamic norm” of what any soul ought to be, not just “sorry achievement.” 146
But only the created participation of Uncreated Light can envision the reality of
soul considered as norm. And we have already witnessed that Lonergan follows Aquinas
in identifying this participation of Uncreated Light as the intellectual light within us, “the
flash of understanding” that is capable not just of understanding a thing’s essence but also
of reflectively penetrating its own essence. 147 And in such reflective penetration,
intellectual light operates as epistemological wisdom, forging the vital link between
thought and reality. Thus, normative self-knowledge—what Lonergan crystallizes into
the summary phrase “wisdom through self-knowledge” 148—is finally identical with
epistemological wisdom.
But we have already witnessed that epistemological wisdom can only be validated
through the process of psychological introspection. We experience this process of
introspection when we “almost catch” ourselves intellectually reaching forward to grasp a
thing’s essence as we exult in a new idea, and then reaching back in judgment to ground
that new idea in the concrete knowledge that yes, the essence that was merely imagined
or supposed does indeed exist. And so, at the very end of a very long day spent
contemplating the wisdom of the Angelic Doctor, Lonergan concludes that the Thomist
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notion of wisdom itself can be reconceived as the normative, introspective selfknowledge that comes from reflecting on ourselves as knowers.
But how exactly does this “epistemological reflection” construct a bridge from
knowledge as a perfection to knowledge of the other and from the order of thought to the
order of reality? In the faculty psychology adopted by Aquinas, the basic account of
knowledge by identity posits that there is always at least an imaginative identity between
thought and reality, since the faculty (understanding) and the thing (the object being
understood) are identical in act; from such identity there results knowledge as a
perfection, as the potency of our intellect is perfected in its actuation. Knowledge as a
perfection is constituted by an act of insight, in which an idea (the definition) of the
thing’s essence proceeds from a direct act of understanding. The intellectual grasp of a
thing’s essence prescinds from its existence, with knowledge of the thing as other not yet
emergent. 149 It is only in a reflective act of judgment that we affirm the thing’s essence as
actually existing, leaving the order of “mere thought” to penetrate into the very reality of
the thing.
Knowledge of the other goes beyond the knowledge of essence, which is the
knowledge by identity through which sensible or intelligible forms are known.
Knowledge of the other as other is “the act of judgment which passes from the
conception of essence to the affirmation of reality.” 150 In the same way that we affirm or
deny the nature of any other object as actually existent, we also can judge the nature of
the active principle of our intellect to be an intellectual light whose native infinity reaches
CWL 2: 80; 83-84.
CWL 2: 101. The reason that Lonergan gives for this is fascinating: knowledge of the other as other only
occurs in a reflective act of judgment, because it is only by the reflective act of judgment that we can reflect
on identity of act and thus know the difference of potency (CWL 2: 84). Cf. 83, 85, and 196-197 on the
limitations of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge by identity for our own finite intellects.
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out to all of being. In turn, from the nature of intellectual light we can judge that yes, our
intellect is indeed capable of knowing reality; in this specific judgment, intellectual light
takes on an explicitly epistemological role. 151 More importantly, this specific judgment
constitutes what Lonergan previously identified as the normative, introspective selfknowledge that comes from reflecting on ourselves as knowers—in a word, wisdom.
Ultimately it is wisdom, reconceived by Lonergan as the psychological process of
introspection yielding normative self-knowledge, that constructs the bridge between the
order of reality and the order of thought. 152 As such, wisdom holds the key to knowledge
of the other as other and knowledge of the order underlying all of reality.

1.5 Wisdom as Unity: The Whole of Being

Moreover, wisdom undergirds the intrinsic relationship between the order
underlying all of reality and the unity of being: without an initial (even if extremely
primitive) grasp of unity, nothing could ever be ordered. The “universal scheme of
things” grasped by wisdom is the order of the universe, where “universe” denotes the
whole of being in the most inexhaustible sense of that word: “the universe in the
multiplicity of its members, in the totality and individuality of each, and in the
interrelations of all.” 153 When our reflective understanding assents in judgment, uttering
“yes” to the existence of any individual thing, it is the unity or whole of that thing that is
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posited as existent, not simply a quality or aspect. The whole of each thing is real; since
wisdom regards the real as real, its premier object is the unity of all being. And as the
highest perfection of judgment, wisdom aims to order nothing less than the universe in its
grand entirety, seeking to know the existence and interconnections of all things in and
through ultimate causes and first principles. To posit the place of any X or Y in universal
order is to knows its role as a part in the larger whole as well as its relation to other parts
in this same whole. 154
Driven by a spirit of critical reflection that never stops asking “why?”, our
intellect is potens omnia fieri. Our growth in knowledge is an ever-repeating actuation of
such potential. It consists in a differentiation of unity X from unity Y, and a
categorization of the relationship between unity X and unity Y and between unity X and
the absolutely “largest” unity Z—the entire universe of being. But the emergence of such
synthetic knowledge erects the specter of the infinite regress. How can we hazard to posit
the role of unity X in the grand scheme of things if we are ignorant of the scheme
itself? 155
Lonergan submits that it is the light of reason within us, immanently caused by
agent intellect, that provides us with an innate grasp of the unity underlying all reality. 156
In effect, we possess a latent but surely anchored map of universal order from the start—
what Coelho calls a rudimentary, inchoate, undifferentiated view of the whole, a
CWL 2: 78; 98 and cf. 237: “the intelligible is always a unity.”
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permanent and universal anticipation of the unity of being. It is precisely because we do
possess an innate (although undifferentiated) grasp of the whole of being that we are able
to accurately situate and rightly order any further determination of being within this
whole.
In the context of Verbum, Coelho describes this anticipation, perpetually given in
intellectual light, as “inchoate wisdom.” When read retrospectively from the perspective
of Insight, Coelho construes this inchoate wisdom as the most primordial heuristic, the
“original upper blade of human knowing,” 157 where the term “upper blade” refers to a
merely heuristic and formal set of generalities in need of further specific, material
determination (denoted by the term “lower blade”). 158 The most general set of
generalities possible is the anticipation of the as-yet-undifferentiated whole of being.
Since it is impossible to order any one thing and make judgments about it in the
absence of a more inclusive intellectual context, the traditional Thomist locution of
Sapientis est ordinare et iudicare—often referenced by Lonergan—mandates that
wisdom is knowledge of the whole of the universe, even though that knowledge is always
imperfect and in development. In its most foundational instance, wisdom is the mind’s
reflection on its own nature as infinite anticipation of the unity underlying universal
order. In more ontological terms, wisdom is the intellect’s reflection on its infinite
potency to come to know any and all intelligibility—that is, to grasp the unity of the quod
quid est of a thing, the unity denoted by the metaphysical notion of form, and to affirm its
existence, its esse or actus essendi, the unity denoted by the metaphysical notion of
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act. 159 As an inchoate grasp of unity, wisdom is a primitive, inborn anticipation that the
whole of the universe is intelligible. 160 In turn, as wisdom continues to develop
throughout our lives, it apprehends more and more of the grand scheme of the universe
by ordering intelligibilities in their relations to one another.

1.6 Wisdom as Unity-in-Duality: Subject and Object

Chapter Two of Verbum opens with Lonergan restating Aquinas’ claim that
wisdom refers first and foremost to knowledge of the objective order of the universe,
clearly emphasizing what Coelho terms the “object pole” of wisdom. However, after
identifying wisdom’s epistemological aspect as epistemological reflection—thereby
opening the way for Lonergan’s innovative interpretation of wisdom as self-knowledge—
the “subject pole” of wisdom comes into stark view. 161 Epistemological wisdom grasps
the commensuration between knowing and being.
Likewise, Lonergan finds this same tension between being and knowledge
intrinsic even to Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ understanding of the object of wisdom:
“Wisdom, as first philosophy, deals at once with the real as real and with the first
principles of demonstrations. It is, in the very definition of its object, a duality.” 162
Lonergan depicts this duality as fruitful tension rather than division or opposition. Long
before reflection on sapientia ever reached the theoretical level—and far in advance of
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the more modern separation of metaphysics from epistemology—the all-important
“psychological fact” remained the same. We know by what we are, and we know that we
know by reflecting on what we are. 163 Epistemological wisdom merely thematizes the
intrinsic connection between being and knowing that Lonergan insists always applies in
the concrete practice of coming to know.
And yet such objectification is of the utmost relevance to philosophical foray,
especially in regard to the subject-object relationship and, ultimately, to the critical
problem. On Lonergan’s count, naïve realism does more than blindly posit the subject as
what is “in here” and the object as what is “out there.” Naïve realism also drapes the
critical problem with the façade of insolubility, since its basic gnoseology is one of
confrontation between two essences that are inherently out-of-sync with one another (if
not flatly opposed) and must somehow be brought into harmony with each other through
another essence. And so a false concept of the real operates as an “outside standard,” a
“true essence” that can somehow validate the truth of our knowledge of the object. 164
In contrast, the very strength of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge by identity is
that it posits ens as the per se and naturally known object of the intellect. The identity in
act between knower and known necessarily defines intelligibility as the act of the
intellect. Such a theory is relatively straightforward to apply to the case of knowing form,
whether sensible or intelligible. The act of the thing as sensible is the act of sensation, the
act of the thing as intelligible is the act of the intellect. In either case, the faculty and the
object are different only in potency. 165 Far from being opposed or divided, subject and
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object are meant for one another. Drawn together by a deep, abiding, and ultimate
compatibility, they become identical in act.
The same intimate compatibility between faculty and object can be extended to
the subjective and objective dimensions of wisdom, revealing further the broader
meaning of the “universe of being” and our place in it and so eventually broaching the
critical problem. Normative self-knowledge (wisdom’s subjective pole) not only grows in
us a grasp of our intellect’s telos—we long to know all of being—but tells us that our
capacity to know is attainable. In short, epistemological wisdom teaches us, slowly but
surely, that our mind is made for reality, and reality for our mind. In addition, our
“subjective” growth in wisdom also cultivates our mind’s capacity to reach the objective
pole of wisdom—actual knowledge of the universe of being, the real as real, the object of
metaphysics.
To know essence as essence and existence as existence—to know being as
being—requires judgment, which reflects on the active unity of faculty and object
according to an immanent standard. Hence Aquinas’ definition of wisdom as a perfection
of judgment—and thus rationally reflective and critical, by Lonergan’s reading—means
that as we grow in wisdom, our knowledge of universal order grows, particularly our
knowledge of being as such. Wisdom selects the concept of all concepts—ens. As any
student of scholastic theology will tell you, the concept of ens is an analogous one.
Rather than the lowest (or highest) common denominator among all other concepts or just
another, most general concept, the concept of ens is any concept when considered in
relation to its actus essendi, which is known in judgment:
Hence in his direct acts of understanding man enters into identity with the
intelligibility of only this or that material nature; it is in an act of reflective
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understanding, in which the nature of understanding is itself understood as potens
omnia facere et fieri, that man becomes capable of grasping the analogous concept of
ens. 166
It is the function of epistemological wisdom to reflect on the intellect’s capacity
to know being by reflecting on the nature of any act of understanding, and such reflection
unearths metaphysical gold. In an enriching feedback circle between the subject and
object poles of wisdom, self-knowledge (epistemological wisdom) and knowledge of the
universe (metaphysical wisdom) are necessarily, intrinsically, and proportionately
connected. Since we know the universe through knowing ourselves, and we know
ourselves by reflecting on our knowledge of the universe, each “pole” of wisdom grows
in proportion to the other. 167
Rather than casting subject and object as opposing actors, as does the
conventional formulation of the critical problem, Lonergan characterizes knowledge as a
teleological movement from the infinite potentiality of our intellect to know all being
toward more finite actuations. The distinction between subject and object can be grasped
in the same exact way that any distinction is truly known—through judgment. The
relationship between subject and object is merely one among many specifications of the
innate grasp of undifferentiated being supplied by wisdom. We reach the real in concrete
judgments long before we make the distinction between subject and object, only one
important distinction in an entire universe of them. And in Lonergan’s estimation, the
most essential judgment about the subject-to-object relationship is that made by
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epistemological wisdom, the rationally reflective and critical act by which the intellect
knows itself as commensurate to reality. 168

1.7 Wisdom as Unity-in-Duality: Knowledge of Self and Knowledge of God

Lonergan contends that our intellectual light holds within itself an “inner nisus
towards the infinite,” 169 manifested as a natural desire for God that cannot attain the
supernatural on its own. It is one and the same act of epistemological wisdom by which
our intellect grasps that it is, as intellect, infinite and, as infinite, inevitably drawn into
union with Uncreated Infinity. Our self-knowledge is a grasp not solely of the
commensuration of our intellect’s nature to all of being but also of the transcendence
within our immanent intellectual light and the origin of that light in divine Light. Human
wisdom is a participation in and likeness of divine wisdom. 170
Just as there operates an enriching feedback loop between subject and object
whenever we come to know, and a fruitfully tense unity-in-duality between the subject
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pole and the object pole as our wisdom grows, there also exists a “dialectical
oscillation” 171 between knowledge of self and knowledge of God. As our self-knowledge
develops, it enlightens our path toward God, clarifies what we already know of the divine
and asks further questions. In turn, greater knowledge of God enlightens, clarifies, and
demands further expansions of self-knowledge.
The dialectical movement between knowledge of self and knowledge of God
unfolds one way according to the natural light of reason in so-called natural theology, a
natural type of wisdom that helps us grasp first principles and judge all things in light of
the Very First Principle. The same dialectical movement unfolds two additional ways
according to the supernatural light of faith, with Lonergan following Aquinas in
delineating two types of supernatural wisdom. The supernatural science of theology aims
to understand divinely revealed truths and judge all other sciences according to the truths
of revelation, while the supernatural wisdom that is a gift of the Holy Spirit puts us into
direct contact with the divine and makes us docile to God’s action in our spirits.
In regard to the latter type of wisdom, Lonergan seems to raise a fascinating
question. If we understand the Spirit’s gift of wisdom as self-knowledge transposed into a
spiritual key, might this spiritual awareness of self, gifted by the Spirit, connect us to a
deeper awareness of God, perhaps even providing us with an additional analogy for
understanding the Trinity, one based in religious or even mystical experience? In
ferreting out the vetera of Aquinas’ position on the psychological analogy, Lonergan is
naturally limited to what Aquinas says and means, and it is clear to Lonergan that

171

CWL 2: 100-101.

73
Thomas’ theory of the Trinitarian processions is psychological, not mystical, at its
root. 172
Although Lonergan discerns an Augustinian influence early in Aquinas’
commentary on the Sentences that seems to posit the existence of “some simple and
continuous intuition in virtue of presence by which the soul knows and loves both itself
and God in some indeterminate manner,” 173 he concedes that the leap from the soul’s
presence to itself to the presence of God to the soul is a large one. And so Lonergan
merely suggests that the soul’s presence to itself in a state of graced rational selfconsciousness—what we might call spiritual wisdom in distinction from the metaphysical
and epistemological aspects of wisdom—might just extend into an awareness of God,
perhaps embedded in what mystical writers describe as the habitual felt presence of God.
Lonergan further hints, from a brief interpretation of a question in Aquinas, that
we might fruitfully understand God’s presence to the soul as a memoria in the mind, a
habitual knowledge of God that is actuated by an inner experience of God’s love for
oneself. In turn, God’s presence to the mind in memoria, when in act, generates an inner
word of judgment affirming God’s goodness, from which proceeds an ineffable act of
love for the divine. 174 But for Lonergan, Thomas’ description of mystical experience only
serves to underline what is essential versus what is accidental: the “special graces”
bestowed in the gifts of the Holy Spirit “have to do with the development of wisdom and
of love in man and not with the essence of what develops.” 175
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Most significantly, Verbum marks the first time in Lonergan’s corpus in which he
connects wisdom with self-knowledge. Wisdom understood as normative self-knowledge
is the beginning point of an ever-widening spiral of thought on self-appropriation that
will become the central thread of Lonergan’s philosophical and theological work. Above
all, we notice that Verbum operates, for the most part, in metaphysical rather than
cognitional terms, and Lonergan’s reconception of Thomist wisdom is no exception: it
revolves around the metaphysical categories of essence, potency, act, and object.
Metaphysical wisdom is the speculative science whose object is ultimate causes and
principles. Epistemological wisdom is the rationally reflective act by which intellect
reflects upon itself, grasping its own nature as well as the relationship between its infinite
potency and its natural object—all of being.
And yet every dicere verbum and every intelligere from which it proceeds is a
cognitional act—an act of the human mind that is experienced psychologically, in a way
analogous to the manner in which acts of seeing, hearing, and moving are experienced in
our bodies, and this experience can be adverted to, explored, studied. 176 The discrepancy
embedded in Verbum’s primarily metaphysical treatment of cognitional process opens a
wide door through which Insight can march, carrying interiority analysis in its bulky
arms. As Lonergan’s foundations inch closer toward intentionality analysis and further
away from faculty psychology, we can anticipate a corresponding shift in Insight toward
a more cognitional account of Thomist wisdom.

2 Insight
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Chapter Ten of Insight details reflective insight as what grasps the sufficiency of
the evidence for a prospective judgment, which is the link between the conditioned
content of the proposed judgment and the fulfillment of the conditions. By the end of
Chapter Ten, Insight’s cognitional theory—what Lonergan also calls introspective
analysis—is complete, with judgment as the keystone. 177 It should be no surprise then
that the first substantial reference to wisdom in Insight occurs here in Chapter Ten, in the
first extensive discussion of judgment in the book. 178 However much Insight represents a
shift away from faculty psychology and toward intentionality analysis, the fact that
Lonergan references wisdom in substantial association with judgment rather than
understanding and experience shows that the traditional Thomist conception of wisdom
as right judgment is not far from his mind.

2.1 Wisdom and the Universe of Being

Wisdom enters the scene in Lonergan’s examination of analytic propositions as a
case of virtually unconditioned judgment that, like all other virtually unconditioned
judgments, flows from an act of reflective insight. Lonergan defines analytic propositions
as propositions whose suppositions (“formal terms of meaning”) provide the conditioned
Interestingly enough, “introspective analysis” seems to regard the general form of cognitional process
that is immanent and operative in the three levels of experience, understanding, and judgment; Lonergan
pointedly remarks that introspective analysis does not generally make us better thinkers or operators (CWL
3: 307). So I am left to conclude that introspective analysis refers to cognitional theory, whereas selfappropriation refers to one’s taking cognitive and existential possession of one’s rationality as it unfolds on
these three levels—a “heightening of consciousness” (345).
178
While Chapter Nine helps us form a general notion of judgment, Lonergan saves the proper explanation
of what makes an insight a judgment, as well as a specification of different cases of judgment, for Chapter
Ten.
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and whose “partial terms” (what is meant by a word or phrase) provide the fulfilling
conditions in their very definitions. A link between the supposition and the definitions of
the terms is provided by “rules of meaning”—syntactical rules that dictate how words are
combined into a complete proposition. 179
But what dictates the terms themselves? Without the fulfillment of the conditions
of other judgments that contain the same partial terms with the same meaning as they are
given in the analytic proposition, such a proposition fails to add to our knowledge and in
fact approaches tautology. In the Thomist schema of intellectual habits, wisdom is what
selects the terms that determine principles, and the principles are the basis of conclusions.
In his discussion of analytic propositions, Lonergan comments on this Thomist
schema, saying that by wisdom Aquinas meant “an accumulation of insights that stands
to the universe as common sense stands to the domain of the particular, incidental,
relative, and imaginable.” 180 There are two significant elements to this latent definition of
wisdom: its object as the universe of being in its explanatory (rather than common sense)
relations, and its emergence as the result of an accumulation of insights, which will be
treated later.
Earlier in Insight Lonergan argued for the nature of common sense as a
specialization of intellectual development, a set of habitual and appropriately incomplete
insights that have the particular, concrete, immediate, and practical as their object—that
is, the relations of things to us, especially as they pertain to making, doing, and
organizing in community. Just as things in themselves and things for us constitute two
distinct but complementary fields of objects, common sense and empirical science are
179
180
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two distinct but complementary “universes of discourse” within our overall knowledge of
being as a whole, or the entire “universe of being.” The ordinary descriptions afforded by
common sense cover only a “section” of the universe of being. 181 In his exposition of
reflective insights in which we reach the virtually unconditioned, common sense
judgments are only one type of virtually unconditioned, alongside concrete judgments of
fact; insights into concrete situations; concrete analogies and generalization; probable
judgments; and mathematical judgments. 182
In fact, in Lonergan’s account all of these different types of judgment can serve as
validation for the defined sense of the terms appearing in analytic propositions. As
already noted, in Aquinas’ account wisdom is the selector of terms. And so if we follow
the analogy to completion, then any (or all) of these other types of judgments, apart from
common sense ones, might take the place of traditional Thomist wisdom in providing
validation for terms. We recall Lonergan’s rather cryptic statement that “an account of
critical reflection and the possibility of judgment will reveal unavoidable judgments.” 183
These unavoidable judgments, Lonergan tell us, will ultimately validate his cognitional
theory as truth rather than empty speculation.
All that is clear from Part One of Insight—Lonergan’s account of insight as an
activity—is that wisdom has as its object the universe of being comprised by things in
relation to each other and, by extension, that wisdom must speak in the discourse of
explanation rather than mere description. It is not until Part Two, which considers insight
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as knowledge, that we learn which type of judgment is to take over the function of
selecting terms.

2.2 The Intellectual Habit of Wisdom and the Self-Affirmation of the Knower

Part One on insight as activity comes to a close with the reader having gained a
basic familiarity with himself as a knower. But familiarity with cognitional theory—what
Lonergan calls “introspective analysis”—is one thing, while affirming it to be
constitutive of one’s own interior world—what Lonergan calls “self-appropriation”—is
quite another. 184 And so Part Two of Insight opens with a formal invitation to the reader
to take possession of the immanently and recurrently operative structure of experiencingunderstanding-judging as the core of his identity as a rational knower. 185
If the invitation is embraced by the reader and applied to her own cognitional
identity, the proceeding judgment is called “the self-affirmation of the knower.” The
conditioned content of the self-affirmation of the knower is simply the content of the
proposition “I am a knower inasmuch as I am a unity-identity-whole characterized by
experiencing, understanding, and judging.” 186 The very judgment of rational selfaffirmation affirms the existence of certain concrete intelligibilities and thereby
establishes crucial cognitional terms. These terms are not the content of cognitional acts
but the acts as acts.
184
One of the more interesting implications of the difference between the two is the fact that introspective
analysis rarely improves the performance of one’s rational activities, while self-appropriation does. See
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But the implications of the self-affirmation of the knower stretch further to
include the outlines of all intelligible contents: “Thoroughly understand what it is to
understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be
understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all
further development of understanding.” 187 The self-affirmation of the knower lays out in
clear terms and relations what is meant by knowledge (correct understanding) and the
“broad lines of all there is to be understood” references the metaphysical elements that
are drawn from cognitional analysis, as discussed below.
Finally, the self-affirmation of the knower opens upon all further development of
understanding insofar as all further developments in knowledge are the content of further
acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging. Therefore, what is said about the
relations of the interlocking acts of basic cognitional structure in the self-affirmation of
the knower applies also to what is said about the relations of the contents of experiencing,
understanding, and judging constituting any particular department of knowledge. As the
primarily cognitional and derivatively metaphysical basis of all development of
knowledge, the self-affirmation of the knower would seem to be a transposition of
Thomas’ intellectual habit of wisdom, the selector of the terms that make up the universal
principles of knowledge.
Importantly, the self-affirmation of the knower stands in functional parallel to the
intellectual habit of wisdom which its transposes. Thomas’ account of wisdom as an
intellectual habit that is the ultimate (if remote) source of all our knowledge is an account
of an unavoidable and permanently valid metaphysical foundation for the development of
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scientia, in the sense of both knowledge in general and knowledge of a particular science.
Lonergan’s account of the self-affirmation of the knower operates as an ultimate,
unavoidable, and permanently valid cognitional foundation for the expansion of all
knowledge. Although primarily cognitional, it is a foundation with profound
metaphysical implications.
Essentially, the function of the intellectual habit of wisdom as an ultimate and
unavoidable metaphysical category is transposed into the function of the self-affirmation
of the knower as an unavoidable and ultimate cognitional category, exempt from radical
revision, and with metaphysical implications. The self-affirmation of the judgment is
unavoidable insofar as it follows with “rational compulsion” from a grasp of the
possibility of judgment, a possibility grounded in a grasp of the account of critical
reflection. Further, the self-affirmation of the knower is an ultimate judgment in the sense
that it represents a pragmatic, concrete, operative engagement of the subject that cannot
be reduced to a more foundational judgment. To seek a deeper foundation than
intellectual self-affirmation provokes a vicious circle, because the very search for a more
ultimate ground involves the cognitional process asserted in the self-affirmation of the
knower.

2.3 The Self-Affirmation of the Knower as Epistemological Wisdom

And yet the self-affirmation of the knower, in and of itself, only takes us so far
along the road to knowledge of the universe of being:
Even in unfolding the process that ends in self-affirmation, we were unprepared to say
whether affirming the self was knowing the self. Affirming the self became knowing
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the self inasmuch as knowing being was judged to be affirming it; and knowing being
became objective knowing through a grasp of the nature of experiential, normative,
absolute, and the consequent objectivity. 188
But Lonergan’s epistemological reflections are not an after-the-fact justification that
externally or accidentally transforms self-appropriation into self-knowledge. The selfaffirmation of the knower itself bears epistemological ramifications, linking the structure
of knowledge with the structure of reality. In and through these epistemological
ramifications, the self-affirmation of the knower can be conceived as the next genetic
moment in Lonergan’s transposition of epistemological wisdom, a transposition begun in
Verbum.
We witnessed in Verbum that wisdom’s epistemological function revolved around
the self-reflective judgment affirming the commensuration of the intellect to being and
thus connecting the order of thought with the order of reality. Insight’s vision of
epistemological wisdom as the self-affirmation of the knower connects knowledge to
being by presenting second-order definitions of being and objectivity that determine the
meanings of these notions in relation to the fundamental operations of the empirically,
intelligently, and rationally conscious subject. If being is defined as the objective of the
pure desire to know, then knowledge is, by definition, knowledge of being. 189 And if
objectivity is defined as emergent from a patterned set of judgments that posit the
existence of multiple beings, the distinction of one being from another, the identity of my
own self as a knower, and the distinction of myself from other beings, then what is
known through any patterned context of judgments that fit the determinate pattern just
mentioned is, by definition, objectivity. Being and objectivity each make contact with the
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self-affirmation of the knower, with certain elements of their definitions operative in this
all-important judgment. 190
The principal notion of objectivity 191 emerges from a patterned context of
judgments that implicitly define the terms “object” and “subject.” On Lonergan’s
account, objectivity is surprisingly simple. Objectivity is attained when judgments are
reached in the following pattern:
A is; B is; C is; D is (etc.);
A is neither B nor C nor D (etc.);
B is neither C nor D, etc. (and so on for D…)
The patterned context of judgments given above implicitly defines what we mean by an
object, but the principal notion of objectivity is not fully intelligible without the addition
of two more judgments: the self-affirmation of the knower and the affirmation of the
knower’s existence as distinct from the existence of other beings. The subject is defined
as any object, say A, where A represents myself as understood and affirmed as an
empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious knower. If the judgment A (I exist as a
rational knower) is correct as well as the judgments affirming the distinction between me

However, it is still reasonable to make a distinction, as does Dadosky, between the self-affirmation of
the knower itself (a paramount “moment” in the ongoing process of rational self-appropriation) and the
epistemological wisdom that transitions from the order of thought to the order of reality. In Dadoksy’s
estimation, epistemological wisdom in Insight encompasses everything that answers the question of why
Lonergan’s cognitional theory is knowing. Here I choose to highlight the epistemological ramifications of
the self-affirmation of the knower insofar as it inextricably connects to objectivity; hence I maintain that
such self-affirmation is, in a sense, already epistemological wisdom. In agreement with Dadosky, it is clear
that self-appropriation is the source of Lonergan’s epistemology. Intellectual self-appropriation is the “third
type” of wisdom, facilitated by Insight, that grounds both epistemology and metaphysics.
191
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and other beings, then it is correct that there exist objects and a subject in the sense just
given. 192
And so the necessity of the self-affirmation of the knower for the very possibility
of both the principal notion of objectivity and the distinction between subject and object
is transparent. The affirmation of subjectivity actually presupposes the affirmation of
objectivity, since I must know that I exist and that my existence is distinct from the
existence of other beings to know myself as a knower. The self-affirmation of the knower
is in fact the judgment that I exist as a rational knower, and once that is affirmed,
subjectivity is affirmed. Once the distinction of my existence as a rational knower from
other existents is drawn, not only do I implicitly know myself as being but I also know
myself as an object who is simultaneously a subject. 193 Therefore the self-affirmation of
the knower is a crucial constituent of the notion of objectivity, and through the notion of
objectivity it also enters into the constitution of the notion of subjectivity.
In summary, the self-affirmation of the knower appears to be a transposition of
the epistemological aspect of wisdom first mentioned in Verbum. The self-affirmation of
the knower in Insight is continuous with the sense of epistemological wisdom espoused
in the Verbum articles—that is, the self-reflective judgment affirming the
commensuration of the intellect to being—in several ways. Both accounts of
epistemological wisdom ultimately affirm an implicit teleology of knowledge for being
and of the subject’s correct judgments for objectivity. 194 And they both ultimately affirm
being as a more fundamental unity-identity-whole than knowledge, for the distinction of
CWL 3: 399-400. Of course all that would be needed to know the existence of other subjects would be
to “intelligently grasp and reasonably affirm the existence of other knowers beside oneself” (CWL 3: 400).
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knowledge from being is a distinction made within being. Likewise, the difference
between object and subject is a positive difference within being, not outside of it, as in
the case of the naïve realism that tends to posit the existence of a subject who stands
outside being and looks at it. 195 In addition, both affirm the subject’s correct judgments as
a more fundamental unity-identity-whole than objectivity, for prior to judgment we can
only think being, not know it. And so the subject cannot know himself until he makes the
correct judgment “I am,” which, when added to other judgments, results in knowledge of
herself as both being and object. 196
Finally, the epistemological wisdom embodied in the self-affirmation of the
knower in Insight naturally transitions us into considerations of being and objectivity.
Perhaps most importantly, the epistemological wisdom of the self-affirmation of the
knower, when mediated through the notions of being and objectivity, organically
culminates in a set of directives—in other words, a method—for the derivation of a
metaphysics. This metaphysics preserves the permanent achievements of the AristotelianThomist schema while incorporating insights from cognitional theory, mathematics, the
natural sciences, modern history, and hermeneutics. 197

2.4 Epistemological Wisdom as Prior to Metaphysics

However, the unfolding of metaphysics from a basis in cognitional theory, and
through a prior expansion of cognitional theory into epistemology, is anything but
straightforward. Standing in the way is what Lonergan calls the polymorphism of
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consciousness—the fact that concrete human consciousness is multiform, with different
patterns of experience competing for priority, blending together indiscriminatingly,
sometimes heading for breakdown, and at other times competing directly with each
other. 198
To overcome the possible confusion presented by the polymorphism of
consciousness for the metaphysical task, Lonergan intentionally accounts for it: he
considers metaphysics as springing from the polymorphic reality of people as they are,
which he describes collectively as “the polymorphic subject in his native disorientation
and bewilderment.” 199 At this stage metaphysics is latent and has no method; the very
possibility of metaphysic lies hidden in the inevitably recurrent and conscious operations
of experiencing, understanding, and judging.
To take up method in relation to metaphysics, the movement to an explicit
metaphysics must begin, and the first step is an acquaintance with the existence and
characteristics of insight in various fields of knowledge, with the self-affirmation of the
knower and the notions of being and objectivity following. The path to explicit
metaphysics is a journey to self-knowledge, and the directives of metaphysical method
are issued by the self-affirming subject to herself. Lonergan examines a dialectic of
metaphysical methods to show that only one is an authentic unfolding of the intellectual

CWL 3: 410-413. For example, the intellectual pattern of experience in which the rational knower can
grasp her identity with the clarity and precision exemplified in Chapter Eleven may very well issue into the
series of accurate basic positions on being and objectivity in Chapters Twelve and Thirteen, respectively.
And yet it is equally possible that the biological pattern of experience, with its focus on vital anticipation,
extroversion, and satisfaction, may surreptitiously influence philosophical reflection with precisely these
tendencies, declaring the real to be the already out there now.
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pattern of experiencing-understanding-judging that is affirmed as constitutive of rational
knowing in the self-affirmation of the knower. 200
The transition from latent to explicit metaphysics is a concrete deduction. To help
us locate the role of epistemological wisdom in the transformation of latent metaphysics
to explicit metaphysics, it is helpful to outline the deduction as follows:
The major premise posits the similarity in form (“isomorphism”) between the structure
of knowing and the structure of the known. If knowing is defined as a composite of a
related set of acts and the known is defined as the related set of contents of these acts,
then the pattern of the relations between the acts is isomorphic with the pattern of the
relations between the contents of the acts. The premise is analytic because knowing is
defined by a similarity to the known, and the know is defined by a similarity to
knowing, and in this bare statement of implicit definition there is not yet any actual
validation of either definition.
The set of primary minor premises contains several assertions that are direct
consequences of the isomorphism of knowing and known. The most fundamental of
these implications is the concrete, recurring structure of unity on the side of the
known, corresponding to the unity of knowing. Because every composite of
experiencing, understanding, and judging is one single knowing, every instance of
known proportionate being is a unity of a content of experience, a content of
understanding, and a content of judgment. 201
Finally, the set of secondary minor premises consists in material provided by
reoriented science and common sense, material that will be integrated into a metaphysical
account of what is known and of what is to be known of the universe of proportionate
being—that is, what can be known by human experiencing, understanding, and judging.
But the entire edifice of Lonergan’s proposal for metaphysics lies in the first major
premise—the isomorphism between the structure of knowing and the known—and so the
validity of this concrete deduction as metaphysical method stands or falls on the validity
of the major premise.
CWL 3: 426-455. Among the possibilities sifted by Lonergan are abstract deduction, universal doubt,
empiricism, commonsense eclecticism, Hegelian dialectic, and scientific method and philosophy.
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And so whether the isomorphism between knowing and known is an analytic
proposition or an analytic principle is of the utmost importance. If it is an analytic
proposition, with knowing defined in relation to the known and the known defined in
relation to knowing in isolation from any verification, then it possesses the two benefits
that accrue to a metaphysical method of abstract deduction: necessity and universality.
On this reading of the major premise, such isomorphism would obtain in any possible
world (because necessary) and would be perfectly abstract (universal), refraining from
asserting the existence of any object. But an abstract deduction like this is ultimately
empty of meaning and riddled with inane internal contradictions, as tempting as its appeal
to self-evident principles might be. 202
Lonergan does not abandon entirely the notion of self-evident principles, but
transforms it. His reading of Aquinas on this point underlines a crucial qualification made
by Aquinas himself: the self-justifying gravitas of self-evident principles does not come
primarily from the logical force of syntax or even the intelligibility and reasonableness of
implicit definition, but from the habit of wisdom, which selects and validates the terms in
the first place. But at this juncture Lonergan faces a quandary, since the judicial virtue of
wisdom is laden with Thomas’ own metaphysics. That much is fine and to be expected,
but Lonergan is searching for a form of wisdom that supposes neither a metaphysics (for
how does one know that Aristotle’s or Aquinas’ metaphysics is correct?) nor a religious
tradition (for the moment, we set aside wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit). The question
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of metaphysical method asks for the “genesis of a wisdom that is prior to
metaphysics,” 203 a genesis that he believes Aquinas never treated explicitly.
Astonishingly, what Aquinas did not treat explicitly, Lonergan discovers
embedded in the Angelic Doctor all along—the epistemological wisdom that generates a
metaphysics, a “third type of wisdom.” In a sidelong reference to his own work in
Verbum, he insists that a cognitional account of a wisdom prior to metaphysics—in a
word, epistemological wisdom—can be discerned in Aquinas’ work. In Insight,
epistemological wisdom is transposed as the self-affirmation of the knower.
In contrast to an empty, deductive approach to metaphysics, Lonergan espouses
an alternative, concrete deduction that relies on epistemological wisdom to determine the
meaning of the partial term “knowing,” which is one of two terms making up the major
premise of isomorphism between knowing and known. Epistemological wisdom,
understood here as the self-affirmation of the knower that transposes Aquinas’
intellectual habit of wisdom, asserts that knowing is experiencing-understanding-judging
and that such a cognitional pattern actually occurs and is precisely what characterizes
myself as a rational knower. The self-affirmation of the knower is a concrete judgment of
fact and an analytic principle that is universal and necessary with a different kind of
universality and necessity than that of a merely analytic proposition. Thus the selfaffirmation of the knower, which defines the term “knowing” of the major premise of
Lonergan’s concrete deduction, lends metaphysical method a concretely existent
referential—the subject as he or she really is—and a contingent necessity, since I may be
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otherwise than I am. But insofar as I am, I am a rational knower whose knowing consists
in experiencing, understanding, and judging. 204
In summary, for Lonergan the twofold problem of metaphysical method is solved
by epistemological wisdom on each count. First, the detached and disinterested desire to
know often goes unrecognized by the subject. Thus while the patterned context of
cognitional acts flowing from the pure desire to know does indeed provide the general
relations of the unknown contents of these acts, this fact often goes unnoticed and thus
remains latent. 205 The self-affirmation of the knower remedies this deficiency, beginning
the transition from latent to explicit metaphysics. Such self-knowledge issues the two
directives constituting metaphysical method: a reorientation of one’s scientific opinions
and common sense, and an integration of what one knows and can know of the universe
of proportionate being through the known structure of one’s cognitional process.
But standing in the way of attaining both directives is the second problem facing
metaphysical method: polymorphism of consciousness. When undifferentiated,
polymorphism of consciousness often taints science with extrascientific opinions and
common sense with common nonsense. Against this distortion the self-affirmation of the
knower works to assert the basic positions on being and objectivity that invite further
development and act as a dialectic sifter to weed out counterpositions, which invite
reversal. Finally, the most constructive of directives of metaphysical method—to
integrate the known and to-be-known of proportionate being under one unifying, heuristic
structure—is the metaphysical task toward which epistemological wisdom most blatantly
contributes.
204
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The epistemological wisdom encapsulated in the self-affirmation of the knower
replaces the Aristotelian-Thomist notion of self-evident principles with the very source of
the meaning of the terms that compose self-evident principles: the unfolding of the pure
desire to know in the affirmation of the empirically, intellectually, and rationally aware
self. The isomorphism between the knower and the known is the keystone to Lonergan’s
concrete deduction of metaphysics, with epistemological wisdom as the self-affirmation
of the knower providing the meaning of the term “knowing.” 206

2.4.1 Epistemological Wisdom and the Notion of Being

For Lonergan the notion of being is a spontaneously operative, pre-conceptual,
all-pervasive, and all-inclusive notion of the to-be-known. And so being itself is the
“anything and everything” that is the objective of the unrestricted, detached, pure desire
to know; the concrete universe of being is what is affirmed in the totality of all correct
judgments. But as prior to any cognitional content, the notion of being given in the pure
desire to know is supremely heuristic, open to determination by anything and everything
that intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation will come to judge as true. Lonergan
notes that since the pure desire to know is a “constituent element” of both the affirming
and of the self that is affirmed in the self-affirmation of the knower, the discussion of
self-affirmation must come before the discussion of the notion of being. 207
Further, for Lonergan the self-affirmation of the knower is sapiential insofar as it
selects the correct notion of being, fulfilling the classic Thomist conception of wisdom
206
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that Lonergan refers to so often. 208 The self-affirmation of the knower is an affirmation of
the naturally given, spontaneous, unrestricted, and all-encompassing drive of intelligence
for correct understanding—an affirmation of the pure desire to know—as a permanent
and essential mark of my rational consciousness, indeed as the defining feature of what it
means to be rationally conscious. This affirmation of the pure desire to know is a
selection of the correct notion of being, which is precisely this drive of intelligence for
knowledge. 209

2.5 Metaphysical Wisdom as the Integral Heuristic Structure of Proportionate
Being

Verbum conceived epistemological wisdom as the self-reflective judgment
affirming the commensuration of the intellect to being and thus connecting the order of
thought with the order of reality. In Insight, epistemological wisdom is transposed as the
self-affirmation of the knower, which supplies the principles from which an explicit
metaphysics is generated. Lonergan’s conception of metaphysical wisdom in Verbum
That Lonergan regards the self-affirmation of the knower as inherently sapiential is a major point made
by Christopher Friel in his illuminating article on “Lonergan’s Notion of Being,” Heythrop Journal 57
(2016): 511-531. Just as in Insight, Lonergan himself states this rather directly in the 1957 Boston College
lectures on mathematical logic and existentialism: “And it is by sapientia that you effect the transition from
analytic propositions to analytic principles. Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m: he doesn’t put it that
way, but he’s showing that sapientia is superior to intellectus” (CWL 18: 346). As Coelho underlines, the
self-affirmation of the knower does not become fully adequate and objective knowledge until correct
positions on basic issues in philosophy have been developed, which does not happen in Insight until the
dialectic of Chapter Fourteen is complete. So although Coelho identifies self-appropriation through
generalized method as coincident with epistemological wisdom, he emphasizes that this represents only the
preliminary phase of metaphysical method. In turn, metaphysical method only becomes metaphysical
wisdom when it is fully dialectical, since dialectic is necessary for the correct interpretation of basic terms.
For the similarities and differences between Coelho’s position and my own, see n. 434 below.
209
Additional judgments of fact are necessary if one is to advance from the correct notion of being—
correctly selected in and from the knower’s sapiential self-affirmation—to the correct definition of being as
the object of the pure desire to know. For example, the reader must still discover that knowing being is
identical with affirming it in a reasonable judgment, and knowledge of being is objective.
208
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followed Aquinas closely; it is the speculative science whose object is ultimate causes
and principles. Insight’s definition of metaphysics as the integral heuristic structure of
proportionate being remains to be investigated, as does the derivation of metaphysical
elements and the unique manner in which Lonergan’s metaphysics acts as the first
principles of all knowledge.
The structure of the known revealed by self-appropriation is the object of
Lonergan’s metaphysics. Because the structure of knowing brings to light the structure of
the known, correct metaphysical positions stem from accurate self-knowledge, while
inaccurate or deficient metaphysical affirmations stem from inaccurate or deficient selfknowledge. As the self-affirmation of the knower is a shift from the contents of cognition
to its acts and its actor, the notion of metaphysics unfolded from such a judgment must be
heuristic. And so explicit metaphysics determines the definitions not of the known
contents of any cognitive act, but of the unknown contents of any cognitive act insofar as
they are heuristically related to the structure of knowledge.
In anticipating the type of act through which the unknown content would become
known, metaphysics must employ heuristic notions. But Lonergan’s explicit metaphysics
is a heuristic structure, laying out the entire ordered set of heuristic notions. And because
it does so exhaustively, metaphysics is an integral heuristic structure; as integral, it
supplies the ordered set of all heuristic notions and melds them into one unity-identitywhole. Lonergan defines proportionate being as whatever is to be known by human
experience, understanding, and judgment, and defines explicit metaphysics as the integral
heuristic structure of proportionate being. 210
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CWL 3: 22-23; 558-559; 416-417.

93
If the Thomist notion of wisdom as metaphysics found in Aristotle and Aquinas
and expounded by Lonergan in Verbum is to be affirmed by our author once again, then
metaphysical wisdom is coincident with Insight’s vision of metaphysics as the explicit,
integral, heuristic structure of proportionate being. Like that of Aristotle and Aquinas,
Lonergan’s metaphysics studies being as subsisting in potency, form, and act, but it
defines each of these elements heuristically. 211 Potency refers to that from which
understanding abstracts, and thus can only be understood in the proper sense of fully
explanatory knowledge by an intellectually patterned experience of the empirical residue.
Form refers to that which is known by the direct insight that grasps unities-identitieswholes in their relation to one another; form is the content of the act of understanding.
Act refers to that which is affirmed as virtually unconditioned in the “yes” of reflective
insight; act is the content of the act of judgment. Since concrete things are known by
understanding, they are forms. Central form is what is grasped insofar as the unity of a
concrete unity-identity-whole is understood. This concrete unity-identity-whole is what
exists, and what is grasped as the existence of intelligible unity is central act. Insofar as a
concrete unity-identity-whole is an intelligible unit grasped in data as individual, central
potency is defined as the individuality of the empirical residue. 212
The next group of terms comprising the elements of Lonergan’s metaphysics are
conjugate potency, form, and act. As there is a distinct type of understanding that grasps
concrete things, there are general structures and abstract laws that grasp the properties of

211
CWL 3: 456. Lonergan contends that what he means by each of the terms denoting components of
proportionate being would be easily recognizable by Aristotle as his own. However, he is also quick to
point out that there are substantial differences between them, stemming from instances in Aristotle’s
physics in which he fails to distinguish descriptive from explanatory knowledge, a distinction made much
more sharply by modern science (458; 507; 511).
212
CWL 3: 457 and 510.
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things and the occurrence of events, which are known by understanding and thus are as
much forms as the unities-identities-wholes of things themselves. And so to central forms
is added an account of conjugate forms—the intelligible mutual relations between
sensible similarities once these sensible similarities are verified and explained in relation
to one another. In turn, conjugate act is the occurrence of the property or event, and
conjugate potency refers to the spatiotemporal details in which properties or events
(conjugate forms) are verified. 213
Other tenets of Lonergan’s metaphysics are included based on their outgrowth
from aspects of his cognitional theory. We recall from the deductive form of latent to
explicit metaphysics that the primary minor premises consist in concrete and recurring
structures ultimately capable of being reduced to the self-affirmation of the knower.
Lonergan clarifies major instances of these structures as classical, statistical, genetic, and
dialectical methods. The conjunction of classical and statistical method reveals the
immanent intelligibility of the order of events to be an emergent probability. Likewise,
the notion of successive higher viewpoints by which the same things have different
properties studied by different sciences expands our conception of the immanent order of
the universe as a generalized emergent probability for both things and events.
Corresponding to the unrestricted objective of the pure desire to know is an
upwardly directed dynamism, the finality of being itself. Again, the notion that lower
levels of otherwise coincidental sets of occurrences can be systematized by higher forms,
when applied to the categories of genus and species, unveils the existence of successive,
explanatory genera. In turn, the existence of explanatory genera makes sense of the
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existence of a succession of distinct and autonomous sciences with no logical process
from one to another. 214
All in all, within the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being that is
Lonergan’s scientific metaphysics, the following fundamental topoi are explored and
articulated in line with his three basic positions on knowing, being, and objectivity: the
six metaphysical elements of central form, central act, central potency, conjugate form,
conjugate act, and conjugate potency; generalized emergent probability; development;
explanatory genera and species; distinctions, relations, and unity. 215 All of these
components comprise the content of Lonergan’s metaphysics, and all are considered in
their relations to one another, thereby approaching the universe of being from an
explanatory angle. Since the metaphysics of Insight is the transposition of the
metaphysical wisdom described in Verbum—metaphysics as a science, following the
Thomist-Aristotelian notion—all of the above form the content of a new metaphysical
wisdom that takes its stand on the structure of human knowing.
The open, dynamic character and foundational nature of Lonergan’s metaphysics
result not merely from its heuristic nature but also from its relation to the other sciences.
As heuristic, it underlies all other sciences insofar as its dual principles—the desire to
know and its ongoing unfolding in empirical, intellectual, and rational selfconsciousness—is the impetus for all questions, insights, and judgments constituting
other departments of knowledge. In striking similarity to the role of Aquinas’ sapientia
vis-à-vis the other sciences, Lonergan’s metaphysical wisdom asks the total, foundational
question to which other sciences give partial answers and so penetrates all other sciences.
214
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Furthermore, its principles constitute the common source of all other knowledge and
make possible a common compatibility and coherence among the different sciences. As
dialectical, metaphysical wisdom transforms the other sciences by encouraging their
positions to fuller development and manifesting the waywardness of counterpositions. As
integral, it joins the partial answers provided by other sciences into a single intelligible
unity. Although not the whole of knowledge in the sense of the achievement of all
concrete knowns, metaphysics is the “whole in knowledge.” 216

2.6 Wisdom as the Highest Viewpoint (and a Note on the Universal Viewpoint)

Earlier we noted Lonergan’s remark that by wisdom Aquinas meant “an
accumulation of insights that stands to the universe as common sense stands to the
domain of the particular, incidental, relative, and imaginable.” 217 A higher viewpoint is a
habitual accumulation of insights that emerges from a particular set of images,
definitions, judgments, and so on, but goes beyond all of these cognitional elements to
ground a larger and broader field of further images, definitions, judgments, and so on that
are capable of placing the original set of cognitional elements in a larger and broader
field of meaning. What is merely coincidental on the level of a lower viewpoint (or lower
science) is understood as systematized at the level of a higher viewpoint (or higher
science). 218 Lonergan’s conception of metaphysics as a science consisting in the integral
heuristic structure of proportionate being can be fruitfully illustrated as a viewpoint from

CWL 3: 415-417.
CWL 3: 331.
218
CWL 3: 37-43; 506.
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two angles: as actually being the highest viewpoint naturally possible, and as containing
within itself something Lonergan calls “the universal viewpoint.”
Like the self-affirmation of the knower from which it flows, Lonergan’s explicit
metaphysics is exempt from radical revision. The primitive terms and relations of any
given science may shift once a higher viewpoint emerges in that science, but the
achievement of a higher viewpoint is made possible by the intelligence that wonders and
inquires and the critical reasonableness that refuses assent to mere opinion. The primitive
terms of metaphysics are these dynamic tendencies of intelligence itself, which admit no
revision; thus human knowledge of proportionate being knows no higher viewpoint than
explicit metaphysics, although such a viewpoint progresses in expansion and
specification as the sciences discover new methods. 219
Lonergan’s metaphysics is critical insofar as it distinguishes between positions
and counterpositions. It is scientific insofar as it possesses a clear and distinct objective,
operates within razor-sharp boundaries, and has a method that serves as a criterion to
avoid the dreaded “mere disputations” of metaphysical past. But Lonergan’s metaphysics
is also dialectical, giving us a basis from which to evaluate any philosophy according to
whether or not (and to what extent) it aligns with fundamental cognitional truths. Thus
metaphysics as dialectical issues in a definition of truth, two criteria of truth, and the
ontological foundation of truth as the intrinsic intelligibility of being. 220

219
Metaphysics integrates the sciences’ discoveries of new methods into its account of the integral heuristic
structure of proportionate being (418), just as it works the conclusions of the sciences and common sense
into a unity by grasping in them the concrete extensions of its own anticipations of understanding (418);
provides the different conclusions of the different sciences with compatibility and coherence (415); and
spurs on the positions within sciences to further development while reversing their counterpositions (415).
220
CWL 3: 546-547; 572-576.
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Meaning occurs within being, and so the truth of interpretation—that is, the truth
of the expression of the meaning of another expression—will also be treated under the
dialectic of metaphysics. The issue of the truth of interpretation calls for the dialectical
aspect of metaphysics to combat what Lonergan describes as the basic problem of
interpretation, the influence of several different kinds of bias in the interpreter’s habitual
accumulation of insights (viewpoints); biases in the viewpoints of the original author of
the original expression to be interpreted; biases in the viewpoints of the original
audience; biases in the viewpoints of the current audience. 221
Insofar as an accurate interpretation presupposes knowledge of the development
of types of meaning in history, in which the original expression must be put into context
to be fully understood, it demands a genetic tool. Insofar as an accurate interpretation
presupposes an understanding of the development of positions and counterpositions in
history, and an understanding of how the polymorphism of human consciousness
introduces elements of confusion into both the original author’s and the interpreter’s
possible meanings, it demands a dialectical tool. Lonergan finds such a genetic and
dialectical hermeneutical tool in the universal viewpoint, which he defines as a potential
totality of genetically and dialectically ordered viewpoints.
Lonergan contends that “the universe of meanings” that emerges from cognitional
theory falls under metaphysical dialectic, and grounds the universal viewpoint possesses

CWL 3: 586-587. Further, the expression of the original author as well as the expression of the
interpreter may be adequate or inadequate to the original truth he knew or the truth of interpretation she
knows now, respectively (576-581). Therefore, there exists a need for a genetic account of the potential
totality of modes of expression as they progress toward “specialization and differentiation on sharply
distinguishable levels” (601). Together with the genetic and dialectic account of the potential totality of
meanings that is the universal viewpoint, the genetic account of the potential totality of modes of
expression composes the upper blade of Lonergan’s methodical hermeneutics, with the lower blade
provided by the different scholarly techniques of interpretation (600-601).
221
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four dimensions: experiences and lack of experience; insights and lack of insights;
judgments and failures to judge; various patterns of experiencing making up the
polymorphism of human consciousness. The universal viewpoint is simply the potential,
full range of possible combinations of the aforesaid dimensions of meaning, ordered
genetically and dialectically. Situating any given, particular interpretation within the
universal viewpoint empowers the interpreter with a full range of possible alternatives in
which the original author’s meaning may be recreated. Since the universal viewpoint has
its basis in the adequate, explicit self-knowledge of the interpreter and the explicit
metaphysics that follows from such self-knowledge, the universal viewpoint is implied
and contained within the science of metaphysical wisdom. 222

3 Summary: Metaphysical and Epistemological Dimensions of Wisdom

On one hand we recall the Thomist identification of wisdom with metaphysics
(first philosophy) and of the wise man as the one who knows the real. On the other hand,
we have Lonergan’s notion of rational self-appropriation—especially its initiation and
crystallization in the self-affirmation of the knower—as the foundation of metaphysics
and, in fact, of all expansions of knowledge. In this sense, the basic notion of selfappropriation at large would seem to take on the role of wisdom in Insight.
And yet Lonergan clearly, albeit indirectly, transposes Thomist wisdom from its
base in Aristotelian theory to a more multidimensional unfolding in interiority with
greater specification than a mere equivalence of Thomist wisdom with “Lonerganian”
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self-affirmation. In Insight, that greater specification consists in a differently (and more
clearly) ordered relationship between epistemology and metaphysics than found in
Verbum. While Verbum explicitly distinguished metaphysical wisdom from
epistemological wisdom, it only implicitly hinted that wisdom’s epistemological function
may be the basis of its metaphysical function. It was Lonergan’s contention that the
commensuration between intellect and intelligible known by epistemological wisdom is a
distinction within being that can be known through a development of understanding and
affirmed as real in a self-reflective judgment.
We noticed that issues of ontology (metaphysics), psychology (cognition), and
epistemology are clearly distinguished in Verbum, with the metaphysical and
epistemological aspects of wisdom differentiated and the intrinsic tension between them
held in unity by the cognitional reframing of wisdom as self-knowledge. However,
distinctions among metaphysics, psychology, and epistemology are not fully concretized
or systematized in Verbum in the form of a full-fledged method, as in the case of
generalized empirical method in Insight. In Insight Lonergan consistently upholds and in
fact performs a clear and distinct order among these three, with cognitional theory
coming before epistemology and metaphysics, not only chronologically but also in
principle and order of derivation.
In Insight the connection between epistemological wisdom and metaphysical
wisdom is clearly and explicitly derivative, since the reflective insight of the selfaffirmation of the knower is precisely what grounds our knowledge of the metaphysical
elements of potency, form, and act. And so it is only after the self-affirmation of the
knower has been made in Chapter Eleven that the two epistemological chapters on the
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notion of being and the notion of objectivity can emerge, and the next four chapters on
metaphysics can be properly grounded. 223
The path laid out in Insight’s “slogan”—from thoroughly understanding what it is
to understand to the broad lines of all there is to be understood, and to all further
developments of understanding—is not a simplistic, abstract deduction or an execution of
a merely analytic syllogism. Instead, the path from the self-affirmation of the knower to
an explicit metaphysics is the cluster of ever-growing and consolidating insights
gradually rising to the universal viewpoint that is an ordered totality of viewpoints. 224

See CWL 3: 398 for Lonergan’s synopsis on the relationship between the self-affirmation of the knower
in Chapter Eleven and the notion of being in Chapter Twelve.
224
CWL 3: 22 and 588. Coelho discusses the universal viewpoint in Insight as being a “type of wisdom
insofar as it is a grasp of order in the universe of meanings.” It is, at the same time, the dialectical aspect of
the explicit metaphysics of Insight, because this metaphysics incorporates the universe of meanings into the
universe of being. Because it integrates all particular heuristic structures, metaphysics is analogous to the
habit of wisdom’s grasp of universal order (Hermeneutics and Method, 74, 85, and 96, with quote on 74).
223
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Chapter Three: Sapientia in the Quest for Theological Foundations: The Emergence
of Method and the Ascension of Conversion in the Gregorian Courses (1957-1964)
In the late 1950s and early to mid-1960s, many of Lonergan’s ideas on the subject
underwent development in dialogue with the hermeneutical and historical discoveries of
nineteenth-century German philosophy. Lonergan himself mentions three specific
courses that he taught at the Gregorian University—De intellectu et methodo, De
systemate et historia, and De methodo theologiae—as his attempt to grapple with the
issues of this Geisteswissenschaften. 225 The “eventual outcome” of such an encounter
was Method in Theology, but what becomes of wisdom in the middling years between the
two epic bookends of Insight and Method? 226

1 De intellectu et methodo (1959): Wisdom as Method’s Companion

The answer resides in the various ways that Lonergan approaches and solves the
questions posed by the development of knowledge in history. Put most generally, this
problem is the question of method, or how to go about the process of coming to know. In
the De intellectu et methodo course he taught at the Gregorian in the spring of 1959,
Lonergan highlights the historical emergence of method as a crucial philosophical and
theological problematic from two different angles: the challenge raised by the trifold

CWL 13: 232-233.
Between the publication of Insight in 1957 and the De intellectu et methodo course in 1959 there lies De
redemptione, a text of paramount importance in Lonergan’s account of divine wisdom. Research by Crowe
indicates that the date of completion was most likely around 1958. See The Redemption, tr. Michael G.
Shields and ed. Robert M. Doran, H. Daniel Monsour, and Jeremy D. Wilkins, Collected Works of Bernard
Lonergan 9 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2018), xv-xvi. Hereafter The Redemption is cited as CWL 9.
Because its focus on divine wisdom represents a unique instance in Lonergan’s thought on sapientia, De
redemptione will be analyzed in the Conclusion in its connection to further avenues of research.
225
226
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dilemma of foundations, chasm, and historicity in the development of knowledge, and the
challenge posed by the development of the notion of science. As will be seen shortly, the
solution to both challenges hinges upon wisdom understood as an intellectual habit.
Wisdom selects the terms forming the foundation of a science, makes judgments about
their actual existence, and properly orders the relations among terms—a solidly Thomist
account reminiscent of Verbum—and yet develops dramatically over time, mirroring the
concrete cognitive context already established by Insight. 227
Granting what Insight says about the act of questioning as the most fundamental
manifestation of the pure desire to know, 228 knowledge can be seen as an ordering of
serial arrangements of answers to a serial arrangement of questions. The process of
ordering answers to any one serial arrangement of questions is a relatively simple
manner: the principle of order is the technique of logical derivation, the process of
distinguishing primitive terms (definitions) and propositions from derived terms and
propositions. 229
System is defined as a virtual totality of propositions established from primitive
terms and propositions by means of a technique of derivation alone. But what is the
principle of order among different systems? The application of a technique of derivation
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Insight, which was covered in the last chapter, was published in 1957. In the summer of 1958, Lonergan
gave a series of lectures on Insight at St. Mary’s University in Halifax, which later came to be edited and
titled as Understanding and Being (CWL 5). Since it repeats much of the same material as Insight but also
incorporates more extensively the existential language and theme of “horizon,” a notion that becomes
increasingly important to Lonergan’s thought, I save my commentary on Understanding and Being until the
fifth chapter.
228
CWL 3: 33-34.
229
Bernard J.F. Lonergan, “Understanding and Method [De intellectu et methodo],” in Early Works on
Theological Method 2, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and Daniel Monsour, Collected
Works of Bernard Lonergan 23 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013), 17. Hereafter Early Works on
Theological Method 2 is cited as CWL 23. By primitive terms Lonergan means to indicate not necessarily
self-evident or necessary ones, but definitions that are not derived from other definitions according to some
deductive technique. CWL 23: 18-19.
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within the same system does not always yield the solution to a new problem; a new
system is necessary, but this also is not always borne out of any logical technique.
At the heart of this dilemma is the distinction between a closed, complete system
and an open, incomplete one. In a closed system the sum of questions equals the sum of
answers. As the system is complete, no more answers can be derived in response to new
questions. In contrast, an open system is incomplete; the sum of questions is greater than
the sum of available answers. 230 For these new questions to find an adequate response, 231
there must be a transition from one ordering, which raises a set of questions it cannot
answer, to another ordering.

1.1 Wisdom as a Foundational Bridge in Historical Development

Lonergan explores three instances of this problematic scenario posited by the
growth of knowledge, what he describes as “three logically distinct aspects of one real
problem, that of method.” 232 There is the problem of the transition from an old ordering
to a new one, which he calls the problem of foundations; the problem of maintaining and
accounting for continuity from one ordering to another, or the problem of historicity; and
CWL 23: 19 and 30-39.
The conception of system in terms of questions vis-à-vis answers is a significant one; as Lonergan will
communicate it in the De methodo theologiae course from the spring of 1962, “All method begins from
questions to which an answer is to be found” (CWL 23: 387). The moment in which the need for a new
ordering is brought to conscious reflection is an intellectually pregnant one, but one that is often delayed in
intellectual history. As an example, Lonergan explains that if the technique of symbolic logic were to be
applied to Scholastic method, the urgent need for a new ordering would become immediately obvious,
since the existence of eternally controversial questions—questions that are unsolvable a priori—manifests
the problem of method (CWL 23: 35; cf. CWL 18:110). In his later writings, Lonergan will interpret the
occurrence of more questions than answers as the sign of an open mind, and the explicit acknowledgment
of this discrepancy as the motivation and accommodation of transcendental method. See CWL 14: 17-18
and “Method: Trend and Variations,” in A Third Collection, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky,
Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 16 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017), 15. Hereafter A Third
Collection is cited as CWL 16.
232
CWL 23: 49.
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the problem of an ever-greater number and ever-greater systematization of orderings,
which become more and more conceptually distant from their sources, or the problem of
the chasm. In each of these conundrums, a new totality of propositions requires a new
ordering and thus new primitive propositions and a new technique of derivation—in other
words, a new principle of development. For each of these, Lonergan cites wisdom as the
principle of development by which new meaning emerges from human intelligence. 233
Dogmatic development raises the question of foundations. How can the same
doctrine possess the same meaning while new questions provoke new and ever-deeper
understanding, even to the point of showing previous understanding insufficient?
Describing wisdom as a kind of deus ex machina in the transition from one ordering to
the next, Lonergan ascribes to wisdom the function of judging the best way to order a
virtual totality capable of receiving several different orders. It draws conclusions from
indemonstrable principles, judges the truth and type of intelligibility of the connection
between terms, judges the validity of different kinds of reasoning, and generates new
systems of knowledge by creating novel orderings of truths. “It judges the purpose of the
ordering; whether, when, and how the former ordering is to be kept, or to be extended, or
whether a new ordering is to be introduced.” 234
A conceptual foundation revolving around judgments within the mind (“an
internal foundation manifested externally”) cannot pretend to resolve disputes regarding
different conceptions of being in the philosophy of history, much less can an external
foundation whose ultimate basis is only preconceived definitions of terms, about which
many philosophers disagree. But when one places foundations in the development of
233
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preconceptual operations of human intelligence as they are developed and perfected
through the intellectual habits of understanding, science, and wisdom, one is able to more
and more clearly grasp the concrete intelligibility in sensible data; more and more
accurately grasp the meaning of the most primitive terms; and more and more correctly
judge the nexuses among them, which in turn form the principles of new definitions and
new propositions in the new orderings. 235
Against myriad objections that would exclude wisdom as a foundation because it
seems that humans are, in the concrete, exactly the opposite of wise, Lonergan assures us
that wisdom itself is a moving foundation. Wisdom itself grows and develops from “an
initial degree.” 236 In its humble beginnings, wisdom is a type of foreknowledge of the
whole of undifferentiated being, given in the notion of being present in each of us
through the same human nature we share and manifested in our common, natural desire
to know. Far from being an all-or-nothing acquisition, the habit of wisdom not only
grows in degrees but is itself the principle of all growth in knowledge.
Lonergan describes the problem of historicity as an enormous conundrum
disrupting theology ever since the Renaissance. Because the causes of knowing are not
identical to the causes of being, the historical path of discovery (also called the way of
resolution or the analytical way) is not the same as the systematic-theoretical path of
teaching (also called the way of composition or the synthetic way). 237 In and of itself, the
existence of these two ways of proceeding are not problematic and do not necessarily
imply two different theologies, for the same totality of propositions can be ordered in two
CWL 23: 53 and 55.
CWL 23: 65. And, along with the habits of understanding and science, wisdom is present to varying
degrees in different persons. See “Analysis Fidei,” the course Lonergan taught at Regis College in 1952
(CWL 19: 467).
237
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different ways. In fact, when history is ignored, the corresponding elements of the two
ways are perfectly equivalent; it is only their order that is reversed.
But the same thing is not understood the same systematically and historically, and
so an awareness that distinguishes and relates the two ways is all the more necessary. For
example, when accounting for the historical development of theology, one must admit not
only that the notion of divine missions comes first in the way of analysis and last in the
way of composition but that the understandings of such a notion are actually different
throughout history. St. Paul does not understand divine mission the same way that St.
Thomas does. 238
Admitting that concepts change in history as the human subjects intending them
undergo change, no logical process can transition us coherently from an analytic ordering
of knowledge to a synthetic ordering of knowledge on a given topic. As Lonergan puts it,
“There is a certain leap here.” 239 But such a leap cannot be a sharply discrete jump from
one mountain to another; a bridge must be built if continuity among different
understandings of the same dogma is to be defended. The bridge Lonergan constructs is a
rough sketch of “the fundamental stages in the development of the human mind,” 240 for
to systematically distinguish the diverse stages of human growth is to give an explanatory
account of the different ways concepts have changed in history. In De intellectu et
methodo Lonergan identifies three stages of the human mind: the symbolic, the linguist,
and the theoretic. 241
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In regard to the problem of historicity, Lonergan notes that the increase in
science, understanding, and wisdom is intrinsically tied to the life of the senses, different
syntheses between the life of the intellect and that of the senses develop through history.
As wisdom is less developed, “a sensation–like mode of concept formation” dominates,
whereas a more methodical, scientific-systematic mode of concept formation comes to
the fore as wisdom grows. Implicitly, the reader realizes that the growth in the subject
that allows for such concept formation to develop is the intellectual conversion of
Insight’s Chapter Eleven, which affirms the rational consciousness of the knower and
especially one of its major metaphysical implications: being is the object of the act of
understanding, not a thing that is “already out there now.” 242
The issue of the chasm also stems from different historical syntheses between the
life of the senses and the life of the intellect. As diverse relations between these two
major principles within the human subject, such syntheses constitute ever-multiplying
orderings that beg for ever more complex systematizations.243 The homoousian
controversy of the third and fourth centuries serves as a paramount example of the
turmoil engendered by the seeming dichotomy between the language of the Gospel and
technical philosophical terms.
Lonergan uses the language of Insight to bridge this chasm: the intellect
understands intelligible form in sensible data, and insight pivots between the concrete and
the abstract. If wisdom is the principle of order as well as the principle of correct
judgments about the ordering of orderings, then it belongs to wisdom to judge of the
different relationships between intellect and sense in the way that systematic theology
242
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utilizes non-systematic sources, such as symbolic, intersubjective, and commonsense
meanings. 244

1.2 Wisdom as Parallel to Modern Science

Another way that Lonergan communicates the urgency of method is by
demonstrating how dramatically the notion of science has changed over time. Here
Lonergan draws a remarkable analogy: “as philosophy is to wisdom, science is to
method.” 245 The ancient Greeks conceived of philosophy as birthed from a love for
wisdom, and as a type of wisdom practice; modern science is birthed from method and is,
de facto, a type of methodical practice. Science is enacted method, with method
understood not as a vitally, intelligently conscious application of directives. 246 Such
directives themselves issue from human understanding, especially from its highest
perfection in the right judgment that is wisdom, the turning of the intellect from a
commonsense to a scientific-systematic understanding of the whole of being.
The “lag time” between scientific practice and reflection is troublesome on
account of the subject and the subject’s need for intellectual conversion. Lonergan
presents a compelling case for the need of science to be liberated from basic
philosophical counterpositions. These scientific aberrations necessitate the application of
one of the rules of general method: reverse counterpositions.
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1.3 Wisdom and Theological Method

The five directives comprising Lonergan’s general method—understand,
understand systematically, develop positions, reverse counterpositions, and accept
responsibility for judging—connote everything that is a priori in any and all sciences,
which, when joined with the a posteriori element of relevant data, fuels scientific
exploration. Because the five rules of general method are founded on the nature of the
human intellect, which remains fundamentally the same however its desire to know takes
form, it applies equally to every branch of knowledge while remaining pliable enough to
modify itself to particular subject matters. General method must be adapted for theology
according to an analogy of truth, since the formal object of theology is God, who so
utterly transcends every human category as to be unknowable in God’s self. In fact, the
notion of truth must be expanded in theology to include not just what we can understand
but what God understands, the whole supernatural order of revelations. 247
But theologians do understand, although imperfectly and analogically, the truths
that God has revealed. Lonergan contends that the very subject matter of theology calls
for “a radical transformation of all our rules” and, as a matter of method, must “be treated
by way of a special technique” 248 that makes room for divine wisdom. Rather than
progressing from data through understanding to the truth of judgment, as the other
sciences do, theology begins with the truth of judgment—the intellectual assent of faith to
revealed truths—and climaxes with an understanding of divine truth. As in several other
texts, in De intellectu et methodo Lonergan makes his own Vatican I’s admonition for
247
248

CWL 23: 117; 153; 165; 177; 209-213.
CWL 23: 209 and 153, respectively.

111
theologians to strive for an imperfect, analogical, but still highly fruitful understanding of
the divine mysteries. And so the central core of his theological method, the “special way
of proceeding,” is by analogy with what human reason can know naturally, from the
interconnections among the mysteries of faith, and from the final end of man. 249
As in any other science, theologians must not shirk the responsibility of judgment,
but theological judgments are of a special type: “A judgment is made in accordance with
a certain wisdom. But the only wisdom adequate for judging about an understanding of
the faith is the wisdom of God, which theologians do not possess.” 250 Just as the starting
point of theology is a divinely elevated yet still reasonable surrender to divine revelation,
the terminus of theological method is humble submission to divine wisdom as it lives in
and guides us through the teachings of the church.

1.4 Wisdom and General Method

But true theological understanding is not just a matter of the proper mindset of the
subject but actually of a wholesale transformation of the subject, a conversion: “But the
real problem is in the subject, who must be turned from his own world to the universe.
Hence there is no question here of deducing further elements from those that are known,
but of transforming the knower himself.” 251 In De intellectu et methodo, intellectual
conversion is characterized as the movement from a symbolic and commonsense
understanding to a methodical, scientific-systematic one. Conversion in this context is the
transition from the more narrow horizon of commonsense understanding, which seeks
CWL 23: 211 and 213; cf. CWL 12: 11-20.
CWL 23: 215.
251
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only to understand determinate situations—only a particular section of the universe—to
the entire universe of being, especially the basic principles constituting the foundations of
a given science and, in the case of metaphysics, all of being, ens commune. 252
But wisdom is the intellectual habit that acknowledges the first principles of all
reality. And so in De intellectu et methodo, wisdom and intellectual conversion would
seem to be identical in the actual search for scientific-systematic understanding, with
intellectual conversion as the cognitional transposition of the metaphysical category of
wisdom as a speculative virtue. Insight states the same, but in De intellectu et methodo
Lonergan debuts his identification of wisdom with intellectual conversion on a new
stage—an account of both general and theological method. Therefore, the second precept
of general method is to understand systematically: to aim at a complete explanation of all
phenomena such that the whole universe is understood as a unity in and through the
intelligible relations of its parts, an enterprise that is impossible without intellectual
conversion. Because no one is born with such knowledge—not even with the idea that
systematic understanding is the ultimate goal of our desire to know—such understanding
grows only gradually in human history through ongoing conversion, paralleling the
growth of wisdom discussed under the problem of foundations. 253
Lonergan denotes wisdom as a moving foundation with roots in the notion of
being and a full blossoming only in our final union with divine wisdom, 254 but method is
the concrete set of directives that guides wisdom’s growth, while wisdom is the driving
force behind the correct application of method. Lonergan remarks that while method can
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assist us in employing our own judgment, it never stands in for actual judging, 255 and
here wisdom is still thought of as the intellectual habit empowering right judgment. And
the virtue of wisdom still operates as the metaphysical equivalence of intellectual
conversion, which is at the very core of methodologic problems, theological and
otherwise.
Thus in De intellectu et methodo Lonergan places wisdom and method in a
relationship of reciprocity, but with method beginning to take over some of the functions
of wisdom: “All knowledge is an accumulation of acts. The function of method is merely
to direct, to order, to foster, and to approve such a series of acts.” 256 While wisdom is still
the principle of right judgment that assures the fruitful application of method, it is telling
that method is depicted here as ordering, the paramount function traditionally ascribed to
wisdom: “New questions can be solved only by changing the way of ordering responses
according to a new method, which is simply not to be found in theological works at the
present time.” 257 If De intellectu et methodo draws the analogical relationship between
philosophy and wisdom and science and method as one of enactment, then the conceptual
lines between wisdom and method run parallel, leaving unanswered the question of
whether they may at some point converge. 258
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Lonergan tells us that “Method need only make explicit what is implicit in the
structure of the intellectual process,” 259 and we can assume that “the intellectual process”
in question entails all of the cognitional components laid out in Insight. In this spring
1959 course at the Gregorian University, Lonergan retains the metaphysical category of
wisdom as an intellectual habit while simultaneously linking it to the practical application
of method, where method is conceived as a set of concrete cognitional precepts, and to
intellectual conversion, where intellectual conversion is conceived as the key unlocking a
whole host of methodological quandaries. At the very least, wisdom is employed in this
text as both a metaphysical and a cognitional category: an intellectual habit and an
ongoing process of conversion. 260

2 Topics in Education: The Role of Science and Education in Developing Wisdom
In Topics in Education, a series of lectures Lonergan gave in Cincinnati in the
summer of 1959, Lonergan mentions wisdom under his exploration of “the new
learning,” which he regards as a “transformation of fundamental concepts regarding what
learning is.” 261 The novelty of the new learning that must be judiciously embraced by the
Catholic educator includes, among other things, the modern differentiation of science that
explicit distinction on Lonergan’s part between wisdom and method in this text, my interpretation is
perhaps more literal than Dadosky’s. However, Dadosky agrees that the transposition of wisdom into
method “had just begun” in 1959 and was not completely effected until the breakthrough to functional
specialization formalized in Method in Theology. See “Lonergan on Wisdom,” 66.
259
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260
Interestingly, in this text method is also sometimes conceived in more metaphysical language as a means
to an end (CWL 23: 4-5, esp. n. 3). Conceiving of method in this way reveals its intrinsically problematic
nature, as it begs the question of the most fitting way to adapt means to an unknown end. While knowledge
is being pursued, the to-be-known is unknown, leaving us with the problem of how to discern the means
toward an unknown end.
261
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Lonergan incorporates more and more deeply into his notion of theology in the late 1950s
and early 1960s. This new differentiation shifts focus from the formal object of a given
science to the group of operations the scientist employs to study that object, a forerunner
to transcendental method and a theme given further attention in the 1960 course De
systemate et historia.
Far from simply an incremental addition of new knowledge, modern science is a
perfection in the very notion of science. The evolution in the content and especially in the
notion of science mimics the genesis of wisdom, whose paradoxical growth was
unraveled at greater length months earlier in the De intellectu et methodo course. Just as
wisdom starts as an incipient view of the whole and moves from this rudimentary base to
more detailed delineations of being that solidify through a gradual accumulation of
insights, scientific wisdom also relies on a gradual accumulation of insights. As in the
Gregorian course, wisdom in Topics is a “foundation that lies ahead,” 262 and modern
scientific wisdom follows this same paradoxical pattern.
Scientific development is a gradual accumulation of insights marked by a
movement toward rather than an actual possession of absolute certainty, since knowledge
of the universe is always maturing, gathering more information about conditions, the
virtually unconditioned, and the nexus between the two. Such scientific development
requires the perfection of judgment that is wisdom—a capacity for knowing whether or
not there are further relevant questions to answer before assent can be given, and which
questions are the most relevant. Here Lonergan continues a major thread of thought,
running through Insight and suggested by the directives in De intellectu et methodo, that

262

CWL 10: 150.

116
rewrites modern science, especially its loyalty to method, as a new form of wisdom
(although not the only one).
Modern science is sapiential: it seeks to know the entire universe of being,
everything in relation to everything. “It [science] is closing in upon a wisdom in the
measure that its differentiation of being becomes ever fuller, ever more exact, and
extends an ever wider embrace.” 263 This new form of wisdom, the “new learning,” is to
be embraced by the contemporary educator, because in helping fill out pupils’ knowledge
of beings’ interrelationships, she develops her pupils’ view of the whole, first given in
wonder, and thereby imparts wisdom.
To help one’s students become familiar with the recurring pattern of their own
basic mental operations, Lonergan implies, is the wisest pedagogy, and exactly what
allows those same students to rightly order the objects of diverse sciences. For a Catholic
philosophy of education to successfully negotiate the new learning by seriously
addressing the problem of historicity, it must transcend mere repetition of first principles
and true propositions. Rather, it must become a concrete and existential wisdom to
support “the individual coming to grips with the meaning for him of true propositions.” 264
Here wisdom is still referenced along the lines of Thomas as the habit that selects
the terms—first and foremost the notion of being—that intellectus uses to construct
analytic principles, as in many of Lonergan’s earlier works. And the discernment of the
correct notion of being from false conceptions is dialectical; even the authentic
development of natural science calls for the conversion of the subject, the transformation
of the scientist himself (another echo from De intellectu et methodo). Because growth in
263
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wisdom is dialectical and naturally limited, a Catholic philosophy of education must open
itself to the ultimate perfection of God’s wisdom—God’s knowledge of God’s essence
and of everything else in that essence, the “total perfect view of the whole.” 265

3 De systemate et historia: Wisdom as the Master Operatory Habit

In both the spring 1959 and spring 1961 notes for his course De intellectu et
methodo, Lonergan contrasts the Greek notion of science with the modern one. He asks
whether the various methodologies behind modern science can account for the
development of these divergent notions and, if so, what such an account might mean for
Catholic theology, its claim to be a science, its internal divisions, and its employment of
method (or lack thereof). In the spring 1959 course he provides five rules of general
method and claims that they can be adapted, through the use of analogy, to the
specialized subject matter of theology. But in the 1961 repetition of the same course, he
insists that it is not adequate to conceive of science only analogically; the problem of
foundations must be solved, all the more so because a “new historical ideal” has entered
into contemporary theological ambition. 266
In the 1959 course De systemate et historia, Lonergan scrutinizes the modern
historical ideal itself, especially its claim to be scientific. Lonergan leverages modern
history’s scientific attributes—both classical and modern—to transcend the dialectical
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This same point is repeated in “System and History [De systemate et historia],” in Early Works on
Theological Method 2, trans. Michael G. Shields and ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, CWL
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265
266

118
opposition between Greek science and modern science in favor of a higher synthesis. The
classical Greek ideal of science aims at what is abstract, static, universal, and certain,
whereas the modern ideal targets the concrete, dynamic, particular, and probable. Modern
history exhibits traits of classical science insofar as it is knowledge through causes and
seeks the intelligibility in human happenings, and of modern science insofar as it
abandons certitude in favor of increasingly probable conclusions gleaned from several
different perspectives on the same topic, some of which will invite development, while
others reversal. 267
Lonergan goes on to elaborate that modern history, as with all modern sciences,
conjoins two distinct movements: a movement from below, in the sense data that is
inquired into, and a movement from above, in the outworkings of an explanatory system
that, while only a working hypothesis, represents the science as it currently is. But the
upper operator itself changes as the science progresses as a whole, producing a series of
histories (a series of perspectives on the data) giving rise to the question of “whether a
system of perspectives can be devised and delineated.” 268 Such a system could fruitfully
guide the progression of a science, enfolding the development of positions and the
reversal of counterpositions into a larger, explicit, regularly occurring system.
When this prospect is applied to the history of philosophy, what is sought is a
philosophy of philosophies with the potential not only to foster future philosophical
knowledge but also to serve as an explanatory system that unites all of the sciences
because it pertains to knowing and the known, issues of maximum universality. Such a
philosophy of philosophies would form the starting point for the systematic way or way
267
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of composition. But to help explain different faith claims as well—a task sure to interest
Catholic theology—a system distinct from and more foundational than a philosophy of
philosophies would be necessary, covering both reason and faith.
Lonergan gives a rough sketch of the diverse shapes such a system might assume.
What Lonergan details in the last and perhaps most significant segment of De systemate
et historia, as well as throughout the handwritten notes from the same 1959 course, is a
system of operational potency. Influenced by his reading of Piaget, Lonergan calls such a
system the circle of operations. 269

3.1 The Circle of Operations

Of course the notion of a concrete set of regularly recurring and mutually
interdependent operations is at the heart of Insight’s project of cognitive selfappropriation. Each operation has its presupposition in another, and each has its
completion in another. Experience presupposes the data of sense and/or consciousness;
understanding presupposes experience as that into which inquiry is to be made; judgment
presupposes a concept to be verified and either affirmed or denied. The data of sense and
consciousness present not as merely random givenness but as patterned, or ordered;
experience is illumined by the activity of insight and is given intelligibility by acts of
understanding; and acts of understanding become fully substantive and pass into the
realm of truth in the rational assent or dissent of judgment. Once all three operations are
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present, interlocking with one another in the full sweep of human intelligence, the circle
is closed. 270
In De systemate et historia Lonergan claims that science—and, by extension, any
human endeavor considered to be a science, such as history, philosophy, or theology—
can be understood as a circle of operations, resulting in a “dynamics of system” pertinent
for understanding not only concrete, dynamic, sensible realities but also abstract, static,
intangible ones. Any circle of operations has its principle in an operatory intellectual
habit, its actual application in linked and composite cognitive operations, and its terminus
in a system of results with the same structure of interrelationships as that of the
operations. Understanding each of these three elements of the circle of operations enacted
in scientific endeavor, especially as they mirror the fundamental cognitive circle of
experiencing-understanding-judging, will prepare us to apply the same concept to
wisdom.
What is operated (the operable, or operabile) is simply that which can be operated
on; it is the presupposition of a finite operation. In relation to a habit, circle, or system, it
is material in relation to something more formal, although it may not be a literally
physical object. For example, an operable may be the internal experience of memory,
operated on by the act of insight. The operation itself is an intellectual act 271 and is the
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means by which an operable is transformed into something else, called the result, end, or
simply “something operated” (operatum). The fundamental circle of human cognition is
an example of successively linked operations, since the result of a previous operation is
taken as the presupposition—the operable—of the next operation in the series. 272 The
pattern of experiencing, understanding, and judging is also called composite since none
of the operations are identical and, when taken together, none of them form a cyclical
series wherein the first operable and the last resultant are identical. 273 Likewise, because
the work of scientific investigation involves conjoined tasks that depend on and are
fulfilled by others and issues forth new knowledge, scientific operations are both linked
and composite.
One of the unique contributions of De systemate et historia is Lonergan’s
discussion of the operatory habit (habitus operatorius). It is the active potency to a circle
of operations, with a different operatory habit empowering a different circle and effecting
a distinct differentiation of consciousness in the subject. 274 Lonergan emphasizes three
attributes of an operatory habit. First, in contrast to the Scholastic notion of operative
habit, which informs one potency, an operatory habit can reside in many different
potencies simultaneously, or even in many different operators, as in a community of
scholars or social institution. Next, its purpose is the attainment of truth, a purely
intellectual end; its birthplace and playground are the intellectual pattern of experience, in
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which the detached and disinterested desire to know unfolds unencumbered by
instrumentality of any kind. Finally, it is known by its operator explicitly; knowledge of
an operatory habit occurs in actu signato, by objective reflection on its operation. In
contrast, common sense understanding is not cognizant of its weaknesses and limitations,
because it is, by definition, simply not self-aware. 275
The structural identity between the generic template of habit-circle-system
implicated in the fundamental circle of cognition implies something intriguing. The
functional order among the operations of experiencing-understanding-judging and the
isomorphism between each of these cognitive operations and the correspondent
metaphysical element is replicated, at some level, in all scientific processes. In this way,
the structure and interrelationships of the sciences are derived from the fundamental
circle of cognition.

3.1.1 Wisdom as the Master Operatory Habit

But what is the habit that recognizes the turnings of the fundamental circle of
cognition? Of course the light of agent intellect—transposed here, as in Verbum, as
wonder, the desire for knowledge 276—is the lever that turns the wheel of cognition and
sustains its motion. But the movement of the wheel and an appreciation of its motion are
two different things, with wisdom embodying the latter. Wisdom is mentioned only once
in the typed and handwritten notes of De systemate et historia, in a reprisal of the section
on wisdom in Insight that describes its dual role as first philosophy and as gift of the
275
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Holy Spirit, with the addition of a reference to Insight itself. To the question of “What is
the genesis of wisdom?”, Lonergan replies that the procedure for gaining wisdom is the
self-appropriation espoused and taught in Insight, with a basic outline of Insight’s
chapters. 277 Because wisdom has already been established in prior texts as the fruit of
self-appropriation, we can patch together a rough interpretation of wisdom in De
systemate et historia by considering its content on self-appropriation, despite the spare
references to wisdom in the text itself.
The novelty that De systemate et historia brings to Lonergan’s thought on selfappropriation is the notion and language of the circle of operations. In this context
wisdom is the personal appropriation of the fundamental circle of cognitive operations as
its constant and undeniable action constitutes our very identity as knowers. Understood as
its own circle of operations, wisdom takes on the entire cognitive pattern of experiencingunderstanding-judging as its operables and transforms it into a self-reflective knowledge
of conscious identity: the self-affirmation of the knower, familiar from Insight. The
ongoing submission of experiencing-understanding-judging—taken together as a
symbolic group—to the self-reflective acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging
gradually develops a unique and powerful inner self-awareness and self-knowledge.
In other words, wisdom is the ongoing process of appropriating one’s own
experiencing, understanding, and judging by experiencing, understanding, and judging
one’s own experiencing, understanding and judging. It is what Lonergan will describe in
Method in Theology as “applying the operations as intentional to the operations as
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conscious.” 278 In the language of De systemate et historia, wisdom is an operatory habit;
its operation is the reflection on one’s conscious performance as a knower; its system of
results is self-appropriation and its outworkings in a cognitional theory, an epistemology,
a metaphysics, and a methodology.
Wisdom is both operatory habit and overseer of all operatory habits. It can be
understood as what Lonergan dubs “operatory abstraction”: wisdom abstracts from
operables, operations, and resultants of each and every particular cognitive act to identify
the structural composition underlying all human thought. As operatory abstraction,
wisdom is the higher synthesis that overcomes the seemingly intractable dichotomy
between classical and modern science. Wisdom bridges the divide between the contingent
and the necessary, the changeable and the eternal, and the particular and the universal,
tracing back the two divergent rivers of classical and modern science to their common
wellspring in one identical pattern of cognitive operations. 279
Rather than idolizing the strengths of either the classical or modern ideal of
science to the exclusion of the other, wisdom recognizes that the act of insight grounds
the positive attributes of each ideal and unites them. Wisdom sees the pattern shining
forth from behind the mottled, multiform silhouettes of a million different habits and a
billion operations, and deciphers their ultimate meaning: the yearning of the human mind
for being, known in the totality of true judgments, penetrates through its every movement
as it strives to reach the Divine Source of all being and all truth.
In summary, as an acquired, natural virtue, wisdom develops only in tandem with
the actuation and development of other circles of operations for other tasks, since its job
278
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is to reflect on the performance of other tasks. It grounds the operations that culminate in
the self-affirmation of the knower. Like the Thomist wisdom that is metaphysics, the
wisdom that is operatory abstraction unites the sciences by providing basic terms and
principles. Diverse sciences obtain their material differentiation from diverse operables;
their formal differentiation from diverse circles of operations; and their “originating
unity” from the fundamental cognitive circle. 280

3.2 A New Definition of “Primitive Terms”

If wisdom is understood as the master operatory habit—indeed, as the operatory
abstraction that unites all operatory habits—then an additional and elegant aspect of
Lonergan’s transposition of Thomist wisdom comes to light. We have already seen that
one of the primary notions of wisdom in Aquinas has its context in the trifecta of
intellectus-scientia-sapientia, where wisdom is the principle of order and judgment with
regard to the primitive terms and first principles grasped by understanding. This
connotation of wisdom is affirmed by Lonergan in the spring 1959 course De intellectu et
methodo in connection with foundations. While not negating the essential role of habits in
human life, 281 in De systemate et historia Lonergan suggests another, complementary
meaning of “terms.”
As often used by both Aquinas and Lonergan, a term denotes the definition of a
fundamental, often metaphysical, concept in philosophy. But in the context of a circle of
operations, the fundamental terms are the operations themselves; fundamental properties
CWL 23: 341-344; 348.
In fact, in this text Lonergan seems to strongly emphasize the influence of habits, both personal and
public, in sociocultural development. See CWL 23: 333-334.
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(perhaps analogous to principles) are relations among the operations; and the formal
object (perhaps analogous to conclusions) is what is determined through the circle. 282
Over and against conceptual definition and employment of “terms,” which faces the
notorious difficulty of philosophical disagreement about their content, an operational
definition and employment of terms allows for the maximum normativity that human
intelligence can afford, because operational terms can be verified through sapiential selfreflection.
By analogy, we can apply the Thomist triad of terms (selected by wisdom) –
principles (grasped by understanding) – conclusions (drawn by science) as follows. As
the highest principle, the habit that discerns between being and not-being and knows the
highest cause, wisdom induces an expansion of consciousness. If the most fundamental
terms are the operations of experiencing, understanding, and judging, then the most
fundamental principle is the self-affirmation of the knower. And the most fundamental
conclusions are those that flow from such self-affirmation and are explored in cognitional
theory, epistemology, and metaphysics.

3.3 Horizon and Wisdom as a Circle of Operations

While the finality of the human intellect is to all being and the finality of the
human will is to all being and all good, our ability to consistently achieve such lofty ends
is greatly constrained by our limited horizons. Our interests are often inappropriately
narrowed, our spiritual interiority underdeveloped, and our intersubjectivity stunted, so
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that both the objects and subjects that ought to concern us shrink down to the small size
of our own biases, just as a material horizon hides what lies beyond. Horizon as a
psychological fact is a basic expression of human polymorphism, the ability we have to
shape ourselves in any number of different ways. 283
As a general notion, horizon can be thought of as a disposition. More specifically,
it can be defined as “the actual capacity a subject has to perform operations,” 284 a
capacity that marks the limits of that subject’s world. In turn, one’s own world is a
product of the tension between the “universal human finality” to all of being and the
limits of one’s particular horizon, with the likelihood that legion difficulties will arise
when one “world” attempts to communicate with another.
Another direct implication of horizon is the Scholastic principle that whatever is
received is received in accordance with the mode of the receiver, so that operables,
operatory habits, operations, and systems are all potentially skewed by the disposition of
the subject. Not everything can be equally assimilated by the same subject, nor can
different subjects assimilate the same operable equally well. Because horizon can narrow
one’s consciousness, any number of data can present and yet remain unable to be
assimilated. Because consciousness is selective and formative, what is beyond one’s
horizon cannot be assimilated. 285
In premature systematization, a group of operations attempts to act on everything
rather than the set of operables to which it is most suited. For example, in the case of the
neurotic, the fear of persecution becomes the heuristic for interpreting all of experience.
CWL 23: 223 and 338-340.
CWL 23: 369. Both the general and more specific notions of horizon are found in the spring 1962 course
De methodo theologiae, discussed below.
285
CWL 23: 261, 271, 315, 328-330, 335, 339-341, 369, 581-582.
283
284

128
And in premature closure, a group of operations takes on too little, so that one’s horizon
contracts, as in the student of Aquinas who avoids reading the most difficult passages and
is thus never challenged by the real possibility that he may be communicating something
foreign to her intellectual location. 286 Lonergan portrays premature systematization and
premature closure as inevitable dangers of all dynamics of system, yet indirectly points to
wisdom as the remedy for both problems.
It is by wisdom that we come to reflect on the fundamental pattern of operations
characterizing the thrust of our conscious life toward all being and all goodness, moving
us closer to the highest natural integration of our rational life possible and incrementally
closing the gap between the absolute object of intellect (all being) and the absolute object
of will (all good) and what we can effectively achieve (our horizon). Therefore, the
distortions of premature systematization and premature closure exhibited by dynamics of
systems can be overcome through wisdom, where wisdom is understood as the greatest
natural expansion of our horizon as human knowers. And since dynamics of system is a
powerful heuristic for analyzing sociocultural development, wisdom as an operatory habit
informing the lives of whole communities may have a major role to play in social change.

3.4 A Note on Order

Consciousness is always organized in some fashion, depending on a wide variety
of factors. Interest, bias, pattern of experience, habits, emotions, and values are only
some of the factors influencing the organization of consciousness on Lonergan’s account.

286
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An overriding but understated theme of De systemate et historia is the contention that
consciousness is much more existential than its reliance on external and internal data
might suggest, a claim he also makes for history. Every human endeavor requires the
selective, formative, and vitalizing functions of consciousness to order the relevant
materials (operables), means (operations), and ends (operated).
Aquinas tells us that wisdom is an intellectual habit that orders all things based on
knowledge of the highest cause, and Lonergan tells us that “nothing is absorbed unless it
is ordered within one’s consciousness.” 287 The limits of the subject’s horizon are
coextensive with the reach of the subject’s habits, already suggesting a connection
between horizon and wisdom. 288 Under the influence of wisdom, consciousness becomes
more effective, at every level, at establishing an order among operables, operations, and
operated that will best achieve the highest good of the subject, including the universal
finality of his intellect to all of being. The connection between the ordering power of
wisdom and the organized nature of consciousness explains why wisdom is eminently
applicable to such diverse topics as art and the scale of values. 289 For artistic potential
consists in the ability to apprehend and effect the order of sensible forms such that,

CWL 23: 297.
CWL 23: 369. The association between horizon and habit is reflected in the very language that Lonergan
uses to describe horizon: “All that lie within that horizon are apprehended, desired, and done with relative
ease, while one scarcely attends to or is capable of attending to whatever lies beyond it” (CWL 23: 369).
289
It seems that the question of order runs throughout both De intellectu et methodo and De systemate et
historia, with the underlying search for method begging the question of how to order means toward the end
of knowledge. The quest for a series of histories (and ultimately a philosophy of philosophies) in De
systemate et historia is the quest for an ultimate system that would identify the order of a priori elements of
human cognition, an order that could then be applied as a method to all future data of history, philosophy,
theology, and so on. To this end, even the preconceptual organization of consciousness that occurs in art is
relevant, as it may reveal a pattern relevant to methodology.
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together, they compose an intelligibility whose meaning is immanent in the ordered
materials themselves. 290
In addition, the natural human good is an ordered order, comprised of the mutual
relationship between particular goods and the social order, and between the social order
and values, which are the “superstructural conditions” at the heart of the human good.
While social schemes could not emerge without particular goods in place, social schemes
sustain the regular recurrence of particular goods, making such vital goods ultimately
subordinate. Likewise, the social order itself is subordinate to aesthetic, intellectual,
ethical, and religious values. Particular goods are proximately ordered to the emergence
of civilization (the social order, or otherwise simply called “the good of order”), and the
social order is proximately ordered to the service of values, which are precisely what
makes this or that particular social order good. There also exists an order operative in the
opposite direction: values are ordered to the flourishing of civilization, and civilization is
ordered to the regular recurrence of particular goods. 291
As a natural, acquired habit, wisdom ensures the smooth subordination of
particular goods to social schemes, and of social schemes to the embodiment of values,
which function as the highest aspect of the human good. As a supernatural gift, wisdom
elevates the entire natural human good, at each and all of its levels, toward the good of
union with the divine.
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4 De intellectu et methodo (1961) and a 1961 Lecture at Moraga: Wisdom
Understood “Methodically”
Perhaps moved by the publication of the 1960 collection of essays La crise de la
raison dans la pensée contemporaine, 292 the spring 1961 reprisal of Lonergan’s De
intellectu et methodo course at the Gregorian does not add much in the way of
fundamentally new material, but it does set some of the same material in a slightly
different context, that of the “ideal of reason.” 293 If the history of our intellectual striving
can be read as reason’s ongoing, genetic quest for sufficient self-education and selfconstitution, then the changing notion of science is a crucial flash point for reason’s
development.
Here again, as in the 1959 version of the same course, Lonergan contrasts the
Scotist voluntaristic notion of science, with its problematical divorce from concrete
existence, with Aquinas’ notion of science as the generation of conclusions from
principles. But precisely because Aquinas’ overwhelming concern lay with the world as it
is, his notion of science sprung from the living fountain of intellectual habits further
informing our native orientation toward truth. The larger point here is that a deductivistic
notion of science, according to which true conclusions are viewed as necessarily
following from principles without regard to the subject’s mindset or the intensely real
implications of the “Euclidean scandal,” 294 is only a counterpositional phase in reason’s
Lonergan reviewed this book in Gregorianum in 1963; his review was republished in Shorter Papers,
ed. Robert C. Croken, Robert M. Doran, and H. Daniel Monsour, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 20
(Toronto: University of Toronto, 2007), 234-236.
293
See editorial footnote 147 at the end of Chapter One (the spring 1959 De intellectu et methodo course)
of CWL 23 as well as all of Doran’s editorial report on the archival notes relevant to the spring 1961 De
intellectu et methodo course (CWL 23: 350-357).
294
The “Euclidean scandal” refers to the fact that entirely different but equally valid series of diverse
systems can be shown to necessarily follow from different sets of principles, a fact that, according to
Lonergan, went unnoticed for an extremely long time (CWL 23: 354-355).
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self-understanding and is, in fact, opposed to Aquinas’ more profound grasp of science as
stemming from acts of understanding, of insight.
The schematic notes from the 1961 De intellectu et methodo also mirror Insight’s
paradigm of wisdom as constituting both the first principle of philosophy and a gift of the
Holy Spirit. In Lonergan’s handwriting we find an arrow pointing from “the principle of
philosophy” to “epistemology” and another pointing from the same to the phrase
“wisdom grows in time.” 295 Lonergan’s denotation of wisdom as epistemology reminds
us, first, of the epistemological aspect of wisdom as embodied by intellectual conversion,
as explored incipiently in Verbum but explicitly in Insight. And his denotation of wisdom
as developing reminds us of his justification in the 1959 course of wisdom as a moving
foundation. His mention of wisdom in these two veins suggests that Lonergan in 1961
was retaining his previous insight into the existence of an epistemological function to
wisdom while beginning to allow a different, additional function for wisdom to surface—
a foundational function that is distinct from metaphysics and strangely connected with the
emergence of method, a connection with depths still to be plumbed.
The summer of 1961 found Lonergan delivering a set of lectures on Insight at St.
Mary’s College in Moraga, California. In a lecture entitled “Wisdom and SelfAppropriation,” he repeats much of the same material on wisdom as in Insight, explicitly
claiming, once again, that self-appropriation, as a source of wisdom, is the solution to the
epistemological problem. Even for scholastics, the epistemological problem is not an
abstract query of whether knowledge exists but the concrete, personal, and radical
investigation of how to acquire wisdom. This investigation cannot be completed by
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deducing from self-evident truths, for every truth in its precise meaning depends on a
determinate notion of ens, and the correct notion of ens is the function of wisdom.
In handwritten scribble at the end of the lecture notes, Lonergan seems to indicate
that wisdom’s familiar Thomist anthem—omnia ordinat et omnia iudicat—can be
accepted either in principle, or “methodically.” To understand wise order and wise
judgment “methodically” is to appropriate oneself as a knower, attending to how one
comes to actually know reality and the order in reality, rather than analytically parsing
out the need for an intellectual habit to do so. The self-appropriating subject is ultimate
because she is the source of meaning; her wisdom discerns being. In 1961, however, the
relationship between self-appropriation as the “methodical genesis of the wisdom on
which all philosophy depends” 296 and the fundamental set of cognitive operations
(including decision) that will become the transcendental method of 1972 is not yet forged
in a strong and formal sense.
5 De methodo theologiae (Spring 1962) and Regis College Institute “On the Method
of Theology” (Summer 1962): Wisdom and Method Closer Still
In the spring 1962 course De methodo theologiae at the Gregorian University,
Lonergan turns his attention to theological method proper. Whereas De systemate et
historia spoke of circles of operations springing from an operatory habit residing in many
subjects, here in the spring of 1962 he speaks of complete groups of combinations of
differentiated operations. The emphasis is on the collaboration among different
combinations of operations toward a common aim—the integration of the intelligible
From “Wisdom and Self-Appropriation,” a lecture Lonergan gave on Insight in the summer of 1961 at
St. Mary’s College in Moraga, California. See Archive Entry 18740DTE060, 4, at
https://www.bernardlonergan.com/archiveitem.php?id=1214. Accessed on January 31, 2019.
296

134
world (which includes doctrines and theology), the interior subject, and the visible world
(the world of common sense and dramatic-practical life, including community). Within
such an integration is to be resolved the dichotomy between theology conceived as an
ideal, eternally immutable science of the intelligible world and theology conceived as a
positivist study of changeable, visible tendencies in history. 297
In addition to this first problematic, in the spring 1962 course De methodo
theologiae Lonergan also discusses a second problematic, concerned with theology as a
mediated and subalternate science and its relation to the other sciences. Lonergan
presents much of the same core material, though in a slightly different format, at the
Regis College institute on theological method in the summer of 1962, and so these texts
will be analyzed in tandem with one another. 298
He begins both courses by explaining the goal of methodology. Method deals
immediately with operations, and only mediately (through operations) with subjects and
objects. The material object is what a science studies; the formal object is the specific
angle from which it is studied. Theology’s material object is God, but its formal object is
God as revealed in the meaning of God’s word and the order of the Body of Christ. De
facto formal objects can be considered under the ratione of being grasped in and through
a certain group of combinations of differentiated operations. 299

“The Method of Theology [De methodo theologiaie],” in Early Works on Theological Method 2, trans.
Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, CWL 23 (Toronto: University of
Toronto, 2013), 365-366, especially ed. n. 5, and 429-445.
298
See the “Regis College Institute ‘On the Method of Theology,’ 9-20 July 1962,” in Early Works on
Theological Method 1, ed. Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken, CWL 22 (Toronto: University of
Toronto, 2010), 363, 379, 381, 391-393.
299
CWL 23: 379. (De iure formal objects are those that are expressed in a definition, or perfectly reached
through an “ideal scientific habit.”) A differentiation is simply an adaptation (accomodatio) of an operation
to its object, so that in place of one operation inefficiently aimed at multiple different objects, there come to
be many operations, each subtly adapted to its particular object. See CWL 23: 367.
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Individual objects are known by a determinate group of operations, but a world is
attained by a group of combinations of differentiated operations. A world is simply a
group of objects, either actually known or (even more so) potentially known; it can also
be conceived as a field of possible objects. Method encompasses all possibilities of
operations and thus can join together numerous and multifarious worlds, since it
comprehends them at their “most radical point,” in and through the operations involved in
knowing these worlds. 300

5.1 “A Wisdom that Regards All Things”: Wisdom as the Integration of
Differentiated Worlds
Eventually the process by which lower groups of operations become differentiated
into new totalities—a new group of groups—runs up against ultimate oppositions, what
Lonergan calls the fundamental antitheses of differentiated worlds. Such radical
oppositions form an example of what Doran calls a dialectic of contraries, a concrete
unity of opposed principles, where the principles are functionally interdependent and are
to be “affirmed, strengthened, and assumed” rather than chosen one over against the other
in an absolute and total rejection. 301
Modes of operations ground differentiations (adaptations) of consciousness, and
differentiations of consciousness ground differentiations in worlds. And so worlds are
ultimately distinguished based on the subject’s modes of operations. Accordingly, worlds
are best defined and described in terms of the operations underlying them.

CWL 22: 42, 53, 56-57, 60; CWL 23: 403.
Robert M. Doran, SJ, What Is Systematic Theology? (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2005), 168-169,
173-174, 184-187, with the quote appearing on 168.
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The sacred world is defined as that which is never immediate. Known only
mediately and analogously, the sacred lives beyond the direct reach of human operations;
it is intimated in symbols and only dimly flickers within the horizon of the subject. It is
the ultimate desire and the ultimate end of human operation, opposed to the proximate
(direct) desire and goal, which is the profane world. The profane world is the presented
and known domain, the realm of nature as it is known by philosophy, science, and so on.
It is wholly circumscribed within the subject’s horizon; it is within the ambit, indeed
within the control, of intelligent and reasonable operations. The root of the radical
antithesis between the sacred and profane worlds lies in the dynamism of consciousness:
we are always reaching for what is beyond our grasp. 302
The second radical antithesis is between the outer and inner worlds, an opposition
rooted in the very structure of consciousness: “…the subject is never conscious unless he
is dealing with some object, but the subject as subject never is an object.” 303 The inner
world is the field of interiority, of subject as subject, of self-presence. The world of
interiority is present even when the subject is not thinking of self. “The fundamental
element to interiority is that it is interior; it is always there, immediate, given.” 304 When
the subject (or anything else) is apprehended, desired, or chosen, we cross over into the
outer world, the field of objectification. 305
Finally, on Lonergan’s account consciousness is specialized in a fundamental way
in the radical antithesis between theory (science) and common sense. Science as a
differentiation in the subject is a technical development of consciousness rarely achieved
CWL 22: 43-46 and 60; CWL 23: 395-397 and 405.
CWL 22: 60; CWL 23: 405.
304
CWL 22: 287.
305
CWL 22: 46-49 and 52; CWL 23: 391 and 397-399. Importantly, for an object to be present to the
subject, the subject must first be present to herself.
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by large swathes of a society. Science and common sense differ dramatically in end,
object, language, and structure (ordering of the conscious flow). Science aims at truth in
and for itself, common sense aims at truth for its practical application. Science regards
things as they are related to each other, common sense regards things as they are related
to our own senses and desires. Science employs a technical vocabulary and insists on
logic and methodology, common sense employs everyday terms and persuades with
rhetoric. Science subordinates all other faculties to intellect in its pursuit of truth.
Common sense, in its pursuit of what is practically useful, subordinates intellect as only
one part of the dramatic-practical subject deciding what to do and say in the world of
everyday living. For common sense is not only the immediate apprehension of the visible
world but also the world of community in which other subjects are considered in relation
to self. 306
Rather than merely suppressing the real and contradictory opposition between the
three antitheses, a true integration of such divergent worlds demands an oscillation
between them. Lonergan suggests that the contradiction among worlds can be solved by
“a certain temporal oscillation” in which a person attends to the visible world of common
sense at one time, to the intelligible world of science at another (if at all), to the world of
interiority at yet another, and to the sacred world at yet another still. 307 As Lonergan

CWL 22: 49-55 and 60; CWL 23: 401-407 and 433.
CWL 23: 405 and 431. No one is perfectly integrated except for God, who in one and the same act
understands God’s self and in that same comprehension knows everything that God can do (thus all
possibilities) as well as everything God does (thus all actualities) (cf. CWL 22: 66-67; CWL 23: 431). In
contrast, as creatures we must content ourselves with a continuous dynamic cycle of successive
differentiations and integrations. We move toward the infinite, but those motions are composite, gradual,
slow, and oscillatory.
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styles it in the summer 1962 institute at Regis College, “Integration is a matter of being
able to move coherently from one world to another, of being able to give each its due.” 308
Differentiations of consciousness must admit of an order that can be discovered
by wisdom and then intentionally applied to everything from science to the vicissitudes
of concrete living. Worlds are integrated through continuous, dynamic oscillations, which
are to be made according to “prudent judgment,” or practical wisdom. Similar to the
modern notion of science, prudence as a practical intellectual virtue judges the
changeable, the contingent, the particular, and the per accidens. Similar to the
Aristotelian notion of science, wisdom as a speculative intellectual virtue judges
everything in reference to and against the standard of the eternal, the necessary, the
universal, and the per se. But they are both wisdom. And in order for the authentic
elements of ancient science not to be abandoned and the accurate elements of modern
science not to be admitted in an erroneous manner, a “wisdom that regards all things”
must be cultivated. 309
Especially now that theology as a whole must attend to the empirical as well as
the eternal, but still for the sake of intellectual truth (truth sought for its own sake),
wisdom must regard all things. “Regard for all things” includes knowing empirical
realities for the sake of truth itself, not for some practical end, as in common sense. The
CWL 22: 66.
CWL 22: 100-108, especially 107-108; CWL 23: 413, 433, 441, 462-463, 675, with quote on 463
(emphasis his). The exact same point is repeated in the 1968 Boston College summer institute on
theological method: “We have to get wisdom and prudence together” (CWL 22: 470). The 1964
Georgetown University summer institute on theological method also reiterates the same point, but with an
eye toward modern philosophy: modern philosophy is concerned less with speculative wisdom as with the
realm of prudence, mirroring the decline in the ancient discontinuity between wisdom and prudence,
necessity and contingency. See “Avery Cardinal Dulles’s Notes for Lonergan’s ‘A Five-Day Institute: The
Method of Theology,’ 13-17 July 1964, Georgetown University,” in Early Works on Theological Method 1,
ed. Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken, CWL 22 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2010), 390. What
Lonergan is attempting to accomplish for the contemporary state of theology is a marriage between
prudence (knowledge of de facto realities) and speculative wisdom (knowledge of necessary realities).
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“wisdom that regards all things” appears to be a new type of wisdom, distinct from but
not opposed to Aquinas’ notion of wisdom as an intellectual habit. It is neither the
speculative wisdom nor the practical wisdom of Aristotle and Aquinas, but a
contemporary combination of both that also bears similarity to Newman’s illative
sense. 310

5.2 Wisdom as Self-Appropriation: A Reprise

Most importantly, in the context of the spring 1962 De methodo theologiae course
and the summer 1962 Regis College institute on theological method, it is the work of the
“wisdom that regards all things,” including the workings of subjectivity, to order and
integrate differentiations of consciousness. The integrating task of wisdom lies primarily
on the side of the subject, since it is not so much the worlds themselves as it is the groups
of operations that must be integrated. 311 If interiority is the “place” from which one is
able to move more effectively among other worlds by appropriating the operations that
make them, then self-presence—more specifically, self-appropriation 312—holds a certain
priority among the various differentiations. Self-appropriation itself “is a medium by
310
CWL 22: 289. Lonergan interprets Newman’s illative sense as referring to the potentialities of
intellectual light insofar as they exceed what can be explicitly laid out by either logic or method. The
illative sense is an expert grasp of the whole context that accounts for the complexities of changeable,
contingent, particular, de facto realities. The illative sense is difficult to objectify and communicate but it is
essentially an outgrowth of the inchoate but ordered view of the whole that is wisdom (CWL 22: 100-108,
especially 100-104 and 372 and CWL 23: 453-455 and 463).
311
CWL 23: 413. Likewise, it is not primarily the objects of a particular science that need to be integrated
as it is the subject who is performing the operations that come to know these objects (CWL 22: 316).
312
Because self-presence (interiority) exists regardless of whether or not the subject attends to it but selfappropriation necessitates this attention, there is a subtle but certain distinction between self-presence and
self-appropriation. It does appear, however, that at times Lonergan uses the two terms interchangeably in
the spring 1962 De methodo theologiae course. In Discussions 1 and 2 of the summer 1962 Regis College
institute on theological method, Lonergan stresses that interiority and subjectivity generally mean the same
thing, although the word “subjectivity” is sometimes associated with false philosophies of the subject, such
as immanentism (CWL 22: 268-269 and 287).

140
which common sense is known reflectively, and by which the world known by common
sense, the intelligible world, and the world of interiority are explored in a methodical
way.” 313
And so the development in Lonergan’s thought that identifies wisdom with selfappropriation, beginning in Verbum and continuing into Insight, finds a new home in
1962. In particular, wisdom as self-appropriation can be understood in this text as the
preconceptual foundation that lies at the basis of all worlds and thus can reduce mutually
contradictory spheres of thought to a “prior common root.” For all questions intend
intelligibility, whether per se or per accidens intelligibility, and all concepts are implicitly
concepts of being. It appears that the intention of all questions toward being integrates the
ancient notion of science with the modern one, and the implicit connection to being
shared by all concepts integrates the content of theology with the content of the other
sciences. 314
Lonergan explicitly claims that wise judgment orders and integrates oscillations
between worlds, and yet he also states that method orders and integrates differentiations
of consciousness, which is paramount to saying the same thing. So which is it? It is one
and both at the same time, since as we will see shortly, method and wisdom appear to be
almost identical in De methodo theologiae, at least in the spring and summer 1962
versions.

CWL 23: 511.
CWL 22: 126-129; CWL 23: 495-501. Lonergan himself draws the connection of the intention of being
in all questions, all preconceptual acts of understanding, and all concepts to the integration of ancient and
modern notions of science, but I am extending it to the second problematic. Theological knowledge and all
other scientific knowledge are both within being, just as Lonergan notes that the meaning of the word of
God and the order of the Body of Christ are not generically different from the meanings and orders found in
other sciences (CWL 23: 391-393).
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5.3 Wisdom as Method’s Younger Sister

Wisdom orders all things and judges all things because it “expresses the supreme
principle itself, namely our intellectual light, and not that bare light by itself but rather as
it extends to and is applied to all things.” 315 But Lonergan insists that methodology must
also be an objective expression and manifestation of intellectual light, because it treats
the very way concepts are generated and judgments are formed. 316 As in De intellectu et
methodo, here Lonergan once again draws a bold parallel between wisdom and method,
although not exactly an absolute identification. In our analysis of De methodo theologiae
that follows, we can relate wisdom to method under the three headings of function,
characteristics, and relationship to interiority.

5.3.1 Functions of Wisdom and Method

First, it is clear that while method does everything that wisdom does, such as
order worlds, wisdom does not perform all of the same functions as method. In essence,
in this spring 1962 course method continues to take over many of the functions of
wisdom, with method not only ordering (as in De intellectu et methodo) but also judging
rightly. Just as importantly, wisdom and method share many of the same characteristics,
with Lonergan choosing to underscore the relevance of method’s characteristics for
theology while still maintaining the significance of the traditional Thomist notion of
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wisdom for conceiving of systematic theology. Finally, in their mutual relationship to
interiority, wisdom and method are practically identical.

5.3.1a The Ordering Functions of Wisdom and Method

As already begun in the fall 1959 course De intellectu et methodo, Lonergan
continues to shift the ordering function of wisdom to method in the spring 1962 course
De methodo theologiae. In the case of wisdom said simply (simpliciter), the ultimate
criterion of ordering, on the objective side, is relation to the highest cause. On the side of
the subject, we have already seen that in Verbum Lonergan follows Aquinas’ position that
we possess an innate (although undifferentiated) grasp of the whole of being, given in
intellectual light. Coelho calls this grasp “inchoate wisdom” and describes it as a
permanent, universal, and immutable anticipation of the unity of being. This
apprehension, in and of itself, is already an ordered view of the whole. 317
This inchoate order, through becoming further differentiated and refined within
the subject, goes on to order and judge all things. 318 Likewise, Lonergan states in De
methodo theologiae that there is an “ordering wisdom” that works in the background of
cognitional process, moving us from data to concepts, syntheses, theories, and systems.
Similar to the subjective ordering provided by wisdom, method orders based on the
interrelations among worlds and the operations that establish these worlds. The order
among worlds discerned by method is discussed by Lonergan in terms of exigence
CWL 22: 102; CWL 23: 627.
See “Appendix 1: Notion and Problem of Method,” a set of undated notes roughly corresponding to the
first chapter of the spring 1959 “Understanding and Method” (De intellectu et methodo) course, in Early
Works on Theological Method 2, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour,
CWL 23 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013), 627.
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(demand), withdrawal, return, and mediation (the modification that one world effects on
another). 319
For example, the stark divergences between common sense and theoretical
thought processes provoke something of an internal crisis as the subject wonders about
the source of their opposing viewpoints and their self-same claim to know what is most
important about reality. Just as the systematic exigence draws the thinker into the
intelligible world, the critical exigence pulls us into the world of interiority where
cognitive acts are observed, related to one another, and understood in relation to the
objects they know or can know. And so the world of interiority is a medium by which
common sense and science are both known reflectively in terms of their operations. 320
From the world of interiority one can return to the intelligible world to bring the
distinctions learned in interiority to bear on more accurate and precise theories of
subjectivity. In fact, movement into interiority can mediate any and all theory by
identifying in any science the fundamental operations necessarily implied in knowing
anything. And the self-understanding achieved in interiority furnishes a basic but
profound analogy for understanding one’s community “at the whole series of stages of
their historical development.” 321 In fact, any notion of development in history
necessitates attention to different degrees of wisdom—different degrees of selfappropriation—in various individuals and schools of thought throughout time. And since
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CWL 22: 67 and 342, with quote on 67. In fact, all historical development can be read through the lens
of mediation, one world’s repercussions on another. CWL 22: 53-57, especially 55, and 67.
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all desire is ultimately desire of God, interiority, common sense, and science are all
proximate worlds that mediate the ultimate world of the sacred, of divine wisdom. 322
But one can also respond to the call of method, through which the world of
interiority, the commonsense world, and the intelligible world are all placed in the order
just described, through the interrelations of their operations. The methodical exigence
“makes the cognitional process used in knowing the visible or intelligible or interior
world to be known reflectively and, further, makes this reflective knowledge govern and
order any further operations to be performed in knowing these worlds.” 323 The
fundamental notion of method is most apparent in the return from interiority to the world
of theory and the world of community. In the end, all development mediates the subject,
since the operations pertaining to each world “produce and manifest ourselves,” 324
leading to greater self-knowledge, to greater wisdom.

5.3.1b The Judging Functions of Wisdom and Method

In De intellectu et methodo, method assists us in using our powers of judgment,
which wisdom rectifies. Method is no substitute for right judgment, and wisdom is still
the intellectual habit empowering right judgment. But in De methodo theologiae,
methodology is said to involve the proper way to make judgments. 325 Lonergan still
provides an analysis of wisdom in terms of the nature of judgment, sufficient evidence,
CWL 22: 53-57; 60; 288-289. Lonergan speaks of there being a transcendental exigence in the Boston
College institute on theological method in the summer of 1968, but that term does not seem to appear either
in the De methodo theologiae course of spring 1962 at the Gregorian nor in the Regis College institute “On
the Method of Theology” of summer 1962.
323
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the virtually unconditioned, different types of objectivity, and different types of sapientia.
But besides his emphasis on a “wisdom that regards all things,” none of the material is
novel, or even particularly well-integrated with his thoughts on method, which in fact
take center stage.
In fact, Lonergan allots to wisdom the task of ensuring that theology’s new
differentiation as a modern science does not relinquish certainty. However, his analysis of
how wisdom accomplishes such a task is relatively superficial, repeating material on
wisdom almost verbatim from other courses (especially De intellectu et methodo) without
much integration of wisdom’s epistemological function as interiority or actual
explanation of how wisdom provides certainty (apart from its status as the intellectual
virtue of right judgment).
What is noteworthy here is not that Lonergan drops out any mention of wisdom as
right judgment—he certainly does not—but that he seems to ascribe to method a more
significant role in judgment than before. In De intellectu et methodo, the third and fourth
directives of method (reverse counterpositions and develop positions) rely on judgment to
sort out position from counterposition. And the fifth directive of method exhorts us to
accept responsibility for judging, with the reminder that wisdom judges all things
rightly. 326 In De methodo theologiae, judgment enters into methodology through its
dialectical function, which judges regarding the authenticity of developments and the
inauthenticity of regressions, reducing them to their correspondent cognitive acts. 327 This
dialectical function enters into systematic theology as well, which must be able to
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critically and methodically parse out correct positions from counterpositions resulting
from theologians’ inauthenticity. 328

5.3.1c The Unifying Functions of Wisdom and Method

Finally, method plays an explicit role in bringing unity to both object and subject,
and wisdom does the same. It is only from the world of interiority that the twofold split in
object and subject, introduced by the dichotomy between the visible world of common
sense and the intelligible world of science, can be overcome. The subject herself is
divided between these two worlds, since she cannot live in both patterns of consciousness
at the same time. The divide in the subject is overcome through the methodological
exigence. By withdrawing from the intelligible and visible worlds into the world of
interiority, where the subject is aware of his own cognitive acts as well as various
patterns of his own consciousness, he discovers the unity underlying all patterns of
consciousness: the invariable pattern of experiencing, understanding, and judging that is
characteristic of all cognition. If wisdom is understood as the appropriation of rational
interiority and thus as almost identical with method, then the unifying power of wisdom
with regard to the subject must be the same or at least similar to that of method. But the
unifying function of wisdom on the side of the subject is not discussed by Lonergan in
this text; rather, the power of wisdom to unify the object is emphasized. 329
The dichotomy between the visible world and the intelligible world resides in the
object inasmuch as the dramatic pattern and the intellectual pattern target different
328
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concerns. Method recognizes the objective unity of knowledge by making its own proper
object the totality of being, conceived in and through the framework of operations by
which being is known. 330 Each and every cognitional process is unified in having either
the intention or the actual achievement of a common end: the assent or dissent of
judgment, “It is” or “It is not.” The methodological exigence brings this common end to
light in its awareness of the way all cognitional process heads toward judgment, and it
transcends the world of interiority once truth is reached. The self-appropriated subject
knows the world of interiority, the visible world, and the intelligible world as all
contained within being; she knows that they are all the same world in their relation to ens,
only apprehended differently. And so methodological consideration covers all things, just
as the analogy of being does. 331
Whereas method orders all being according to the operations through which being
is known, and according to the interrelations of those operations, wisdom orders all being
in terms of relation to the highest cause. The unity provided by the traditional Thomist
notion of wisdom is primarily an objective unity.
The conception of wisdom espoused by Lonergan in his works on theological
method from 1962 is not necessarily more restrained than in his earlier works; rather, his
conception of what method does and can do is more expansive. As mentioned, wisdom in
these texts might be imagined as method’s younger sister; as will be clear directly below
in our discussion of their respective characteristics, wisdom can do some of what method
can, but not everything.
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5.3.2 Characteristics of Transcendental Method and Wisdom

Lonergan lists eight attributes of method: comparative, genetic, dialectical, one,
synthetic, concrete, historical-critical, and transcendental. 332 The first three are
isomorphic with the levels of experiencing, understanding, and judging, and are
illustrated by examples from early Trinitarian thought. Method is comparative: it appeals
to the empirical element in things to discover similarities and differences. It is genetic
inasmuch as it seeks to understand the differences by attending to a chronological series
of developments and making explicit what was implicit in previous tradition. Method is
dialectical: it judges concerning all of these changes and reduces them to the presence or
absence of conversion and attempts to pin down exactly when a loss of authenticity or a
return to authenticity occurred. Its dialectical aspect acknowledges an objective irrational
element in the history around a doctrine that went awry and thus introduces the notion of
normativity, allowing us to transition from the history of a doctrine to the normativity of
the doctrine itself. Wisdom is also dialectical insofar as it judges all thing rightly,
separating the wheat from the chaff.
Because it is genetic and dialectical, method is also synthetic—it puts things
together and originates the truth. Wisdom is also synthetic. In the context of a single field
of knowledge, it is a synthetic overview of all knowledge in that field, and in the context
The spring 1963 De methodo theologiae and fall-winter 1963-1964 De methodo theologiae courses add
“organic” (also termed “synthetic-organic”) to this list. See CWL 23: 383, n. 29; “The Method of Theology
[De methodo theologiae] Spring 1963: Editorial Reconstruction,” in Early Works on Theological Method 3,
tr. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan
24 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013), 20, 26, 32, 59; and “The Method of Theology [De methodo
theologiae] Fall and Winter 1963-64: Editorial Reconstruction,” in Early Works on Theological Method 3,
tr. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan
24 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013), 158. Hereafter Early Works on Theological Method 3 is cited as
CWL 24.
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of all being, it is an all-encompassing comprehension of the whole. Method is concrete,
as it can encompass the most minute details of the here and the now. Likewise, if the
marriage of prudence and speculative wisdom generates a new “wisdom regarding all
things,” then wisdom is certainly concrete, as the concrete refers to all of being.
Method and wisdom are both unifying (“one”). Whereas wisdom orders all being
in terms of relation to the highest cause, method orders all being according to the
operations through which being is known, and according to the interrelations of those
operations. In either case, their object is the entirety of all that can be humanly known. 333
Method is historical-critical because it puts under the microscope not only the operations
of past communities but also of current historians.
Method is also transcendental insofar as it treats operations of intellect and will,
whose objects are the transcendentals (being, the true, the good). But it is transcendental
in another sense. It adverts more intently to combinations of operations than single
operations, and correspondent to combinations of operations is a parallel in the
combination of things operated.
And so method takes its stand on the isomorphism between cognitional theory and
metaphysics. If human knowledge of a proportionate object is reached through a
composite process of experience, understanding, and judgment, it follows that the
proportionate object itself is a form existing in matter. The most fundamental form of
wisdom, a primitively ordered apprehension of the unity of being that becomes further
differentiated as one learns, is also transcendental in this sense. Inchoate wisdom’s own
primitive order corresponds to the order in things that it will discover as it continues to
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grow. However, in contrast to the far-ranging aspects of method, the attributes ascribed to
wisdom are relatively limited. 334

5.3.3 Wisdom as Interiority and Method as Interiority

In their mutual relationship to interiority, wisdom and method are practically
identical. The foundations for method are forged in interiority, spurred on by the critical
exigence. “Insofar as there is the self-appropriation of the subject, insofar as he becomes
clearly and distinctly aware of his operations, there arises method.” 335 Method is the
mediation of the world of theory and the world of community by interiority, the world of
the subject operating as subject. All methodology is inevitably formed in terms of the
subject, since method is the intellectual aspect of interiority—appropriating what one is
doing when one is knowing. In addition to being a function of interiority, method is also a
tool for growing in interiority, since it intentionally extends self-presence to the
operations constitutive of other worlds. 336
Rational self-appropriation is the intellectual aspect of interiority. If wisdom is
transposed generally as rational self-appropriation in Verbum and Insight and method is
simply the practical application of rational self-appropriation toward the gaining of
knowledge in De methodo theologiae, then wisdom and method appear to hold the
selfsame position relative to rational interiority. This inference is upheld in Discussion 2
of the summer 1962 Regis College institute on theological method when Lonergan is
CWL 22: 24-29; CWL 23: 381-387.
CWL 22: 138-140 and 284, with quote on 138.
336
CWL 22: 273 and 290-291. The other aspect of interiority is existential: it critiques the subject in
himself or herself and does so along the lines of horizon, authenticity, conversion, judgments of value, and
so on.
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asked, “Can you relate interiority to St Thomas’s two kinds of wisdom?” He responds
that there are two wisdoms in St. Thomas, wisdom as construed by Aristotle’s
Metaphysics and wisdom as construed as a gift of the Holy Spirit, a couplet repeated from
Insight. 337 The first kind of wisdom, transposed by Lonergan as rational selfappropriation, is the very structure of the subject laid out in his cognitional theory.
Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ notion of wisdom is one of objective order; Lonergan’s
interiority analysis is a wisdom of the subject. 338
While not denying the possibility and relevance of objective order, Lonergan’s
transposition of sapientia is first and foremost the identification of an order, or structure,
in the subject. As a subjective order, wisdom helps us ground and explain the proportion
among elements of objective order. 339 The new wisdom principally studies the order
among cognitive operations and how they develop differently in different individuals;
therefore, it is particularly well-suited to exploring historical development. “That type of
extension of the notion of wisdom is necessary if we are going to go systematically into
history and into notions of development in history.” 340

CWL 22: 288-290. For Lonergan’s possible transposition of the gift of wisdom into the terms of
interiority, see below.
338
Cf. the passage from “Wisdom and Self-Appropriation,” a lecture Lonergan gave on Insight in the
summer of 1961 at St. Mary’s College in Moraga, California: “One tackles wisdom in its principle, not on
the side of the all to be ordered and judged, but on the side of the subject that orders and judges. One
reaches the order of all, through the principle of that order.” (See Archive Entry 18740DTE060, 1,
emphasis his, at https://www.bernardlonergan.com/archiveitem.php?id=1214. Accessed on January 30,
2019.)
339
CWL 22: 67 and 288-291. CWL 22: 67: “By knowing the operations, one can fix, clarify, and eliminate
the confusions that are involved in theoretical objects, and the theory throws light on the world of
community.”
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The emergence of interiority, or self-appropriation, as a central category in
Lonergan’s work predates that of transcendental method. 341 As will be seen most clearly
in Method in Theology, Lonergan understands transcendental method as the proper
outworking of (among other things) the self-affirmation of the knower described and
enacted in Insight. If the epistemological aspect of wisdom is transposed in Insight as the
self-affirmation of the knower, we can reasonably anticipate that the various functions of
wisdom will be taken over, in whole or in part, by the role of transcendental method. But
that transposition remains to be discerned, especially in regard to the increasing attention
Lonergan lends to conversion in his later corpus. What is exceedingly clear in the early
1960s is the fact that wisdom and method are both identical with the appropriation of
rational interiority. So it makes sense that wisdom and method are almost identical
concepts at this point in Lonergan’s development. They are distinguished, however, by
the differences in their respective functions and characteristics, as outlined above.

5.3.4 Wisdom and Conversion

More specifically, we saw in De systemate et historia that Lonergan obliquely
presents wisdom as the remedy to limitations of horizon; here in De methodo theologiae
he indirectly picks up on this same thread, remarking that horizon is shifted to the utmost
through conversion. Surely the subject’s horizon is broadened greatly when reflecting
upon the operations themselves, as in the case of wisdom’s role as master operatory habit.
But conversion is more than a simple expansion of horizon: it is “a change in the very
According to Coelho, the term “transcendental method” is not used until the spring 1962 De methodo
theologiae course. See Hermeneutics and Method, 116, and CWL 23: 385.
341
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interiority of the subject.” 342 It is a reorganization of the subject’s consciousness, of the
subject’s world. If conversion is a fundamental reordering, not only of the subject’s
relation to objects, but also of the subject’s basic orientation in life, then wisdom as
ordering must have a part to play in the process of conversion, but this relationship is not
explicitly explored in any of Lonergan’s work from the late 1950s and early 1960s. 343
In De systemate et historia, the limitations of horizon posed by premature
systematization and premature closure were implicitly set in opposition against the
horizon-opening power of wisdom. In De methodo theologiae this problematic is
transposed into an explicitly theological context. Inasmuch as there is an absence of
authenticity—that is, a lack of conversion—the horizon of the receiver will distort the
ongoing thematization of faith that is theology, resulting in aberrant understandings of
doctrine and of theology itself. And so wisdom and conversion are both touted, albeit
indirectly, as solutions to troublesome dynamics of systems and distorted reception of the
meaning of the word of God and the order of the Body of Christ.
The more explicit and forceful connection, however, lies in the relationship
between conversion and method. For the dialectical function of method not only reduces
the authenticity of developments and the inauthenticity of regressions to their
correspondent cognitive acts; it also reduces these cognitive acts to the authenticity or

CWL 23: 371-373, with quote on 373.
In an item in the Lonergan Archive that would have been composed around the same time as the early
part of the spring 1962 De methodo theologiae course, Lonergan defines orientation as the direction in
which the subject’s exercise of freedom tends. In and of itself, one’s orientation is “an original and
originating value” that can be absent, as in the inauthentic drifter, and restored by conversion. See
“Appendix 2: Items Related to ‘De Methodo Theologiae,’” in Early Works on Theological Method 2, trans.
Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, CWL 23 (Toronto: University of
Toronto, 2013), 689.
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inauthenticity of the whole subject in terms of conversion or lack of conversion, with
conversion understood as religious, moral, and intellectual. 344

5.4 Theology as Wisdom in De methodo theologiae (Spring 1962) and the Regis
College Institute “On the Method of Theology” (Summer 1962)

The highest instance of sapientia simplicitur is divine wisdom, which understands
perfectly all things. The greatest wisdom reached by a creature is the beatific vision, a
proximate participation in divine wisdom. Compared to God’s own wisdom and the
wisdom of the blessed, theological wisdom is more remote, and has to be learned. It is a
subalternated science derived from the science of the wisdom of God and of the blessed.
Since only God’s own wisdom is the proportionate principle of understanding God and
the mysteries hidden in God, the theologian must rely on God’s wisdom as it is mediated
by positive participations such as revelation and the virtue of faith, and by negative
participations such as the infallibility of the magisterium.
If sin had not entered the scene, philosophy would have been the reigning
science. Now, however, it is theological wisdom that judges all things in the actual order
of the universe, since it is uniquely capable of understanding sin, grace, redemption, and
so on. Lonergan still follows Aquinas in affirming theology as the science that is about
God and everything else insofar as it is related to God. Since everything is ordered to
God, theology is a general wisdom that judges and orders absolutely all things.

CWL 22: 14-15, 32-33, 140-141, 184-185, 193-194, 260-266, 287-288, 290-291, 303-304; CWL 23:
371, 373 and n. 15, 383-385, 511, 583.
344

155
Theological wisdom knows the whole of being, but a view of the whole still stands in
need of more particular and detailed viewpoints provided by specialized fields.
The relationship between theological wisdom and the diverse wisdoms of various
specialties is one of complementarity and unity. The joining of general, theological
wisdom with the complementary wisdoms of the various, specialized sciences is one
aspect of the transformation of prudence from the practical (concerned with what is to be
done) to the speculative order (concerned with truth per se) discussed earlier. And in its
architectonic role, theological wisdom seizes upon an order that connects itself with all of
the other sciences by referring all of them to God. A collaboration between the general
wisdom of the theologian and the specialized wisdoms of other experts allows theology
to incorporate the achievements of modern scientific endeavor, including not only the
natural sciences but also philosophy and the human sciences.
Following Aquinas, Lonergan contends that theology acts in both scientific and
sapiential ways. As science, it grows in knowledge of God, its proper object, and of
everything in relation to God. As wisdom, it stands superior above all other human
wisdoms, since it studies God; it locates its own role within the larger system of the other
sciences; it judges the value and limitations of other sciences; and it critically
appropriates the conclusions of the other sciences for its own purposes. As that which
orders and judges all things, theology is architectonic in relation to itself and other fields.
Because theology’s architectonic function makes less direct reference to God, its
sapiential role is more remote than its scientific one. And yet because Lonergan is acutely
interested in the relationship between theology and the human sciences, theology’s
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sapiential role operates as a prominent theme of Lonergan’s courses on theological
method in the early 1960s, even when wisdom is not explicitly mentioned. 345
In De methodo theologiae, the type of theology that can be most easily identified
as wisdom and that Lonergan discusses at length is systematic theology, which is set off
against both positive and dogmatic theology. 346 Lonergan elucidates the differences and
connections among positive, dogmatic, and systematic theologies in terms of their
respective relations to this dogmatic-theological context. Like all contexts, the dogmatictheological context is a remainder concept—it is the assumed or implied context of any
true theological statement. The dogmatic-theological context first emerged from
reflection on scripture and tradition and was crystallized in history through successive
transitions from faith to theology. It includes not only truth but also heresy, since truth is
dialectical, developing in opposition to error. It contains notions that are proper to
theology and absolutely fundamental; they slowly become explicit in the theoretical life
of the church and exert a profound influence on all other notions. These fundamental
notions are called theological categories, and some are more explicitly developed than
others. The dogmatic-theological context exhibits elements of sapientia in the way it
implicitly orders these categories. 347
Systematic theology’s specific end is the very purpose of the dogmatictheological context: the growth in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom so highly
CWL 22: 105-108; CWL 23: 361, 391-393, 458-463, 527, 561, 671-673. In at least one pre-Method text,
the sapiential contribution to theology vis-à-vis other disciplines is explicitly linked to method. In a
footnote to the 1961 De Deo Trino: Pars dogmatica, Lonergan appears to extemporize the relationship of
method to various “integral parts” of theology (positive, dogmatic, systematic, and so on) as a sapiential
one. It is the “sapiential or methodical part” of theology that must “preside to distinguish the [other] parts,
assign to each its function and duties, and direct the assistance that each gives to the others” (CWL 11: 7, n.
1). This 1961 foreshadowing of the sapiential functions of transcendental method is perspicuous.
346
CWL 23: 531 and 561.
347
CWL 22: 30-31, 170-174, 232, 308; CWL 23: 551-553, 555, 579-589.
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praised at the First Vatican Council. In turn, systematic theology would seem to be the
proper theoretical incarnation of wisdom, since its proximate and principal aim is to
analogically understand the mysteries of faith themselves, which are ultimate principles
in a scientific theology. Lonergan characterizes the wisdom of systematic theology as
methodically critical, just as he aligns wisdom in general with method in general. The
movement from positive theology (history of a doctrine) to systematic theology
(understanding the doctrine itself) passes through dialectic, thereby introducing the
notion of normativity and effecting the transition from what was said to what was and is
true. So systematic theology sifts through opinions and arguments and winnows positions
from counterpositions with the categories of horizon, authenticity, and conversion. 348
Last but not least, one of the theologian’s essential and positive participations in
divine wisdom comes in the form of the gifts of the Spirit. In the summer 1962 Regis
College institute on theological method, Lonergan hints at a possible transposition of the
gift of wisdom into the terms of interiority when he remarks, “The gifts of the Holy
Ghost are the adaptation of the subject, his subordination to a superior principle of
direction.” 349

6 De methodo theologiae (Spring 1963 and Fall-Winter 1963-1964):
Wisdom of the Concrete as Part and Parcel of Transcendental Method

The spring 1963 and fall-winter 1963-1964 De methodo theologiae courses can be
studied as a certain climax of Lonergan’s “Roman Period” spent teaching at the
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Gregorian, as well as a certain summit of Lonergan’s ongoing transposition of wisdom
into cognitional-intentional terms during this time period. They recapitulate many topics
from earlier courses in this period while giving further shape to elements that will be
formally debuted in Method in Theology. These dual De methodo theologiae courses
from the early 1960s represent the clearest presentation thus far of all that transcendental
method entails, both in general and for theology in particular. Further, the spring 1963 De
methodo theologiae course proposes a new idea for wisdom’s relation to method: wisdom
as included within method. These two texts will be considered together, as they revolve
around the same basic ideas; just as importantly, the fall-winter 1963-1964 version adds
nothing novel to the position of wisdom vis-à-vis method found in the spring 1963
version. The crucial development in both texts seems to be the deeper incorporation of
both wisdom and conversion into transcendental method, through a richer complication
of the heuristic notion of horizon. 350

6.1 Wisdom and Transcendental Method

In the De methodo theologiae courses from the early 1960s, Lonergan revisits the
notion of horizon and greatly expands its applications to both method and theology.
Horizon is fundamentally a heuristic notion that can be conceived from the image of the
bounding circle, the extension and limits of one’s vision. A horizon is established by the
correlative components of its pole and its field. The image for an insight into the meaning
of “pole” is the physical standpoint of the viewer, and for “field” it is the totality of
Another crucial development in both these texts is the increased clarity in the distinction and
interrelation obtaining among positive, systematic, and dogmatic theology and their respective correlation
with experience, understanding, and judgment. See CWL 24: 79-86, 103-110, and 136-147.
350
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visible objects that can be seen from such a standpoint, those things chosen by the viewer
to be seen.
The originary pole is the very structure of human consciousness shared by all
subjects in common; in the originary pole lies the possibility of conversion, of proper
self-constitution. The existential pole is the actual operating subject, operating de facto in
such and such a way, conditioned relatively by psychological, social, and cultural forces,
but constituted absolutely by his existential orientation in the presence or absence of
intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. The implicit or exercite field of lived
experience is the manifestation or objectification of one’s presuppositions, choices,
values, judgments, and decisions, and is correlative, simply as a matter of fact, with the
existential pole. “What kind of person I am and what kind of world is present to me are
correlative.” 351 The explicit or signate field of explicit reflection is the correlative of the
originary pole by intention; it is philosophy, theology, method, or any other science as it
aims to objectify the normative demands of the originary pole.
Lonergan analyzes existential poles and their correlative fields from various
horizons—psychological, social, and cultural. For example, in a cultural horizon
considered at the level of the individual, the existential pole moves from undifferentiated
through differentiated to integrated operations. But its correlative field is an integration
among worlds achieved through wise oscillation, as underscored in the spring 1962 De
methodo theologiae course.
But considered psychologically, socially, and culturally, horizons are only
developed in a relative way, and often from outside forces more than anything else. There
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is also the need for conversion, a pinnacle of the existential subject’s freedom to choose
her own direction, her own self-constitution, consciously, rationally, and deliberately,
from the inside. Conversion is a function of existential decision and is potentially a
threefold transformation of the existential pole, with a corresponding transformation of
entire fields. Intellectual conversion breaks the hold of perceptualism, the mythic notion
that knowing is taking a good look, and turns the subject toward a knowledge of the real
as that which is affirmed in a true judgment. Moral conversion breaks the hold of selfcentered desires and satisfactions—“the good for me”—and turns the subject toward that
which is good for its own sake. Religious conversion breaks the hold of the reign of sin—
the moral impotence that ineluctably results in irrational social, cultural, and
psychological determinations—and turns the subject toward the intersubjective faith,
hope, and love characteristic of the reign of God. 352
Transcendental horizon is the absolute and total horizon, outside of which nothing
exists. While relative horizon is the result of psychological, cultural, and social
development, transcendental horizon results from conversion or the lack of conversion,
intellectual, moral, and religious. Transcendental method attends to the transcendental
horizon, in both its subjective aspect (all transcendental poles) and its objective aspect
(all transcendental fields). In either case, transcendental method seeks to discern horizons
through a factual determination that is differentiated relatively in accord with
psychological, social, and cultural development and absolutely and critically in accord
with intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.
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It is in the context of this aim that Lonergan comments that “Wisdom has been
thought to reside in the speculative domain, prudence in the practical. But once historical
consciousness has arisen, there is a need for wisdom regarding the concrete. Wisdom
regarding the concrete is understood inasmuch as it is included in method.” 353 Since the
concrete refers to all of being, “wisdom regarding the concrete” is clearly identical with
the “wisdom regarding all things” from the spring 1962 version of the same course, in
which the latter phrase symbolizes the marriage of prudence and speculative wisdom that
parallels the negotiation between modern and ancient science. 354
Lonergan’s claim that transcendental method, or methodical horizon, enfolds
wisdom within itself makes eminent sense given the amplified role in judgment that he
assigns to method in the early 1960s. The passage under examination occurs in the
middle of a discussion that underscores method’s ability to expect, explain, and judge
differences. Transcendental method is factual, critical, and evaluative. Method responds
to questions by judging facts regarding the degree and kind of development and the
presence or absence of conversion in any thinker, work, or statement. It is critical,
judging the root division between position and counterposition. It is evaluative, judging
what is less and more significant to the theologian.
Wisdom is part and parcel of transcendental method simply because wisdom is
right judgment, and judgment is increasingly considered by Lonergan to be a prominent
and essential function of method. The importance of judgment in method turns up as

CWL 24: 40-42 and 62-63, with quote on 63
The same point surrounding the trifecta of prudence, wisdom, and modern science in the spring of 1962
is repeated in regard to prudence, wisdom, and modern philosophy in the spring of 1965 in the lecture
entitled “Dimensions of Meaning.” Here Lonergan speculates, the “entry of philosophy into the realm of
the existential and the historical not merely extends the role of philosophic wisdom into concrete living but
also, by that very extension, curtails the functions formerly attributed to prudence” (CWL 4: 240).
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early as 1959 with De intellectu et methodo’s third, fourth, and fifth directives, and the
spring 1962 De methodo theologiae course characterizes two of method’s attributes,
dialectic and historical-critical, as expressions of judgment. In the spring 1963 and fallwinter 1963-1964 De methodo theologiae courses, Lonergan accentuates the role of
judgment in method by describing it not only as dialectical and critical but also as factual
and evaluative. In these last two courses, the entire mission of method is to evince
progress and unmask aberration through the exercise of critical, dialectical, factual, and
evaluative judgment. Our first “case study” showing the credibility of this newly
articulated relationship between wisdom and method appears in dialectic, the explanatory
mode of transcendental method that most closely aligns with judgment. 355

6.1.1 Wisdom and the Dialectical Function of Method

One of the clearest indicators that a shift in Lonergan’s conception of wisdom in
relation to method has indeed taken place is the concomitant shift in a fundamental
function of wisdom, the selection of basic terms, to method. Rather than repeat material
from Insight and other works on wisdom’s selection of the primitive terms that then
compose first principles, in these two De methodo theologiae courses from the early
1960s Lonergan emphasizes that the ground of basic terms lies in interiority. 356 The

CWL 24: 62-64. The other three explanatory modes of transcendental method given in these texts are
genetic and synthetic-organic, which are both functions predominantly of understanding, and comparative,
which is associated with experience.
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Proper principles of a given science derive their meaning from the actual performance of that science as
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principles of theology adhere in the intelligibility of the mysteries of the faith—for example, in the
psychological analogy for the Trinity, the nature of grace, the organization of the church, etc. CWL 24:
119-120.
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subject in himself or herself, not propositions, constitutes the first principle. 357 Selfappropriation leads to knowledge of the isomorphism between knowing and known, and
the interrelations between the two lead to basic terms.
And prior to the conceptualization of levels of consciousness and the composition
of the known are the transcendentals, the openness of the mind toward being, truth, and
goodness. Lonergan holds that basic terms in themselves are the transcendentals precisely
as they are preconceptual, as defining fundamental existential orientations of the human
being. As expressed and objectified in rational interiority, basic terms have to do with
knowing, objectivity, and the real. Knowing is a composite of experience, understanding,
and judgment; objectivity is a matter of the assembly of the data (experiential), coherence
(understanding), and positing (judgment); and the real is what is experienced, understood,
and judged correctly. 358
Common notions, principles, and terms are operative wherever and whenever a
human mind is operative, since they derive from the fundamental structure of human
consciousness. Transcendental method itself can also be called foundational or
fundamental method, as every affirmation or negation can be analyzed into its origin in
the structure of the human mind. Transcendental method expresses the intention of being,
and the foundation of all method is the heuristic notion of being, the “to be known.” In
fact, the intelligibility of all common principles and notions is, for Lonergan, heuristic,

CWL 24: 48 and 98-102. A couple years later, Lonergan will characterize the tendency to designate
primitive, abstract propositions as “first principles” and deduce or somehow derive all other truths from
such propositions as a hallmark of a classicist worldview. He goes on to sharply contrast such a worldview
with the historical mindedness that gives rise to transcendental method, which places concrete foundations
in the cognitive structures of the conscious, operating subject. See “The Transition from a Classicist
Worldview to Historical Mindedness,” in A Second Collection, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky,
CWL 13 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016), 7.
358
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and their heuristic structure is a channel through which proper knowledge, as in theology,
can be gained. And the methodical aspect of transcendental method acknowledges the
operations through which all of the transcendentals are known, and specifies how proper
methods come to know particular realities. 359
Significantly, the a priori in every science is the very subject who experiences,
understands, judges, and decides, the one who asks “What is it?” and “Is it?”. 360
Although common principles and notions are a priori, they still undergo development
from lived practice to reflection on practice. However, this fact does not prevent serious
philosophical differences, because the need for conversion—and hence the need for
dialectic—is ever-present.
Dialectic as a function of transcendental method discerns the transcendental
horizon, the presence or absence of conversion in any thinker, work, or statement. Just as
various philosophers have meant wildly diverse things by the term “being,” an example
often cited by Lonergan in an earlier timeframe to show the need for wisdom, “The same
word appears with radically opposed meanings in the process of dialectic.” 361 The
proposal of drastically different connections among so-called basic terms are as
numerous as opposed positions exposed by dialectic. The distortion based in nonconversion taints not only terms but premises and conclusions: a positivist understanding
of being leads to fundamental premises being understood in a positivist sense, which
leads to positivist positions on knowing and objectivity and so on.
The foundational division between progress and aberration is the conflict between
common principles as they are exercised in the lived experience of experiencing,
CWL 22: 48, 68, 101, 119-129.
CWL 24: 7 and 11.
361
CWL 24: 27.
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understanding, judging, and deciding and common principles as they are reflected upon
and made explicit in a science, philosophy, theology, or method. “One is always a human
being, and only sometimes a philosopher. And it may be that the philosopher does not
quite grasp the human being that one is.” 362 Dialectic is fundamentally existential: its
exercise as a function of method is a matter of responsible judgment, and its conflicts are
resolved by conversion.
Dialectic proceeds concretely through the application of the transcendental
principle that what is normative in experience, understanding, judgment, and decision is
also normative for all expressions, objectification, and events. The application of this
principle traces a regress to the normative exercitum (the lived experience) to show the
likeness between positions of one time period and those of another, and between
counterpositions of one time period and another. A position is defined as the agreement
between the lived practice of what normative transcendental structure implies for all
human beings by nature (exercite) and the explicit reflection (signate) on that practice. A
counterposition is defined as the disagreement between the exercite and signate. And in
the case of theology, the signate is the word of God. Dialectic advances positions and
reverses counterpositions, and when it does so regarding the most fundamental realities, it
contributes to the selection of basic terms, as Thomist wisdom once did.
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CWL 24: 121.
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6.1.2 Theological Wisdom and Transcendental Theological Method

When horizon and method are both understood heuristically and in conjunction
with one another, a transcendental methodological heuristic structure emerges. It is
descriptive, explanatory, and directive, and it covers all things, from science and
philosophy to history, hermeneutics, and theology. Lonergan summarizes in broad
strokes the import of such a method and its application to theology:
We may apply the heuristic structure: description and the four modes of
explanation (comparative, organic, genetic, and dialectical) as these determine
a series of horizons both from the developmental viewpoint of psychology,
society, and culture, and from the viewpoint of intellectual, moral, and religious
conversion. Such a method includes the genesis of all dogmas and systems, a
refutation of all heresies and aberrations, and an understanding of the history that puts
doctrines in their concrete context. 363
Lonergan submits that the method outlined above is “automatically theology,”
and it is not difficult to understand why. Nothing lies outside of what is transcendental, so
the supernatural order is included within the transcendental horizon. Moreover, because
transcendental method attends to the transcendental horizon, it attends to all of the
conversions individually and in their mutual relations. 364
Religious conversion is of course the most essential to theology: theology studies
the very word of God, spoken in both Christ and Christ’s church, and in its manifold and
perpetual penetration into human history. But our understanding of the word of God can

CWL 24: 82.
The theologian attends more to religious, intellectual, and moral conversion than to different aspects of
development, since the former are more fundamental and their lack is more likely to infiltrate theological
understanding in a destructive way. And yet the theologian does still attend to psychological, social, and
cultural development insofar as they bear on the discernment of positions from counterpositions. CWL 24:
63-64.
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364

167
be confounded by latent theories that the real is equivalent to bodies, and the truth of the
word of God can be corrupted by the naïve realism that wants truth to be “the already out
there now”; hence the need for the Greek councils to act in historical doctrinal
development as the midwife to “Christian realism.” 365 And so religious conversion and
intellectual conversion are intrinsically connected, with the latter clarifying the former
and the former slowly but effectively fostering the latter.
The ultimate rationale for the application of transcendental method to theology is
also the simplest: transcendental method changes the theologian. By promoting reflection
on the operations employed by theologians, transcendental method is foundational for the
work of theology; it unleashes fuller possibilities of what faith illumined by reason may
mean and what it can discover. As critical, transcendental method searches out basic
philosophical errors that skew dogmatic and theological development. As unitive, it
brings together positive, systematic, and dogmatic aspects of theology within the
operations of one or many theologians, since these functions of theology are isomorphic
with the conscious levels of experience, understanding, and judgment, respectively. 366
More than anything else it does in and for theology, transcendental method
unveils the transcendental horizon of the theologian. The Regis College institute of 1962
on theological method stressed that the foundation of theology is not the natural structure
of human consciousness but that structure as it is transformed by the gift of faith. The
interiority of the theologian is a new interiority in which the natural operations of
experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding are healed of sin’s wound and
elevated to understand the divine mysteries. The source of theological thought is neither
365
366
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reason nor faith nor reason with the affirmations of faith extrinsically adduced. The
source of theology is a new, composite principle, the integration of faith and reason in the
theologian’s intellect.
In the language of the De methodo theologiae courses of 1963 and 1964, the
existential pole of theology is the theologian precisely as she is or is not intellectually,
morally, and religiously converted. The explicit field of the actual theology that the
theologian creates will tend to correlate with his existential self-constitution. Thus every
theology exhibits either authenticity or distortion, in accord with conversion or lack of
conversion, psychological, social, cultural development or lack of development, in the
theologian or theologians. 367
Despite Lonergan’s position in the spring 1963 De methodo theologiae course
that wisdom is part and parcel of transcendental method, ample examples of the
traditional Thomist notion of wisdom remain in this text, and they all pertain to theology.
There is the description of theology as “a certain total vision regarding God and all other
things in relation to God”; theology’s relationship with the other sciences as sapiential;
divine wisdom, the only fully proportionate principle for theology; the supernatural gift
of the Spirit that enlightens the church’s, and hopefully the theologian’s, judgment on
supernatural matters; and wisdom as the general way of proceeding in theology, since
wisdom is necessary to order questions, problems, and solutions. 368
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7 Summary: Wisdom in the De methodo theologiae courses and Regis College
Institute on Theological Method
Although Lonergan stated in the spring 1962 De methodo theologiae course that
integration of worlds is the work of wise judgment, Lonergan laid the details of this
integration at the feet of method, suggesting once again method’s increasing workload
vis-à-vis wisdom. In the De intellectu et methodo course of 1959, wisdom was method’s
watchful mentor, making sure method’s directives are applied appropriately. Wisdom and
method worked together hand-in-hand, but they still appeared distinct, with wisdom
being the more functionally foundational role.
But in all of the De methodo theologiae courses, the roles of wisdom and method
almost seem reversed. Method is the larger, more prominent concept, with wisdom’s role
beginning to lessen. In the spring 1962 course De methodo theologiae, method is the
application of a new “wisdom that regards all things” toward the conscious and reflective
purpose of guiding development—development in each of the worlds (and, by analogy,
with each of the sciences) and development in the sense of an integration of worlds. This
new wisdom regards all things in and through the appropriation of rational self-presence,
just as method regards all things in and through the rational appropriation of cognitive
operations.
Here the crucial connection between method and wisdom is not only one of
enlargement and reduction, with method’s role waxing as wisdom’s wanes. This
connection certainly holds true, but it can be further specified in terms of the exact
functions method begins to take over, the lengthening list of attributes ascribed to
method, and their dual connection to interiority. The relationship is also one of
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transposition, with traditional wisdom being rewritten in the larger, richer key of
cognitional-intentional analysis.
The De methodo theologiae courses of spring 1963 and fall-winter 1963-1964
continue where the spring 1962 class left off, repeating several themes while specifying
the advantages of transcendental method for theology with greater clarity than before.
The spring 1963 version explicitly remarks that wisdom regarding the concrete is
included in method, and this contention is borne out in Lonergan’s discussion of
dialectic’s discernment of basic terms. Lonergan’s longstanding emphasis on wisdom’s
role in selecting the meaning of basic terms undergoes a marked shift in the spring 1963
De methodo theologiae course. It is now the function of dialectic, not wisdom
traditionally conceived, to reduce the opposed meanings of the same basic terms to the
existential pole, measured against the originary pole. 369
We recall that the first phase of Lonergan’s transposition of Thomist wisdom
generally conceived wisdom as rational self-appropriation in Verbum and Insight. But in
369
This same basic position is reiterated in the form of an article originally published in Gregorianum at a
time practically contemporaneous with the 1963 and 1963-1964 De methodo theologiae courses. In the
spring 1963 “Metaphysics as Horizon,” Lonergan contrasts the expert with the proverbial wise man along
the same lines as Aristotle and Aquinas, but using the language of horizon: wisdom is the ultimate and
basic horizon, the “unrestricted viewpoint.” Considered under the formality of being, metaphysics is
equivalent to the objective pole of this unrestricted viewpoint. But, as a science, metaphysics is not
equivalent to the total and basic horizon, because the metaphysician may or may not be sufficiently
converted. It is the practitioner of transcendental method, attentive as she is to conversion or lack of
conversion, that fully embodies wisdom because she represents the subject in its “full and proper stature.”
Perhaps even more explicitly than in the De methodo theologiae courses of the 1960s, here Lonergan again
rewrites wisdom as transcendental method, although the transcendental method of 1963 is not identical to
that of the early 1970s. Still, in 1963 Lonergan can boldly remark, “in the horizon of the wise man, the
philosopher of the Aristotelian tradition, the objective pole is an unrestricted domain, and the subjective
pole is the philosopher practicing transcendental method, namely, the method that determines the ultimate
and so basic whole.” His reasoning is also transparent, with the notion of horizon more fully untying the
“knot” presented by various objections to wisdom as foundational in the 1959 De intellectu et methodo. It
is not enough to say that wisdom is the habit of order that decides which problem should be tackled first,
second, and so on, as in De intellectu. Rather, “problems and solutions are what they are in virtue of the
horizon in which they arise,” and transcendental method takes full cognizance of horizon in a way that
traditional accounts of sapientia do not (“Metaphysics as Horizon,” quotes on CWL 4: 198, 204, 199,
respectively). Likewise, in the 1963 lecture “Exegesis and Dogma,” Lonergan equates the “realm of
wisdom” with the realm of self-appropriation and conversion (CWL 6: 156).
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the early 1960s there is a hint that Lonergan may be expanding his transposition of
wisdom as rational self-appropriation to, perhaps, other kinds of self-appropriation, with
the middle term of method as a bridge between wisdom and conversion. And yet the
exact relationship between wisdom and conversion is far from clear in these texts.
Insofar as wisdom is increasingly aligned with method in the chronology of
Lonergan’s thought, and method includes a dialectical function that considers the
presence or absence of conversion, we can anticipate that wisdom may eventually come
closer to an identification with conversion. But that anticipation must yet be
substantiated. In the remainder of our chronological survey, we will witness Lonergan’s
vision of transcendental method unfold more fully, especially in its promise to unite
different operations and disciplines, and we will carefully search for the conceptual
location of wisdom in his breakthrough to functional specialization as the proper method
of theology.
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Chapter Four: Sapientia in the Third Stage of Meaning: Wisdom as Transcendental
Method and Conversion in Method in Theology (1964-1972)
Lonergan’s work through 1964 features Thomist wisdom as a richly multifaceted
and surprisingly talkative travelling companion. But Thomist wisdom becomes a much
quieter interlocutor during what Crowe calls the “post-1965 regrouping of forces for the
writing of Method in Theology,” 370 and wisdom’s conspicuous absence in Method lends
credibility to Crowe’s original idea that transcendental method has taken the place of
sapientia. We can appreciate the intelligence of Crowe’s hypothesis more deeply now,
after having observed the increasing convergence of transcendental method and wisdom
from the late 1950s through mid-1960s.
As will be argued below, I am in fundamental agreement with Crowe that Method
represents a singular moment in Lonergan’s transposition of Aquinas’ notion of wisdom
into the terms and relations grounded in rational interiority. Method effectively completes
the transposition of wisdom as rational self-appropriation begun in Verbum and continued
in Insight. According to Crowe, in Method wisdom’s functions have been assumed by
transcendental method itself. The claim that wisdom’s role is subsumed as transcendental
method in the cognitive-existential context epitomized by Method can be evaluated on
two fronts: from an overview of method in general, and from an analysis of functional
specialization in particular.
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1 The Fourth Level of Consciousness

Just as the transposition of epistemological wisdom into the self-affirmation of the
knower and the transposition of metaphysical wisdom into the integral heuristic structure
of proportionate being presupposed Insight’s basic cognitional theory, the eventual
identification of wisdom with transcendental method, dialectic, and foundations
presupposes the fourth level of consciousness. Doran indicates the major themes of the
second stage of development in Lonergan’s position on the subject as value, feeling,
judgment of value, decision, and conversion. 371 Here I will briefly recapitulate the bold
lines of Lonergan’s position on each of these items in Method before responding to the
question of where exactly sapientia might reside in the third stage of meaning, the
emergence of interiority.
As the transcendental notion of the intelligible generates questions for
understanding and the transcendental notion of the true and the real generates questions
for reflection, the transcendental notion of value drives questions for deliberation. The
transcendental notion of value is reached when questions for deliberation—Is it truly
good? Is it truly worthwhile?—are met in a judgment of value that answers in the
affirmative. As with the judgment of fact, which asserts the existence of a being
independent of the subject, the meaning of a judgment of value is independent of the
subject. It asserts what is truly worthwhile, regardless of how the subject’s mood may
incline toward or away from that good at any moment. Again, similar to the judgment of

Decision is present in Insight, but compared to its prominence in Method, it is not yet fully articulated or
weighted.
371
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fact, the judgment of value has its criterion in the authenticity—the self-transcendence—
of the subject.
But between the judgment of fact that knows reality (especially human reality)
and the judgment of value that knows the good, there is the apprehension of value as it is
given in feelings. Feelings that intend value are not states such as fatigue or irritability,
which have a cause, or trends such as hunger or thirst, which have goals or ends. Rather,
feelings are “the intentional responses with which your whole being is illuminated when
you are presented with the values you might realize.” 372 As intentional responses,
feelings have objects: either the ontic value of persons or the qualitative value of truth,
beauty, virtue, and so on. Such feelings give our intentional consciousness “its mass,
momentum, drive, power,” 373 and when they successfully carry us to self-transcendence,
we enjoy the peace of a good conscience. Full moral self-transcendence is not reached
until the existential commitment of decision, which moves us closer to action.
Lonergan sometimes calls the fourth level of consciousness rational selfconsciousness, since it is through decision that the subject chooses not only who she will
be, but through herself and for herself, makes herself become that person. In the spring
1963 De methodo theologiae course, there are myriad actions associated with the level of
decision: in the stage preceding choice there is taking counsel, deliberating, evaluating
different courses of action and different ways of being; in the stage of actual choice there
is the practical judgment of value that affirms an action as good, from which is spirated
the choice or decision; and in the final stage of action there is a disposition of objects and,
more importantly, of one’s self.
372
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Although Lonergan specifically calls moral conversion “the existential moment,”
every decision has an existential component: we become who we are through decisions.
The existentially aware decision to self-constitute is an exercise of personal freedom.
When I interiorly speak, “Thus it shall be,” and “thus” is a way of being myself that I
intentionally, freely, and knowingly choose, I enact the very decision that I internally
speak, and my external actions, whether they deal with things, persons, or God, flow
from that decision. Not all decisions are explicitly self-reflective “existential moments,”
to recount a phrase from both Insight and Method. But the ones most responsive to our
existential self-constitution reflect conversion, a turning away from the avoidance of
responsibility for self-possession and self-gift and a turning toward the embrace of
personal freedom. 374

2 General Resemblances Between Transcendental Method and Wisdom

Transcendental method is the appropriation of one’s own foundational reality, of
who one is as subject, which is implicated in and illuminative of every cognitionalexistential endeavor. Transcendental method is the concrete, normative subject
appropriating conscious, intentional, recurrent, and interrelated operations of
experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding as they occur in a normative pattern
that yields cumulative and progressive results. 375 Lonergan treats each element of this

CWL 24: 41-47, especially 43 and 46.
“Experiencing” stands as shorthand for all of the operations of the senses, perception, and feeling.
“Understanding” stands as shorthand for all of the major activities of intelligent consciousness; it is
preceded by inquiry and imagination and followed by conception and formulation. “Judging” stands as
shorthand for all of the major activities of rational consciousness; it is preceded by reflecting and
marshalling and weighing the evidence. “Deciding” stands as shorthand for all of the major activities of
374
375
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definition in kind, a format that will be followed here to elucidate the similarity between
transcendental method and wisdom.

2.1 Operations as Patterned, Related, and Recurrent

Prescinding for a moment from the fruit of method, what remains is a
transcendental, normative pattern of recurrent and related operations. The conscious,
intentional operations constitutive of transcendental method are “patterned” and “related”
because they follow upon one another in a concrete order of internal relations—a
pattern—characterized by mutual dependence, telos and transcendence, and underlying
unity.
Without the data of experience inundating us as soon as we awake there would be
nothing to experience; without intelligent inquiry and divergent conceptions there would
be no reason to seek truth; without judgment and the reasonable pronouncement of “yes”
or “no,” there would be no responsible effort to deliberate on what we should do or be in
response to factual knowledge. 376 Just as the higher levels of consciousness materially
depend on the lower, the lower levels are formally influenced by the higher. Our desire to
act virtuously and be persons of value not only inspires all of our judgments of value but
also intensifies the passionate disinterestedness of our pursuit of truth, since we cannot
begin the process of verifying our hypotheses in earnest unless we have already somehow
decided that it is worthwhile to seek truth.

rational self-consciousness; it is preceded by taking counsel, deliberating, evaluating, and is followed by
speaking, writing, and doing. CWL 14: 8, 10 and editorial n. 3, 13.
376
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Each level of consciousness is distinguished from the next by type of operation
and the quality of consciousness that varies with each change in operational task. This
modification in the feel of self-awareness can be heightened in one’s experience for the
sake of clarifying and distinguishing one level from another. What comes to light in the
process of self-appropriation is that each level exists for the sake of the next, and all
together exist for the sake of knowing and loving the yet incompletely known and
imperfectly loved totality, whole, universe. 377
The pattern obtaining among the operations is first given in consciousness, is
itself experienced as part of the experience of the operations. The pattern itself is an
outgrowth of the underlying unity of consciousness, and this unity is simply given, is
simply the unity of one functional and functioning conscious process, one self-presence
that flows continuously when awake, and in incoherent fragments when dreaming. 378
Conscious process is formally dynamic because it spontaneously and inevitably evokes
and synthesizes its own components—not just operations but groups of groups of
operations, to recall De systemate et historiae—into one living whole, and does so
attentively, intelligently, rationally, and responsibly. 379
Like those of method, the functions of wisdom are recurrent and related
operations. Its nexus of functionality centers on consideration, judgment, and ordering,
apparently in that order. 380 If wisdom first and foremost considers or contemplates God,
CWL 14: 13-17.
CWL 24: 41-47, especially 43 and 46.
379
Lonergan repeats this language in Method in Theology in a short section on Piaget serving as foreground
to a later discussion of the human good. See CWL 14: 25 and 28-31.
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As observed in Chapter Three, Lonergan brings into relief the paradoxical interdependence of wisdom’s
judging and ordering functions in De intellectu et methodo. However, in at least two places he describes
judgment as the most derivative function, stating that wisdom judges all because it grasps and orders all. In
the notes from “Wisdom and Self-Appropriation,” one of a set of forty lectures given in 1961 at St. Mary’s
College in Moraga, California, he states that wisdom judges all because it grasps and orders all. (See
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at least one dimension of its contemplation may stem from its right judgment about
divine things, especially its basic assertion of God’s existence. But Aquinas’ most central
statement about wisdom’s functions, found in his discussion of the gift of wisdom but
surely representative of other forms, highlights the dependence of judgment and order on
the consideration of the highest cause. 381 At least in the way of teaching, judgment
proceeds by way of cause, so that judgment about lower causes and effects flows from a
consideration of the highest cause. If sapiential judgment is related to consideration of
God as highest cause, then sapiential ordering is related to consideration of God as final
end, for to grasp the order of something is to understand its relation to its end. Judgment
and order also seem to be directly related: to judge rightly about creatures is to
understand their order to God.
Because our intellects are most essentially characterized as potency, there is
always more to know and appreciate about God. And so the circle of right judgment
about divine things leading to a contemplation or habitual consideration of God, which
leads to right judgment about earthly things and right ordering of earthly things back to
God as first cause and final cause is an ever-spinning circle. And as the temporal realities
that are to be related to God as principle and end are always changing, our judgment and
ordering of all things to God never cease in this life.

Archive Entry 18740DTE060, 1, at https://www.bernardlonergan.com/archiveitem.php?id=1214. Accessed
on January 24, 2019.) Further, in the Regis College institute of 1962, wisdom’s judgment depends on its
ordering of the totality of conditions necessary for the absolute positing of judgment (CWL 22: 102). In my
opinion, the paradoxical nature of wisdom in the second stage of meaning (theory) may partly drive its
transposition into the third stage of meaning (interiority).
381
II-II, 45, 1, response: ad sapientem pertinet considerare causam altissimam, per quam de aliis
certissime iudicatur, et secundum quam omnia ordinari oportet.
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2.2 Operations as Transcendental

In contrast to categorical intention, which asks determinate questions and issues in
culturally variant, determinate answers with limited denotation, the transcendental
intention of method asks unrestricted questions, seeking what is comprehensive in
connotation and unrestricted in denotation. Rather than provide us with answers, the
transcendentals are the source of questions. They are unrestricted because questions are
unrestricted. They are comprehensive because they intend the whole universe, of which
we know only a part at any given time.
The distinction between transcendental and categorical intention corresponds to
Aquinas’ distinction between wisdom said simply and wisdom said with qualification, a
distinction also referenced by Lonergan in the spring 1962 and fall-winter 1963-1964 De
methodo theologiae courses. 382 Wisdom is embodied in a limited way by the artisan
whose skill represents a certain ultimate standard in one specific realm of knowledge and
practice. But wisdom is embodied in an unqualifiedly ultimate way by the wise person
whose knowledge of the highest causes and practice of living in conformity with that
knowledge—especially the order of the universe ordained by the Highest Cause—spans
across and unites all realms of being. 383 The wise know God as unqualified, formally
unconditioned being and as unqualified, absolutely unconditional goodness and love.
The transcendental notions are not knowledge; they are intending, and their object
is being. The relationship between intention and being forms a second meaning of
“transcendental,” the unity between subjectivity and objectivity. They conjoin diverse
382
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operations into one single knowing, unite singly known objects into one compound
object, and unite many compound objects into the order of an entire universe of being.
Like wisdom, the object of the overarching, transcendental intentionality of human
consciousness is the whole universe. And in the light of divine wisdom, the terminal
value of transcendental intention is not merely the human good we effect but the
redemption of the whole universe wrought by God, “an all-encompassing good” into
which human good is integrated. 384
The isomorphism between transcendental intending and the order of an entire
universe of being finds a Thomist echo in the identity in act between the knower and the
known. Knowledge is only possible if the likeness of the thing known can come to be in
the knower, but this similarity is effected not merely through the innate receptivity of
human intellect but also through its agent intellect, which participates in divine light. This
identity in form between the knowing and the known occurs only at the level of
understanding.
But it is only in an act of reflective understanding, issuing in an act of judgment—
an affirmation or negation of a thing’s act of existence—that the knower really and truly
knows concrete being. 385 Judgment involves affirmation of the other as other, the reality
of difference. 386 Through true judgment we affirm that the esse intentionale first

CWL 14: 112 and 360, with quote on 112.
CWL 2: 158-162; 57-59; 95-99, especially 96; 201.
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There exists an intentio intellecta or esse intentionale at the level of understanding as well, in the inner
word of definition. I choose to highlight here the presence of the intentional at the level of judgment
because it illuminates both Aquinas’ and Lonergan’s position that judgment includes affirmation of the
other as other, something that knowledge by identity does not fully reach, even though Aquinas’ account of
knowledge by identity explicitly acknowledges the modal difference between the form in the thing and the
form as understood by the intellect. See CWL 2: 83-85, especially 84; 158-162, especially 162; 196-197,
especially 197.
384
385

181
conceived by understanding does in fact accurately represent the actus essendi of the
thing.
The centrality of knowledge by intentionality is especially apparent in the wise
whose noble work is the contemplation of God, whose being transcends the limitations of
matter, exposing the limitations of knowledge by identity. As pure act, God’s
understanding is the same as God’s being. The tenant that knowing is by similarity holds
no less true for judgment than for understanding: understanding is by similarity between
the form of the known and the form of the knowing in the midst of modal difference,
while judgment is by similarity between the esse intentionale in the knower and the actus
essendi of the known. Judgment is not simply knowledge of the correspondence between
the mental compositio reached by understanding and the real composition in the thing—it
is a known correspondence. “It is only in the second type of intellectual operation, only in
the production of the second type of inner word, that intellect not merely attains
similitude to its object but also reflects upon and judges that similitude.” 387
In this context wisdom’s knowledge of God is a singular exception: wisdom’s
consideration of God includes a grasp of dissimilarity between our idea of God and God’s
reality, since God’s reality is thoroughly unlike our conceptions of God and our process
of coming to know God. In God there is no distinction between existence or essence or
between intellect and intelligible. There is not even a distinction between God’s intentio
intellecta and the divine res intellecta. Wisdom’s judicial consideration of God truly
reaches knowledge of divine reality through correct judgments, but at the core of its
contemplative insight is the acknowledgement of a complete and utter entitative
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disproportionate between its intention of God and God in God’s self. 388 In this way
Thomist wisdom is most of all a reflection of the unrestricted or “transcendental” in
transcendental intention.

2.3 Operations as Normative

In general, a pattern of operations can be considered normative if it is envisaged
as the right way of doing a job—in the case of transcendental method, a verifiable and
reliable way of coming to know the universe and to grow as cognitional-existential actors
developing at a given time in history. In transcendental method, the pattern of experience,
understanding, judging, and deciding is defined as the right way of explaining and
facilitating the occurrence of coming to know and choose anything proportionate to
human cognitional and existential process. The “ought” of this method is the
objectification of the transcendental notions in the form of precepts that express the
intentionality of each respective level of consciousness: Be attentive, be intelligent, be
reasonable, be responsible.
But how do we know that these precepts, even when unexpressed, are still always
immanent, operative, and normative? The foundation of method is not the objectification
of subjective process in the form of theories, descriptions, or accounts, all of which can
be revised, but in the dynamic structure of conscious, intentional subjectivity itself, which
cannot be revised without performing the very activities under question, thereby denying
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our “own proper essence.” 389 Concepts, words, and propositions about subjectivity are
subject to revision, but never in such a way that attention becomes inattention,
intelligence becomes stupidity, reasonableness becomes silliness, and responsibility
becomes irresponsibility. 390
As a perfection of the speculative intellect, Thomist wisdom, too, would seem to
bear intrinsic normativity; it is the habit that enables one to consider and judge divine
truth and judge and order all other truths easily, promptly, and with pleasure. Like all acts
of intellect, to understand and to judge rightly about divine truths is an act that remains in
the knower as that knower’s own act and perfection. The divine truths treasured and
contemplated by sapientia act as a canon against which all other truths are measured.

2.4 Cumulative and Progressive Results

Lonergan defines progressive results as a continuous series of discoveries, and
cumulative results as the synthesis of a new insight with all previous valid insights.
Progressive discoveries and cumulative syntheses both proceed not from a set of rigid
rules but from the innate and spontaneously operative procedures of the human mind
encapsulated in method, which acts as “a framework for collaborative creativity.” 391
We notice a parallel here with the synthetic and progressive character of “insight
into insight,” the program laid out in Insight’s Preface. Each and every insight is a priori
inasmuch as it goes beyond merely empirical consciousness and is synthetic inasmuch as
it organizes experiential data into explanatory unifications. And so self-appropriation is
CWL 14: 367.
CWL 14: 21-23, 367, 382, 389.
391
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synthetic because insight into insight provides us with an explanatory unification of the
entire set of a priori, synthetic components in our cognitional activity. If every insight
unifies and organizes, then insight into insight yields a unification and organization of all
departments of knowledge into a metaphysics that is a verifiable and integral heuristic
structure, with every metaphysical statement implicating a statement regarding
cognitional fact. Furthermore, insight is progressive, begetting further insight. Single
insights may combine beyond a mere mastery of subject, coalescing into a higher
viewpoint—the emergence of a new structure of insights and their consequents,
epitomized by an expansion into new operations, new objects, and new standards for
thought and praxis. 392
The epistemological wisdom of Verbum is synthetic because it connects the order
of thought with the order of reality. Its transposition into the self-affirmation of the
knower in Insight is synthetic because the unity of the subject’s one consciousness, at
once empirical, intelligent, and rational, is given in consciousness, thereby fulfilling one
of the key conditions for self-affirmation: the subject’s reality as a concrete and
intelligible unity-identity-whole. 393 And the transcendental method of Method in
Theology is synthetic on multiple accounts: it shows the unity of all knowledge and
highlights the conscious intentional unity from which unified knowledge flows. In
addition, it links the invariable structure of knowing with the isomorphic structure of the
known, showing the unity between the human mind and the universe of being, between
cognitional theory and metaphysics. 394 If the self-affirmation of the knower of Insight
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acted as a transposition of the epistemological wisdom of intellectual light grasping its
commensuration to reality in Verbum, then perhaps through an analogy of proportion the
synthetic aspect of transcendental method, as an extension of the self-appropriation
Insight first invited, will prove to have sapiential facets as well.
Transcendental method is progressive insofar as it repeatedly drives and codifies
“a sustained succession of discoveries.” 395 It applies its awareness of the incessant
occurrence of questions and the radical openness of the transcendental notions to the
subject’s own experiencing, understanding, and judging as these recurrent and related
operations result in knowledge. Further vistas of knowledge open as new data is
unearthed that puts previous judgments in doubt, incites new hypotheses, gives rise to
further modified judgments, as the circle of method turns again and again. 396
Aquinas and Lonergan both describe wisdom in terms that suggest synthesis,
indicating a parallel with transcendental method. In the 1962 course De methodo
theologiae as well as the 1962 institute at Regis College, the integration of differentiated
worlds was achieved through a “wise oscillation”; in other words, a synthesis of various
differentiations of consciousness is the work of personal wisdom. 397 In various pieces
from the Roman years, especially The Triune God: Systematics (1964) and the De
methodo theologiae courses of spring 1963 and fall-winter 1963-1964, Lonergan
associates the way of synthesis—the way of proceeding from causes to effects, principles
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to conclusions, and reasons to realities—with the ordering function of wisdom. In the
way of analysis, the order of things themselves is still being learned; in the way of
synthesis, the cognitional procedure of teaching mirrors the order in things themselves
that wisdom has discerned.
Science is also properly synthetic: it understands causes in their effects, but these
causes are only first in a specific realm of being. But wisdom is synthetic in a more
ultimate way than science: it reflectively understands and judges causes that are
absolutely first in the entire ontological order and orders them into a unified system. It
comes to know this system of world process—of universal order—by ordering the most
foundational questions as they emerge in the human mind, selecting the inquiry whose
solution is necessary to answer all subsequent questions. 398
Aquinas also understands the function of wisdom as being eminently synthetic, in
at least two ways: in its reference to the synthesis of judgment and its recognition of the
unity of all being. 399 Judgment is either the affirmation of synthesis between the thing
and the form previously understood by the intellect, or the negation of synthesis between
the thing and the form previously understood by the intellect. 400 Although its object is
God, the Ultimate Indivisible, wisdom’s grasp of divine truth is the synthesis of
judgment: affirming God’s existence and attributes and denying any composition or
imperfections that might accrue to our necessarily analogous understanding of God.
In his interpretation of Aquinas’ notion of intellectual light, Lonergan posits that
the ground of all knowledge is an inchoate and inborn view of the whole of being: an
undifferentiated grasp of unity and an anticipation that the whole universe is
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intelligible. 401 The existence of a commensuration between our intellect and the universe
of being is a truth that has to be learned like any other. This truth is what Coelho reads in
Verbum as “epistemological wisdom”—the rationally reflective act by which intellect
reflects upon itself, grasping its own nature as well as the relationship between its infinite
potency and all of being. 402 In this way, wisdom as the innate and inborn grasp of the
unity of being becomes the mature self-knowledge of the wise, who realize the intimacy
between the human mind and the universe it understands. The “epistemological wisdom”
that Lonergan locates in Aquinas speaks to a synthetic unity between knower and known
that spans across sciences, even in the midst of distinction.
As with synthesis, Aquinas and Lonergan both describe wisdom in terms that
suggest discovery, once again indicating a parallel with transcendental method. It is
precisely the speculative intellect’s discovery of truth, the motion of reason from the
more known to the less known, that is guided by wisdom when reason inquires into the
divine. Wisdom’s quintessential act may very well be a contemplative grasp of God that
rests in the knowledge of the Highest Cause, as the motion of reason rests in the
understanding it eventually achieves. But it is no less the work of the wise to seek that
rest. Certainly in its functions of teaching and defending, habitual wisdom continually
strives to eradicate ignorance and show the intelligibility of being. 403 And donum
sapientiae not only judges speculative matters based on its union with God but also
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directs practical ones, and the number of human affairs in need of wisdom only increases
with time. 404
Lonergan’s emphasis on the progressive nature of wisdom looms large in his
Gregorian courses from the late 1950s and early 1960s, especially the 1959 De intellectu
et methodo. Against the objection that would deny the foundational status of wisdom
because of the multitude of fools, Lonergan stresses that an initial, relatively undeveloped
degree of wisdom is a sufficient foundation for further development. Far from detracting
from wisdom’s claim, an acknowledgment of development is the humble hallmark of
wisdom’s beginning. Put simply, the wise one knows how much she does not yet know;
far from shunning human development in its many aspects, some agonizing and some
beautiful and some both, the wise one lovingly surrenders to it. 405
Finally, the cumulative and progressive nature of wisdom’s functionality is
exemplified in its secondary functions. Wisdom’s primary functions—consideration of
the divine, judgment about the divine and judgment of all else according the divine, and
ordering all things to God—ground two secondary functions of wisdom, teaching the
truth and refuting objections to the truth. 406 And so Mabry comments on wisdom’s
relation to transcendental method thus:
It should already be readily apparent that these operations [consideratio, iudicium,
ordinatio] are related as an ordered series initiated by the initial experience and grasp
of the highest cause. An evaluation is made, which in turns gives way to responsible
II-II, 45, 3, response and replies to all three objections.
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ordering and deliberative teaching. This ordered set of operations yields results,
namely, the dissemination of the truth. For Thomas, a true life of contemplation
always overflows into a life of activity. Returning to Lonergan’s comments about the
role of method “in an age of novelty,” we see that Lonergan perceives transcendental
method (at least as applied in theology) to be capable of identifying and refuting errors
and in turn identifying and showing the way forward (i.e., teaching the truth). 407
3 Functions of Transcendental Method and Objectives of Thomist Wisdom

The Gregorian courses of the late 1950s through the early 1960s saw Lonergan’s
transcendental method increasingly absorb the three general functions of Thomist
wisdom—considerare, iudicare, and ordinare. In Chapter One wisdom was described as
bearing foundational, consummate, normative, and unifying roles in Thomas’ account of
knowledge. As will be seen, transcendental method amply provides for all four of these
objectives of Thomist wisdom, leaving behind a set of remainder concepts unique to
Lonergan’s context. And as might be expected, the functions of transcendental method
enlisted by Lonergan follow closely from the constitutive elements of its definition as a
normative pattern of recurrent, related, and transcendental operations yielding cumulative
and progressive results. While remaining distinct, the meaning of these functions
substantially overlap, opening the possibility of multiple ways of reading the proportion
between transcendental method’s functionality and that of wisdom. What is most
important, however, is the striking analogical equivalence in functionality throughout.
Lonergan describes the broadest functions of transcendental method as unitive,
systematic, heuristic, foundational, normative, critical, and dialectical. 408
Eric Mabry, “Officium Sapientis: Sapiential Moorings of Lonergan’s Notion of Method and Interiority
in Thomas Aquinas” (paper presented at the West Coast Methods Institute, Loyola Marymount University,
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3.1 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Unitive

The analogical similarity between the unifying function of transcendental method
and the unifying objective of Thomist wisdom is transparent. Transcendental method
provides a “key to unified science.” 409 If the spokes of a wheel represent diverse sciences,
the hub of the wheel is the same human mind that comes to know in each of them.
Transcendental method is simply the appropriation and objectification of one and the
same human cognitional process active in every science.
Although in the Aristotelian-Thomist division of knowledge certain sciences
might have lesser degrees of absolute intelligibility than others due to matter, they all
depend on the first principles whose terms are selected by wisdom. Furthermore, in its
metaphysical form, wisdom’s knowledge of potency and act, matter and form, essence
and existence, and substance and accident enters constitutively into the explanations
proper to different sciences. Likewise, transcendental method is a constituent part of the
special methods proper to the other sciences. 410

3.2 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Systematic

The objectification of interiority in transcendental method gives birth to a set of
basic terms and relations—its systematic function. A system is an intelligible whole in
knowledge characterized by technical language in which terms and relations originate
409
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from a single understanding, with the relations fixed by the terms and the terms fixed by
the relations. 411 The basic terms introduced by transcendental method refer to the
operations of cognitional process and the basic relations are the ties that join them with
one another. They are the essence of cognitional theory but also ground an epistemology
insofar as they capture the dynamism of the concrete subject whose authentic, selftranscendent subjectivity issues into objectivity. Basic terms and relations also ground a
metaphysics, since they are isomorphic with ontological structure. Since the source of
basic terms and relations is cognitional process, which is exempt from revision at the core
of its lived reality but revisable in its conceptualization, transcendental method’s
systematic function furnishes continuity throughout all sciences without imposing
inflexibility. 412
Thomist wisdom corresponds in a general way to system in the way of synthesis,
since the wise know appearance from reality; 413 the synthetic “way of wisdom” is the
way of things in themselves, the way of scientific system. More adequately, however,
wisdom is systematic in its right judgment on first principles. The meaning of the most
basic term—being—is fixed by wisdom’s right judgment (consequent to its
contemplation of Unconditioned Being) and enters into the fabric of all the sciences.

3.3 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Heuristic

Transcendental method’s systematic function leads into its heuristic one. Heuristic
procedures are ubiquitous in modern science and method. Transcendental method’s
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heuristic strength lies in its ability to build a bridge between the activity of intention and
the intended unknown by applying the basic terms and relations of cognitional process.
Whenever the unknown is a human subject or an object proportionate to human
experiencing, understanding, and judgment, we already know that it is an identity-unitywhole, a compound of potency, form, and act correlative to the levels of consciousness.
Wisdom’s heuristic function is opaque, but discernable in Verbum. Wisdom’s inchoate
form as a primitive anticipation of the unity of being eventually gives rise to one of the
most basic logical and heuristic structures, the law of the excluded middle: either X is or
is not. 414

3.4 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Foundational

Transcendental method is foundational because explicit self-possession draws
together all sciences into “a higher unity of vocabulary, thought, and orientation” by
furnishing common foundations (the pattern of recurrent and related operations);
common norms (the transcendental precepts); common systematics (the same basic terms
and relations, based on cognitional process); and common procedures (critical, heuristic,
and dialectical methods). 415 Self-appropriation binds together the intimate core of all
sciences in one and the same normative subject whose normativity stems from selftranscendence, both cognitional and moral. Thomist wisdom is foundational because its
study of the Highest Cause, known by theologians to be the Triune God, primarily
answers the question of where all reality comes from. Secondarily, the foundational
414
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question of what comes first in human knowledge is answered by wisdom’s selection of
primitive terms.

3.5 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Normative

Transcendental method’s normative function, expressed in the transcendental
precepts, is grounded in the “spontaneous, structured dynamism of human
consciousness.” 416 This normativity can be translated into specific categorical precepts by
studying the operations dominant in a given field. Wisdom is normative in the way it
judges the principles and conclusions of other sciences against the standard of divine
truth. As the first principles which wisdom helps construct are ultimate and normative
across all fields, the principles that come first in a given science are ultimate and
normative for that science. 417

3.6 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Critical

Transcendental method is critical: it cuts to the root of basic philosophical
disagreements by reducing metaphysical disagreements regarding reality to
epistemological disagreements on objectivity and distortions in cognitional theory,
flawed epistemology to flawed cognitional theory, and mistaken cognitional theory to the
inherent discrepancy between the actual thinker’s cognitive performance and his or her
mistaken objectification of it. The latter is the most fundamental of the triad because
416
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misrepresentations of who we are as knowers inevitably infect epistemology and
metaphysics with errors. 418
Lonergan clarifies that wisdom’s epistemological moment is a “generalization of
the criteriological issue,” not the critical one. Sapientia does not critically unfold “how
our immanent activities also contain a transcendence,” 419 but as right judgment, it
correctly grasps and is aware of when an assent or judgment ought to be made based on
resolution to first principles. All wise judgments are made based on resolutio in
principia. One can even say that wisdom is judgment about the criteriological basis of
right judgment. But Thomist wisdom does not properly unfold the critical trifecta of
cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics.
So while Thomist wisdom cannot be said to be critical in the way envisioned in
transcendental method, as its epistemological moment perhaps does not push back far
enough to the origin of knowledge in intention, it still points the way to a more
methodical development of the connection among thought, objectivity, and reality by
heightening, in an absolute way, the connection between reflection in general and reality,
and this connection is the epitome of judgment. 420 One and the same habit of sapientia
knows highest causes and, in its indirect validation of the very possibility of
demonstrable knowledge, knows our capacity to know.
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3.7 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Dialectical

The critical function of transcendental method naturally culminates in its
dialectical one. The normative structure of our conscious intentionality is violated often
and variously. And so when the critical function of transcendental method untangles the
wayward detours of confused cognitional theories, epistemologies, and metaphysics, a
dialectic of position and counterpositions appears. But the very presence of this dialectic
“only objectifies and manifests the need for man to be authentic” while simultaneously
beckoning to conversion. 421 While not directly causing conversion, it ushers us right up
to its threshold by instigating an encounter with people, ideas, and beliefs that shed light
on our darkness.
Perhaps because its ratio expressly prescinds from will, 422 Thomist wisdom lacks
the existential overtones to Lonergan’s notion of dialectic. But its judgment of truth from
falsity, both at the level of principles and conclusions, and its discernment of reality from
appearance still make it a sharp intellectual tool in the theoretical stage of meaning.
Perhaps more than any other, transcendental method’s dialectical function would seem to
take over wisdom’s consummate aspect by leading us to the grace-framed door of
conversion, which for Lonergan represents something absolutely ultimate in the
transformation of human consciousness.
In conclusion, the functionality of transcendental method absorbs wisdom into
itself, fulfilling Lonergan’s pithy statement from the 1963-1964 De methodo theologiae
course: “Wisdom regarding the concrete is understood inasmuch as it is included in
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method.” 423 The functionality of a wisdom that considers highest causes and judges and
orders all other truths according to the First Truth bears resemblance to both the
definition and the functions of transcendental method. And the reverse is true as well: the
functionality of transcendental method generously incorporates the objectives of wisdom.
But the structure of transcendental method is multidimensional. It is delineated into two
phases of accounting for the meaning-laden data of theology, with four functional
specialties in each phase. And so the question arises of how the transposition of wisdom
into transcendental method might be further specified in terms of functional
specialization.

4 Functional Specialization

The central role of the question in the birth of method was explicitly thematized
as early as the 1959 course De intellectu et methodo, and in the two De methodo
theologiae courses from 1963-1964. All methodology is the enlargement of a simple
principle: we know insofar as we answer questions. 424 But questions can be distinguished
from one another in a variety of ways. In the same texts that broach the topic of how to
distinguish theological questions and theological material, wisdom is spoken of as what
orders the questions and their solutions, suggesting at least a vague connection between
wisdom and functional specialization. 425
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In contrast with material division, Lonergan elects operational division—that is,
methodical distinction—as the best way to distinguish different theological questions. In
Method, Lonergan elaborates on functional specialization as a novel way of treating
different theological materials differently, ordering theological questions coherently, and
uniting different materials and different questions. 426
Functional specialization is the idea of distinguishing all of these things by the
fourfold operations of consciousness. In its basic form, functional specialization consists
of four groupings of theological tasks, each of which relies on all four operations but
greatly accentuates the characteristic operation of its respective level of consciousness—
experiencing, understanding, judging, or deciding. By elucidating one single theological
process from data to results, the functional specialties that compose this process are
organically and intrinsically connected.
Since each functional specialty has a unique goal, each employs a unique
methodology distinct from the others and together these distinct methodologies make up
one transcendental method. And so transcendental method becomes not just a normative
pattern of related and recurrent operations with cumulative and progressive results but a
normative pattern of interdependent normative patterns. But because theology reflects on
religion in a given culture and both religion and culture change with time and in time, it
proceeds in two distinct stages, yielding eight functional specialties total.
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The first stage of transcendental method is indirect discourse that focuses on
“hearing” what others have said in and about the religious past. The goal of this first
phase is an open, receptive encounter with the past in the research that makes available
the data that grounds this encounter’s experiential aspect; in the interpretation of data that
understands what a theological author meant; in the history that judges this interpretation
by positing the wider context of Christian movements; and in the dialectical procedure
that decides which movements or elements in a movement represent positions and which
represent counterpositions.
In the second phase of transcendental method, “theology, in response to the past,
takes a stand in the present with respect to the future.” 427 For the second phase bears
witness to the religious word to which the theologian has listened in the first phase, and
directly hands on the tradition of that word. It is direct discourse in which the theologian
brings their own self-transformation and existential decisions to bear on an objectified
horizon in foundations; on the affirmation of theological truths in doctrines; on the
intelligible ordering and analogical structure of theological understanding in systematics;
and on the experiential manifold of current cultural issues in communications.
The advantages of functional specialization are manifold. What was once an
overwhelming project can be reduced to distinct groups of tasks each with its own focus.
This simplification also prevents any one theological task from developing “totalitarian
ambitions,” attempting to exclude or belittle others. 428 And since its eightfold
differentiation directly depends on the normative structure of intentional consciousness,
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transcendental method proceeds from data to results with extraordinary and verifiable
legitimacy. 429

5 Wisdom as Functional Specialty: Dialectic

Our first inkling that Thomist wisdom and Lonergan’s notion of dialectic may be
related in the way of transposition came in the spring 1963 De methodo theologiae
course, and the same link was present in the winter 1963-fall 1964 version of the same
class. The bridge between the two came in the form of basic terms: there is in philosophy
a dizzying array of historical development and conflict around the meaning of
fundamental notions. Philosophical differences recur in the form of perennial realisms,
perennial idealisms, perennial empiricisms. These disagreements are perennial because
they are based less in conceptual misunderstandings than in truly contradictory,
fundamental existential orientations. By this time for Lonergan, what is meant by “first
principles” is not self-evident propositions but the a priori, invariant and normative
structure of the operating subject; the most basic or fundamental terms are not even the
conceptual meaning of being but the transcendental “openness of the mind” toward
being, truth, and goodness as that openness is manifested in cognitional structure; and
even the transcendentals themselves are understood in light of the operations we all enact
as knowers. 430
In Lonergan’s work from 1963 and 1964, dialectic discerns the correct meaning
of notions like being through an explicit analysis of horizon. It judges and decides
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whether a given horizon, embodied in a particular author, statement, or historical
movement, is an expression of our unrestricted desire for knowledge and unrestricted
desire for goodness and beauty, or something that falls short of this originary, naturally
given subjectivity, thus expressing a contradiction between what one is and what one says
one is. Dialectic emerges insofar as “the intelligible, the true, and the good is contrasted
with the absurd, the false, and the evil.” 431 And in this fallen world, a life lived in accord
with an unrestricted telos is only possible on a consistent basis as the fruit of conversion,
whether that be intellectual, moral, religious, or some combination. And so dialectic, in
and of itself, implies consideration of conversion, and dialectical conflicts are resolved by
conversion. 432
In the spring 1963 course De methodo theologiae, Lonergan describes dialectic
itself as a function of both existential decision and the sphere of personal judgment
“illuminated by” such decision: “Dialectic, then, removes questions from the field of
growing intelligence (description and explanation) to the field of judgment. It does not
make a formal judgment: I must decide about my own existence. But it illuminates the act
of judgment and reduces opposites to their principles.” 433 In fact, so high is the summit
climbed by dialectic that it would appear to have one foot in method and one foot in the
ultimately spiritual transformation—the experience and living out of conversion—that
nourishes and in fact makes possible the authentic practice of transcendental structure,
but which is not fully circumscribed within that methodological structure.
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Still, it is clear from the De methodo theologiae courses of 1963 and 1963-1964
that Lonergan thinks of dialectic first and foremost as an embodiment of methodical
judgment. While acknowledging that dialectic brings into sharp relief the inescapable
influence that existential decision has on our judgments around positions and
counterpositions, he still identifies the dialectical function of method with judgment. Just
as importantly, although existential decision intrinsically implicates the possibility of
conversion, and conversion is at the heart of dialectic, Lonergan places existential
decision largely outside of explicit methodical structure. It remains to be seen, however,
exactly how Method, with its expanded functionality of transcendental method, clearer
distinction and inclusion of the level of decision, and delineation of seven additional
functional specialties will substantially shift the very notion of dialectic, and whether that
will modify the nascent transposition of wisdom’s selection of first terms into methodical
dialectic we noticed in 1963-1964.

5.1 Dialectic in Method in Theology

In contrast to De intellectu et methodo, in the De methodo theologiae course of
1963-1964 it is dialectic, not wisdom, that selects first terms. 434 And four years later, in

Although the point is not made as explicitly in 1957, Lonergan does begin to attribute the selection of
first terms to dialectic in Insight. For what is the evidence for the truth of metaphysics as Lonergan
conceives it? What is the basis of the “long and difficult accumulation of direct and reflective insights”
(CWL 3: 508) that eventually culminates in explicit metaphysics? Lonergan communicates this evidence
through a military metaphor: such evidence is approached by breakthrough, encirclement, and confinement
(508-509). The breakthrough is the self-affirmation of the knower; the encirclement is the protean notion of
being as whatever one intelligently grasps and reasonably affirms; and the confinement is the final and
actual identification of being with what is intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, with this
identification issuing in the dialectical opposition of two contradictory notions of reality, knowing, and
objectivity. I have chosen to align epistemological wisdom with the self-affirmation of the knower, since
self-appropriation is the ultimate (if remote) source of the meaning of primitive notions like being, but it
434
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the 1968 lecture “The Future of Thomism,” Lonergan explains that because it is not logic
but the normative, invariant structures of subjectivity—the generators of logic—that are
truly foundational, the “first principles” spoken of so frequently in classical Thomism can
be transposed as transcendental method in a contemporary cognitional context. 435 And in
the 1968 Boston College lectures on transcendental philosophy and the study of religion,
it is, once again, the authentic subject who is the first principle. 436
The same theme is repeated in Method, with the explicit appeal to conversion
reminiscent of the dialectical function of method in 1963-1964: “Conversion transforms
the concrete individual to make him capable of grasping not merely conclusions but
principles as well.” 437 In turn, one’s notion of objectivity shifts according to the place
given to the concrete subject in one’s theological system. When logical proof is held as
fundamental, then the concrete normative subject is ignored or thought to be something
that must be abstracted from for true objectivity to occur. When the concrete normative
subject is positioned as central to every aspect of theology, then objectivity is affirmed as
residing in the self-transcendence of that subject in the form of intellectual, religious, and
moral conversion. If dialectic is concerned with principles—with what is absolutely
seems true that the dialectical aspect of metaphysical method is what proximately terminates in the basic
terms of philosophy, something that does not happen until Chapter Fourteen of Insight (long after the selfaffirmation of the knower in Chapter Eleven). The dialectical thrust of Lonergan’s transposition of Thomist
wisdom in Insight has already been nicely captured by Coelho. His account emphasizes the transposition of
Verbum’s epistemological wisdom into Insight’s generalized empirical method, which includes a crucial
dialectical aspect, and Verbum’s metaphysical wisdom into Insight’s explicit metaphysics, which likewise
includes a crucial dialectical aspect. See Hermeneutics and Method, 35-44, with a helpful summary on 4748.
435
See the 1968 lecture “The Future of Thomism” in A Second Collection, ed. Robert M. Doran and John
D. Dadosky, CWL 13 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016), 46. The same point is repeated in Appendix
1 of the Collected Works edition of Method in Theology, entitled “The New Context.” It is an earlier
version of what came to be Chapter One of Method and was likely composed sometime between 1965 and
1967. See CWL 14: xiii; 340 and editorial n. 1; 343 and editorial n. 5; 366-367.
436
See “Transcendental Philosophy and the Study of Religion, 3-12 July 1968, Boston College,” in Early
Works on Theological Method 1, ed. Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken, CWL 22 (Toronto:
University of Toronto, 2010), 421-633.
437
CWL 14: 313.

203
fundamental in theological system—and conversion empowers us to grasp principles,
then the question becomes how exactly dialectic involves conversion, and how exactly
dialectic distinguishes between the presence and absence of conversion. 438

5.1.1 Dialectic and Conversion

As it turns out, dialectic treats conversion through objectifying and addressing
conflict. Most obviously, when the diachronic evolution of functional specialization in
the mediating phase is traced, there are noted contradictory styles of research,
contradictory interpretations, contradictory histories, and contradictory ways of
evaluating these histories. All these may be influenced by inappropriately limited or
distorted horizons—by a lack of conversion. The objectification of conversion into a
horizon in foundations, the articulation of doctrines within that horizon, the systematic
understanding of those doctrines, and the communication of that understanding to the
current situation which produces new data in the present and for the future may also all
be subject to aberration, because there can be unauthentic conversion (what one might
call “alleged conversion”). And even authentic conversion is an ongoing and everprecarious process. 439
If horizon is the scope of our knowledge and the range of our interests, then not
all differences in horizon are contradictory and thus not all our “dialectical” in the sense
relevant to the fourth functional specialty. Complementary differences in horizon
represent legitimate divergences in interests and specializations, for example in the
In what way conversion constitutes a “first principle” will be discussed under Wisdom as Functional
Specialty: Foundations.
439
CWL 14: 126-127, 232, 252, 237, 254, 380, 393.
438

204
variety of professions. Genetic differences in horizon unfold successive stages in a
process of development, for example in the current work studying the development in
Lonergan’s transposition of wisdom. Complementary horizons can be bridged and the
successive movements of genetic horizons can be traced.
But dialectical differences in horizon are those that necessarily imply mutual
negation: they can only be overcome through religious, intellectual, or moral conversion.
What is considered true, good, beautiful in one horizon is harshly condemned as false,
evil, ugly in its dialectically opposed horizon. Each of these horizons regards the
rejections of its opposite as the one and only intelligent, reasonable, and responsible
course of action, and will eventually, at a certain point in its development, marshal
significant resources to objectify its views on intelligence, reason, responsibility, even
love.

5.1.2 The Urgency of Dialectic for the First Phase of Theology

Dialectic’s most fundamental task is the overturning of bias. Because historians
can occupy dialectically opposed horizons, critical history does not, on the whole, issue
in uniform results. Historical judgment can be flawed, exposing the need for something
beyond judgment to resolve historical conflicts. The goal of interpretation is not only to
understand the author but to understand one’s self, since the latter grasp directly impacts
the former. But conversion or lack of conversion significantly shifts the self that is to be
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understood. Special research is also impacted by conversion or its absence, since
differences of horizon dictate which data is noticed and which is overlooked. 440

5.1.3 The Structure of Dialectic

Theology must meet the matter of value directly, since its data is the data of
human consciousness, and this data is already laden with meaning. 441 The “new
theology” Lonergan advocates for in Method, the theology whose path will be lit by
transcendental method, is empirical, interpretive, and historical. It mediates between a
religion and the significance and role of that religion in a cultural matrix. 442
Accordingly, the central function of dialectic is “to clarify concrete instances in
which authentic and inauthentic existence have given rise to oppositions within religion
or within theology” and it accomplishes this through “a technique that objectifies
subjective differences and promotes conversion.” 443 This technique is comprised of an
“upper blade” of operators and “lower blade” of the materials to be operated on. In a
theological context it focuses directly on contradictions within and between Christian
movements.
The operators of dialectic are twofold: develop positions and reverse
counterpositions, the same precepts that composed the third and fourth directives of the
“general method” of De intellectu et methodo. Positions are statements that are consistent
with conversion and are developed by being integrated with new data and discoveries.
CWL 14: 222-223; 230-232; 394-396.
For the significance of theology’s receptivity to data already laden with meaning “from above
downward,” see Doran, What Is Systematic Theology?, 125 and 137.
442
CWL 14: 3; 371-378.
443
CWL 14: 386.
440
441
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Counterpositions are statements inconsistent with conversion and are reversed by the
removal of inconsistent elements. Dialectic arranges competing truth claims, classifies
them, reduces them to their roots, and manifests their extremes by developing alleged
positions while reversing alleged counterpositions. In all of this it prepares the way for
existential encounter.

5.2 Evidence of a Transposition

If dialectic is truly a transposition of Thomist wisdom, then it must fulfill the
objectives set out by Thomist wisdom. And it does. Dialectic is foundational insofar as it
reduces opposed histories, interpretations, and researches to conversion and lack of
conversion as opposed principles. Dialectic is consummate insofar as it initiates
encounter among persons at the level of value, including transcendent value, preparing
the way for what is ultimate—conversion.
Dialectic is normative insofar as it underlines the true nature of a fundamental,
ongoing process in the world constituted by human meaning: authenticity is ever a
withdrawal from inauthenticity, and the standard for authenticity is self-transcendence. It
accents the impact “from above downwards” of values and decisions on every aspect of
life, every historical investigation, every interpretation, and every inquiry of research.
The unity surveyed in dialectic is of the concrete, dynamic, and contradictory oscillation
between authenticity and unauthenticity that is the ongoing process of the human world.
Finally, dialectic is an indispensable requirement for ensuring the unity proper to an
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authentic deployment of the second phase of theology, protecting it against the
destructive plurality of dialectically opposed horizons.

5.3 Dialectic as Epistemological Wisdom

As reviewed in Chapter Two, in Verbum epistemological wisdom is the unique
act of judgment that reflects upon its nature and proportion to reality. As a specialization
in decision, dialectic foregrounds self-knowledge and the radical revolution in self that is
conversion in a vastly more explicit way. While Lonergan’s extrapolation of Thomist
wisdom’s “epistemological moment” is an intentional heightening of judgment, the
wisdom of dialectic is the thematization of the entire fourth level of consciousness. “It is
meeting persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects, and
allowing one’s living to be challenged at its very roots by their words and by their
deeds.” 444
The dramatic difference between the operations of judgment and decision
notwithstanding, the analogy of proportion is clear. Epistemological wisdom is an
exceptionally self-reflective judgment of fact; dialectic is a set of judgments of value and
decisions that invites exceptionally penetrating self-critique and perhaps existential
decision. Epistemological wisdom posits the synthesis between our self-knowledge and
our knowledge of the universe. Dialectic not only develops knowledge of the other; it
also reflects the newly affirmed value of the other back on oneself, to sound out a
resonance or dissonance, paving the way for a potentially self-determining and other-

444

CWL 14: 232.
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embracing decision. Dialectic is the outgrowth of the reciprocal relationship between
knowledge of self and knowledge of the other. It grasps the value or disvalue in the other
studied by history, and from that grasp a decision proceeds to develop positions in line
with conversion, to reverse counterpositions in an effort to remedy conversion’s absence,
and perhaps to change one’s own way of thinking and living. 445
The epistemological wisdom of Verbum was transposed in Insight as the selfaffirmation of the knower, but Insight’s account of decision was underdeveloped
compared to Method. In Method the idea of self-affirmation is expanded in an existential
direction to become the appropriation not only of experiencing, understanding, and
judging, but of deciding and loving as well. 446 And so the self-affirmation of the knower
becomes transcendental method. Moreover, the functional specialty of dialectic can be
thought of as an extension of epistemological wisdom, but transposed into the fourth
level of consciousness. Through a preparation for existential encounter rather than logical
persuasion, dialectic illuminates, but does not demonstrate, the polymorphic foolishness
at the heart of bias while beckoning us to the foundational, consummate, normative, and
unitive wisdom of conversion. 447

CWL 14: 237-238, 254, 380-381.
Although Lonergan does not explicitly affirm a fifth level of love in consciousness in Method, it is
telling that in at least one point in the text he phrases the transcendental precepts to include love, since the
understanding throughout Method is that one transcendental precept summarizes the normative thrust of
one entire level of consciousness. “It [conversion] is total surrender to the demands of the human spirit: be
attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love” (CWL 14: 252). There are other places,
however, where he quite clearly designates love as belonging to the level of decision (CWL 14: 103).
447
CWL 14: 251, 321, 336. Also see CWL 12: 14 and editorial n. 27 for Doran’s and Monsour’s suggestion
that an earlier statement by Lonergan may anticipate the functional specialty dialectics: “Still, foolishness is
manifold: different people are unwise in different ways.”
445
446
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5.4 A Further Verification: Dialectic and the Universal Viewpoint

In addition to filling in the deficiencies of the first phase and overturning bias,
dialectic has a more ultimate aim—the formation of a comprehensive viewpoint. This
“high and distant” aim of dialectic is a comprehensive viewpoint in which each and every
contradictory viewpoint underlying conflicting Christian movements, their conflicting
histories, and their conflicting interpretations is grasped in its character, oppositions, and
relations with the others, forming a single unifying perspective on Christian (and perhaps
even interreligious) conflict. The “high and distant” aim of dialectic sounds remarkably
similar to the universal viewpoint of Insight, and in a footnote discussing the simplifying
power of functional specialization, Lonergan asserts that this is the case. 448
Recall that the concept of being is not the foundation of the explicit and critical
metaphysics presented in Insight. Metaphysics is based, instead, on the prior, more
“primitive terms” of wondering intelligence and critical reflection of concrete, normative
subjectivity. As the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being, metaphysics is the
highest viewpoint naturally possible and is coincident with the metaphysical wisdom of
Verbum. But Lonergan’s metaphysics is also dialectical, evaluating any philosophical or
theological claim based on its conformity to or divergence form foundational cognitional
reality. Because meaning occurs within being, dialectical metaphysics can also judge the
truth of an interpretation. And so within the integral, heuristic structure of metaphysical
wisdom there emerges a heuristic structure, a potential totality of genetically and
dialectically ordered viewpoint that Lonergan calls the “universal viewpoint.” By

448

CWL 14: 124-125; 146, n. 2.
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indicating that what was termed a universal viewpoint in Insight becomes the functional
specialty of dialectic, Lonergan also implicitly aligns wisdom with dialectic. 449

6 Wisdom as Functional Specialty: Foundations

Dialectic captures the climax of the “from below upwards” movement from
experience in research, up through understanding in interpretation and judgment in
history, to the decision that clarifies authenticity from unauthenticity. But the decision
reached by dialectic is only partial. The fourth functional specialty “tends to eliminate
evidently foolish oppositions and so narrows down issues, but is not to be expected to go
the roots of all conflict, for, ultimately conflicts have their ground in the heart of man.” 450
In other words, dialectic cannot know for sure whether its designation of position versus
counterposition is absolutely correct, as conversion actually occurs outside of the
strictures of methodical consideration. What begins once dialectical analysis ends is not
technically the functional specialty of foundations but conversion itself. 451

6.1 Foundations and Conversion

Because it only clarified conflict but could not resolve it, dialectic wielded
conversion as a winnow in a somewhat gross manner. To parse position from
counterposition it relied on whatever authenticity the theologian had already achieved
and the way in which he was challenged by the otherness of the religious deeds, persons,
CWL 3: 572-591.
CWL 14: 134.
451
CWL 14: 254, 379, 390.
449
450
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and movements of history. Still, it employs conversion as a dependable compass, using it
as a criterion to decide among alternatives.
Because foundations is the objectification of triple conversion itself, and the fifth
functional specialty orbits around conversion as around a “first principle” in a different
way than the fourth. Foundational reality is the horizon established by religious, moral,
and intellectual conversion as they are operative in individuals, groups, cultures, and
societies. Foundations is the objectification of that horizon; it is the existential element of
the second phase of theology that shepherds the entire methodical process, even exerting
a retrograde influence on the first phase.
A foundation is what is first in an ordered set. The objectification of conversion is
the “first” in a set of more and more complete objectifications of the priority of
existential decision and love in religious and theological development, cascading down
from foundations all the way to communications. In this way foundations is the
absolutely first methodical step in the mediated phase of methodical theology, the stage
that directly discourses on what is and what is not, that consciously and deliberately
decides “one’s horizon, one’s outlook, one’s worldview.” 452 It shapes the framework in
which doctrines are affirmed, systematics draws its analogies, and communications gain
traction.

452

CWL 14: 250-253 and 394-396, with quote on 251.
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6.2 Foundations and General Categories

In 1963-1964, it was dialectic rather than wisdom that judged the correct meaning
of primitive terms. But from 1964 to 1972, dialectic moves from judgment to decision.
And because the functional specialty of dialectic is neither fully informed by the presence
of conversion nor fully capable of thematizing conversion, its approach to foundational
reality is through distinction of position from counterposition. Foundations, on the other
hand, mobilizes the foundational reality of conversion to determine the meaning of
primitive terms which, in the thought and language of Method, are categories.
Foundations derives both general and special categories from its objectification of
conversion. The transcendental notions ground the possibility of questions and answers,
but categories make them determinate. Like all objects of knowledge, categories are
intended by operations. Just as the principle of theology is not reason and not faith but
reason illumined by faith, the theologian working in the fifth functional specialty
concerns herself with both general and special categories, with both interiorly and
religiously differentiated consciousness.
General categories regard objects that are shared between theology and other
disciplines, furnishing the basic anthropological component of theology. The basis of
their derivation is, in a word, transcendental method. Basic terms are the fundamental
cognitive-existential operations and basic relations are their interconnections. The
broadening of basic terms and relations gives rise to derived terms and relations that
indicate the objects known in operations and correlative to states.
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Like the wise metaphysician whose knowledge of the Supreme Cause helps him
grasp the meaning of ens, the wisdom of the self-appropriated practitioner of
transcendental method bestows transcultural and “exceptional validity” to general
categories. While the explicit formulation of basic terms and values may fluctuate with
cultural change, the foundational reality they signify never changes. But this remarkable
soundness only enters into the fabric of theology when general categories are verified in
the theologian’s own conscious living as an authentic man or woman, where they pass
beyond the status of provisional models to become descriptions of reality.

6.3 Foundations and Special Categories

The lived reality of grace is universal and transcultural, one and the same gift
offered to all people at all places and times. In distinction from its manifestation, which is
culturally variant, the transcendence of God’s gift of love—the efficacy of religious
conversion—places it above human comprehension. In at least some way, knowledge
necessarily precedes all human loves, but divine love is exceptional. It is not conditioned
by prior human knowledge but conditions the emergence of humanity’s spiritual,
existential, cognitive, affective search for God. It is not beholden to any cultural
formulation. It is, instead, the principle that infuses otherworldliness into a culture; the
principle that promotes cultural progress; the principle that is trespassed when cultures
decline.
In religiously differentiated consciousness the gift is orientation to transcendent
mystery, and the primary and fundamental meaning of God is the term of that orientation
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rather than the content of a concept. This orientation is an otherworldy falling-in-loving
and being-in-love with Someone transcendent in lovableness and is thus being in love
without limitations, qualifications, conditions or reservations: it is total and complete
self-surrender. When theology proceeds from a theoretical differentiation of
consciousness to one grounded in graced interiority, the dynamic state of otherworldly
love is the transposition into a methodical theology of what in a theoretical theology was
the habit of sanctifying grace. The same dynamic state, which of itself is operative grace,
issues in acts of love, hope, faith, repentance, and so on, introducing the notional
difference of cooperative grace. Lonergan states that the dynamic state of being in love
with God is conscious with the consciousness of the fourth level, but admits a critical
caveat: it is coincident not with the entirety of the highest level of human consciousness
(decision) but with that level’s fulfilment in religious conversion. “It takes over the peak
of the soul, apex animae.” 453
For Lonergan, the gift of God’s love that is the basic special category derived in
foundations is intrinsically connected to but not identical with authentic religion. By
“religious word” is meant an expression of religious meaning and value. But the religious
word is twofold. There is the prior, inner word of God flooding our hearts with love. It is
essentially an unmediated experience of the mystery of love and awe. Usually the inner
word is not objectified but instead “remains in subjectivity as a vector, an undertow, a
fateful call to dreaded holiness.” 454 The outward word consists in the traditions, practices,
and teachings of an authentic religion. It is historically conditioned, not in a relativistic
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CWL 14: 103.
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manner but as demanded by the integration of religious meaning with other meanings and
the de facto variation of religious expression according to different realms of meaning.
The relationship of the outer word of authentic religion to the inner word of God’s
love is not incidental. They both come from God, especially when the outer word marks
the entrance of God’s constitutive and incarnate meaning into human history, as it does
with Christianity. “The religious principle is God’s gift of his love, and it forms the basis
of dialogue between all representatives of religion. The Christian principle conjoins the
inner gift of God’s love with its outer manifestation in Christ Jesus and those that follow
him.” 455 It is constitutive of the unfolding of divine-human communion in history. So on
one hand, Catholic Christians do not separate their experience of God’s love from the
Holy Spirit; on the other, they affirm God’s gift of love given to us in the Spirit, but also
embrace the universal salvific will of God and recognize that the gift may be operative in
individuals who do not appropriate it to the Third Person of the Trinity.
And so theological foundations in a Christian context rests on two special basic
categories at the heart of religiously differentiated consciousness: the religious experience
of the gift of God’s love and the terms and relations born from the specifically Christian
expression of that gift. Derived special terms and relations, which Lonergan lays out in
four sets, start with the subject in love with God (basic terms and relations) and move to
subjects in community, the source of their togetherness in the Divine Community of the
Holy Trinity, the difference between authentic and unauthentic Christianity, and the
power of Christian authenticity to overcome decline by facilitating redemption. 456
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CWL 14: 332.
CWL 14: 101-104; 108-111; 114-120; 272-274.
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6.4 Evidence of a Transposition

If foundations is truly a transposition of Thomist wisdom, then it must fulfill the
objectives set out by Thomist wisdom. And so it does. As the functional specialty in the
second phase of theology that embodies decision, it acknowledges the transformation of
the subject’s existential self-constitution in conversion as foundational reality, as the
ultimate “first principle.” When the theologian falls in love, his being becomes being-inlove, and then that dynamic state becomes a first principle of actions, words, decisions,
feelings, values, desires, and fears. It especially impacts our discernment of values: in
Method God’s gift of love is the first principle at the level of decision, because our
apprehension of values depends on what we love, and God’s gift transforms our
apprehension of values. 457 From the concrete normative subject’s unrestricted
questioning and native desire for self-transcendence—and their fulfillment in
conversion—foundations derives basic general and special categories that act as primitive
terms in theology.
Like the first principles that Thomist wisdom indirectly validated, which were
formed partly from intellectual light and partly from sensory knowledge, the categories
derived by foundations are the a priori, “upper blade” that are further specified,
developed, and adapted by the “lower blade” of data. 458 And because general categories
are common to many disciplines, the combination of general and special categories
allows for a sapiential function to theology. 459
CWL 14: 101 and 103, n. 12.
CWL 14: 273-274.
459
See the important passage from The Triune God: Systematics: “And so, although theology in the
exercise of its sapiential function uses and should use other sciences such as logic, methodology, and
457
458
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Foundations takes it stand on religiously differentiated consciousness as
expressing the supernatural consummation of our natural desire for God. Because it
explicitly welcomes into human consciousness Someone of the deepest meaning and the
highest value, being in love with God is the consummate fulfillment of our conscious
intentionality. As the existential commitment of the theologian to all that she holds dear,
foundations objectifies the normative horizon of conversion. The normative dimension of
foundations is most pronounced in its explicitly religious dimension, for the dynamic
state of being in love with God in an unrestricted fashion transvalues all our values and
the knowledge born of that love (faith) transforms all our knowing. 460
Foundations provides the second phase with “the unity of a grounding
horizon.” 461 For it provides the basis from which doctrines will choose to affirm authentic
positions from the many alternatives offered by dialectic; the existential context in which
systematic understanding has its full intelligibility; and the basic message of authenticity
that is to be inspired through communications. Moreover, the categories derived by
foundations collaborate hand-in-hand in all of the three mediated functional specialties
that foundations informs. 462

philosophy, nevertheless it is up to theology to determine the proper ends of each of these other sciences.”
(CWL 12: 103 and editorial n. 59) as well as from the fall-winter 1963-1964 Method of Theology course:
“The sapiential use of theology has to do with its relationships to philosophy, the human sciences, the
natural sciences, the humanities, the arts, history—in a word, the rest of the academic world” (CWL 14:
102).
460
CWL 14: 102 and 111-114.
461
CWL 14: 135; cf. CWL 22: 462.
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CWL 14: 127; 132-137, especially 135; 237-238.
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6.5 Foundations as Metaphysical Wisdom

In Method, answers to the questions of cognitional theory, epistemology, and
metaphysics are ingrained into the very biphasic structure of the general or “basic
science” that is transcendental method. As in Insight, all three kinds of questions and
their answers come from the data of consciousness. The functional specialty of
foundations heightens the normative horizon of consciousness that is conversion. When it
objectifies intellectual conversion, it produces general categories—basic terms that name
conscious and intentional operations, and basic relations that name elements in the
dynamic structure of consciousness connecting operations with one another. Metaphysics
as the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being is incorporated into foundations
as one set of derived general categories. And so the metaphysics of Insight (and thus
metaphysical wisdom) is transposed into a central category derived by foundations, a
category that then becomes one of the three central elements—cognitional theory,
epistemology, and metaphysics—in the “basic and total” science of transcendental
method. 463

CWL 3: 415-428; CWL 14: 23, 27, 268, 294-295, especially ed. n. 23 on 295, and 317. The enfolding of
cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics within transcendental method constitutes a significant
moment in Lonergan’s thought on both method and metaphysics. Coelho sees this moment as occurring as
early as 1962 and then meticulously shows that the “total and basic horizon” of the wise man in the 1963
“Metaphysics as Horizon” coincides with the “general science” (containing all three elements) that is
transcendental method in the 1972 Method. See Hermeneutics and Method, 125-128, 189-192, 203, and
211.
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7 Caveat to A Transposition

At this point we may notice a cognitive dissonance at a crucial location in our
transposition of Thomist wisdom into Lonergan’s cognitional-intentional analysis, a
dissonance not explicitly negotiated before because the horizon then formed by
Lonergan’s notion of the subject belonged to an earlier phase of his development, one in
which decision was not at the forefront. In and of itself, the fact that transcendental
method is imbued with essentially existential components and necessarily existential
implications, but Thomist wisdom is not,464 begs an obvious question. What is the basis
of comparison between the two, and is it valid?
In an indirect response to this query, Frederick Lawrence notes that Lonergan’s
method navigates philosophical and theological conflict through an appeal not to
argumentation but to encounter, the existential forerunner of conversion. According to
Lawrence, Aquinas’ synthesis of the special categories of Christian tradition and the
general categories of Aristotle successfully performed the sapiential role of the control of
meaning by ordering theological tasks into lectio, disputatio, and praedicatio. But he
believes that Lonergan’s dialectic and foundations, unlike the other functional specialties,
find no clear correspondence in this sapiential framework. He argues for understanding

Although it is true that wisdom as an intellectual habit bears some relation to the will insofar as one can
will to consider divine truth and then will to judge and order other truth by the measure of divine truth,
Aquinas parses intellectual from moral habits precisely on the basis that one’s will need not be good to
exercise intellectual virtue. On this reading, one can be wise, intimately familiar with the workings of the
universe in the intricate interrelations of all its parts as they form a whole, but still be quite intent on
carrying out evil actions. One can quite reasonably argue that the wise person, through his contemplation of
divine things, is in a privileged position to grow in love of God and neighbor, but this is not by any strict
necessity in Aquinas’ rendering of the natural speculative habit.
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transcendental method as a transposition of Thomist wisdom but not for specifying it
further. 465
And yet the fact that contextual differences between Aquinas and Lonergan
comprise the only significant remainder—the only “excess” in transposition—left after an
analysis of the general resemblances of Thomist wisdom and transcendental method may
actually suggest the accuracy of our attempt to trace Lonergan’s transposition further into
functional specialization. The justification would seem to lie in what Lonergan calls an
analogy of proportion, a model of conceptual development at the heart of his notion of
transposition and the same mode of argumentation that Lawrence applies for the other
functional specializations. In a methodical, empirically conceived theology, new
developments are continuous with the old by an analogy of proportion. 466
On this account, then, if the judgments surmising the role of wisdom in Aquinas’
metaphysical system are true and the judgments surmising the role of transcendental
method in Lonergan’s cognitional-existential system are true, and wisdom plays the same
kind of role in Aquinas as transcendental method in Lonergan, then our transposition can
be verified and judged as a legitimate and truthful inference. In Method transcendental
method’s functionality in comparison to that of Thomist wisdom is one of even greater
expansion than was present in the early to mid-1960s. If we grant on the basis of our
immediately preceding argument that a transposition is valid, it still seems that

Frederick G. Lawrence, “Lonergan and Aquinas: The Postmodern Problematic of Theology and Ethics,”
in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 437-455,
especially 439 and 447-448.
466
“If a theology will be continuous with Thomism, for example, it will stand to modern science, modern
scholarship, and an associated philosophy as Thomism stood to Aristotelianism.” See “A New Pastoral
Theology,” in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, CWL 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto,
2004), 293.
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transcendental method is not a coextensive transposition of wisdom. 467 Rather, it is a
superabundant one: as the crucial 1963-1964 De methodo theologiae course explained,
wisdom is included within transcendental method. Transcendental method surely
performs the same functions and objectives in Lonergan’s system that wisdom did in
Aquinas’, but its line of vision stretches far beyond what the proportion of analogy, in
and of itself, sees.

8 Wisdom as Conversion

At this juncture we may ask why Thomist wisdom becomes dialectic and
foundations rather than potentially triform conversion itself, the subject’s “selftranscendence reaching its summit.” 468 After all, wisdom is foundational, consummate,
normative, and unitive, and conversion embodies all of these dimensions in an essential
way. Indeed, wisdom and conversion would appear to be intimately conjoined, if not
identical. But how can Thomist wisdom be transposed by Lonergan into all of these
things—transcendental method, dialectic, foundations, and conversion—without
contradiction or confusion?
The answer lies in the structure of the “new foundation” of the renewed theology
Lonergan maps out in Method and in his distinction between lived reality, spontaneous

This “excess” is perhaps what stops Lawrence from extending his argument to dialectic and foundations.
I concur with Lawrence that Lonergan elevates Aquinas’ hermeneutics of interiority from a primarily
cognitive basis to an existential and practical hermeneutics that enfolds the cognitive within itself. But the
judgment transposing Aquinas’ primarily metaphysical account of wisdom into what will ultimately
become Lonergan’s primarily cognitive-existential context (as the next chapter will show even more
strongly) seems sound to me, as long as it answers all relevant questions (as the next chapter will do more
thoroughly).
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objectification, and reflective objectification. 469 The new foundation is not a set of first
principles enfolding primitive terms but the theologian transformed by conversion.
Understood as the subjective aspect of conversion, wisdom is the radical transformation
of self-appropriation and self-knowledge into self-transcendence that occurs, ultimately,
under the influence of grace. It is the bare fact, the lived reality, the ongoing and everprecarious process of religious, intellectual, and moral conversion.
The wisdom of conversion also has an objective aspect. Conversion is
spontaneously objectified in the dramatically changed attitudes, ways of thinking,
speaking, judging, valuing, and acting that are only proximately removed from the lived
reality of conversion itself. For example, religious conversion is spontaneously
objectified in a transformed way of living imbued with the fruits of the Spirit; moral
conversion is spontaneously objectified in an apprehension and enactment of value in
alignment with what is truly good over against individual and group bias, with success
experienced as a happy conscience and failure experienced as an uneasy one; and
intellectual conversion is spontaneously objectified in the consistent practice of raising
and pursuing all further questions over against the short-sightedness of common sense
bias and perhaps also the practical (but not yet explicitly thematized) awareness that truth
is what is known in verified judgments and knowledge of the true is knowledge of
being. 470

CWL 14: 390.
See Doran, “What Is Conversion?”, 2011, 18-19 for these two more spontaneous implications of
intellectual conversion. His understanding of the complexity of intellectual conversion in Lonergan is
extremely helpful, because Lonergan often speaks of intellectual conversion from the angle of its full
thematization in a particular intellectual position, but this would seem to me to be a reflective rather than
spontaneous objectification of intellectual conversion.
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Because we have the ability not only to undergo and spontaneously express
conversion in our lives but also to explicitly advert to it, formulate it, affirm its presence
in our lives, decide to continuously renew it, and surrender ourselves to the fostering of
communal transformation, conversion has a reflective objectification—what might be
called the “superstructure” or “thematization” of conversion. Such objectification is
reflective “when one endeavors to state just what is the source, what are the conditions,
what are the full implications of conversion.” 471
While dialectic reflectively objectifies a nascent awareness of value and disvalue
into a hypothetical schema of positions and counterpositions, foundations boldly moves
this reflective objectification a vast step forward by fully and certainly stating the whole
horizon fixed by religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. Since every subject knows
and observes transcendental method to the extent that he or she is attentive, intelligent,
reasonable, and responsible, this method is lived experience. As the self-appropriation
that applies operations as intentional to operations as conscious, transcendental method is
spontaneous objectification. Finally, the reflective objectification of transcendental
method would seem to lie in the formal and well-developed thematization of this method,
with its long litany of implications, in a work like Method.
Just as consciousness is not an operation above experiencing, understanding,
judging, and deciding but the quality of experience, of self-presence, that accompanies
each kind of operation and morphs along with it, wisdom in our conscious intentionality
is not a redundant reflection on self-reflection or a self-appropriation of self-
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appropriation at a potentially infinite remove. 472 Rather, the subjective aspect of wisdom
is simply self-appropriation reaching its ultimate transformative height in the selftranscendence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. And the objective aspect
of wisdom is any and all direct objectifications, both spontaneous and reflective
objectifications, of that foundational reality.

9 Summary: Wisdom as Transcendental Method

Chapter Three ended with the anticipation—already supported by Crowe, Coelho,
and Dadosky—that the various functions of Thomist wisdom are to be taken over by the
role of transcendental method. With the foregoing review of Method, we are finally in a
position to fully verify that hypothesis in the affirmative. 473 We have witnessed that each
of wisdom’s major functions—considering the highest causes, judging, and ordering—
are amply incorporated, in various ways, into the notion of transcendental method, as are
wisdom’s objectives—foundation, consummation, normativity, and unity—into the
functions of transcendental method. As Dadosky comments, “The transcendental precepts
of be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible are the application of the
habitual propensity of wisdom both as foundation and goal.” 474

CWL 14: 12 and 18.
To my knowledge, this hypothesis was first formulated by Crowe in 1984 and then taken up again by
Coelho in 2001, Lawrence in 2002, Doran and Monsour in 2007, Mabry in 2013, and Dadosky in 2014.
Crowe and Coelho both suggest that the transposition of wisdom into transcendental method should be
specified further into dialectic and foundations, while the remaining scholars stop at transcendental method
at large, with Dadosky emphasizing the new order ushered into theology by the wisdom of functional
specialization. In contrast to earlier interlocutors, Dadosky analyzes divine wisdom in De redemptione,
which is the wisdom of the Cross in healing the disorder within human persons and the universe introduced
by sin. See the conclusion for an analysis of De redemptione.
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But the transposition of Thomist wisdom into transcendental method supersedes
even what an analogy of proportion suggests. What propels the enfoldment of sapiential
functions into the two functional specializations that emphasize existential decision,
judgments of value, and conversion is precisely what Lonergan clarifies throughout
Method and other works from the early 1970s: it is only on the basis of a full
understanding and acceptance of modern science, modern philosophy, and modern
scholarship that transcendental method makes the most sense and bears the clearest
urgency. Although the transcendence of truth guarantees the possibility of valid
transposition, Aquinas’ personal, cultural, intellectual, and historical context is simply not
the same as Lonergan’s, and this legitimate, but not contradictory, difference in relative
horizon makes for a strong distinction in their respective conceptions of wisdom. 475 And
yet Lonergan’s transposition of Aquinas’ notion of wisdom retains the attributes that
were most essential to Aquinas’ conception—foundation, consummation, normativity,
unity, and the ability to consider highest causes and judge and order everything else
according to that consideration—and greatly enriches them, advancing their significance
in a cognitional-existential context responsive to contemporary theological and cultural
challenges.
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As true, truth is in the knower, but as transcendent, it is independent of any subject. Once the evidence
for the fulfillment of the conditions for a conception to be affirmed is sufficiently grasped, we know with
confidence—and know that we know—that such a thing exists or is true. Nothing less than the sufficiency
of the evidence guarantees the transcendence of truth, and yet nothing more is demanded by our rationality
to issue in the absolute positing of judgment. CWL 24: 118.
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Chapter Five: Sapientia in the Fourth Stage of Meaning: Wisdom as the SelfSurrender of Love in Post-Method Works (1972-1982)

Despite the relative paucity of data on wisdom in Lonergan’s corpus from 1972
through 1982, his explicit statements on and implicit understanding of Thomist wisdom
in the last segment of his scholarly career are remarkably multidimensional. Lonergan’s
transposition of wisdom has occupied a genetic rather than dialectical horizon through the
thirty-plus years of development reviewed thus far, even including the landmark shifts of
Insight and Method. And given his consistent support for a theology analogously
continuous with the permanent achievements of Aquinas, wisdom can be appropriately
interpreted in the last set of Lonergan’s writings from a hermeneutic of continuity.
Accordingly, the implicit identification of wisdom with the living experience of
conversion in Method, spontaneously objectified in changed meanings, values, and
patterns of living and reflectively objectified in the functional specialties of dialectic and
foundations, will be applied as a simplifying hermeneutic to the seemingly disparate data
of Lonergan’s last decade of scholarly life.
In all these three permutations of wisdom as conversion, the transposition of
wisdom into conversion remains at the level of decision, an aspect of consciousness that
Doran describes as essential to the second stage of development in Lonergan’s position
on the subject. But he designates the two final stages in Lonergan’s position on the
subject as the increasing centrality of love and the movement of love “from above
downward” in consciousness. 476 Doran’s is one of several voices affirming that a distinct
way of being conscious, that of love, represents not only a distinct stage in the
476
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development of Lonergan’s theory of subjectivity but also a “fifth level” of
consciousness. Lonergan’s account of love substantially intersects with his account of
conversion (especially religious conversion) and thus can be incorporated into yet
another, fuller transposition of Thomist wisdom. 477
Thus in what follows a further, fuller transposition of Thomist wisdom, now
conceived as self-transcendence in community or self-surrender to communion, both
human and divine, will be constructed. The overarching context around wisdom in
Lonergan’s later writings comes from his notion of human subjectivity as selftranscendent and wisdom as successive self-transcendence sublated by love, with the later
notion necessarily involving love as a distinct level of consciousness. And so conversion,
self-transcendence, and love will first be studied (Sections 1, 2, and 3). Then, as with the
analysis of wisdom as transcendental method in Chapter Four, Lonergan’s transposition
of wisdom as love will be broken down into the ways it fulfills foundational,
consummate, normative, and unitive functions, mirroring these same roles played by
sapientia in Aquinas. Under this fourfold rubric, the sapiential nature of all love will be
underscored (Section 4) before attending to religious love as a more specific, and even
more ultimate, form of existential wisdom (Section 5). Since explicit mention of wisdom
as love occurs infrequently in Lonergan’s works, relevant material throughout
Lonergan’s corpus and in the secondary discussion will be examined, while still giving
prominence to Lonergan’s later works for their overall emphasis on love.

In fact, beginning in the 1972 “Philosophy of God” lectures, Lonergan himself explicitly recognized a
fifth level, although this recognition sometimes seems to have waxed and waned. See Jeremy Blackwood’s
groundbreaking And Hope Does Not Disappoint: Love, Grace, and Subjectivity in the Work of Bernard J.F.
Lonergan, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University, 2017).
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1 Conversion and Self-Transcendence

Chapter Four ended with the position that the lived experience, spontaneous
objectification, and reflective objectification of conversion are foundational,
consummate, normative, and unitive relative to other key elements in Lonergan’s
anthropology. And so conversion acts as an implicit transposition of Aquinas’ notion of
wisdom. Conversion is indeed a concept as basic and indispensable to Lonergan’s
thought as wisdom is to Aquinas’. And even in his post-Method works, Lonergan does
not seem to abandon his tacit alignment of wisdom with conversion.
For example, in the 1979 lecture “Horizons and Transpositions,” Lonergan
compares the notion of wisdom with the notion of horizon. From one angle, wisdom
would seem to be more expansive, because it regards all that exists. But horizon,
Lonergan explains, is actually the broader term; it is the boundary of a subject’s interests
and knowledge, regardless of whether her interests are truly worthwhile values or what
she thinks is true is actually true. Precisely because wisdom concerns being—all that is—
it excludes the nonbeing of human aberrations, aberrations both in knowledge and
morality. 478 In the sphere of morality wisdom transcends the sinful attitude of constant
self-seeking to embody what is truly good, what is truly of value. But in the concrete
dynamics of human living, wisdom can only consistently embody what is really true and
what is really good by conversion. As Crowe remarks, “The wise person sees beyond the
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horizon of the unwise.” 479 And so wisdom is not any or all horizons but the horizon that
objectifies multiform conversion. 480
In Method and beyond, conversion represents the high point of self-transcendence
as well as what makes consistent self-transcendence even possible. Without question,
intellectual, moral, religious, and psychic conversion are “fundamental forms of selftranscendence” 481; they are absolutely necessary for authenticity. But conversion is not
the only modality of self-transcendence. The transposition of Thomist wisdom in
Lonergan’s later work demands that we situate wisdom in a larger movement of selftranscendence than simply conversion. There are at least two reasons for this situating.
First, although it is made consistently authentic and pure only through religious
conversion, the naturally proportionate love of human community characteristic of the
wise person—clearly a central instantiation of self-transcendence—is not completely
coextensive with any conversion, raising the question of how such natural love can be
grafted onto Lonergan’s later transposition of wisdom. Second, this exact question is
answered for us in 1974 when it is within the larger location of successive sublations
sublimated by being-in-love, including the naturally proportionate love of human
community, that Lonergan himself suggests that Thomist wisdom should be retained.
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“Rhyme and Reason: On Lonergan’s Foundations for the Works of the Spirit,” 320, from Developing
the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes, ed. Michael Vertin (Toronto:
University of Toronto, 2000).
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1.1 The Converted Self as the Transcending Self

Expounding on Lonergan’s 1974 essay “Self-Transcendence: Intellectual, Moral,
Religious,” 482 Doran reviews each conversion as a “movement from” and a “movement
toward.” Moral conversion turns us from the apparently good to the really good and
enacts a transformation of feeling, from feelings that are inherently self-interested
(satisfying or dissatisfying, pleasant or unpleasant) to feelings that are intentional
responses to values as these are interrelated according to an integral scale correspondent
to the structure of consciousness itself. And intellectual conversion—the transposition of
the epistemological wisdom of Verbum into the self-affirmation of the knower in
Insight—replaces the insidiously destructive myth that knowing is simply taking a good
look with the “startling strangeness” of the realization that the real is known through true
judgment.
Through the experience of a supernatural love, religious conversion transports us
to a mysterious new horizon of being and acting whose unrestricted and unconditional
source is entitatively disproportionate to human nature. Existentially first but also
intellectually in a derivative way, religious conversion is a movement away from the
distorted worldview in which what is actually proximate is held to be ultimate; it is a

“Self-Transcendence: Intellectual, Moral, Religious,” in Philosophical and Theological Papers 19651980, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, CWL 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 313331.
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movement toward the authentic worldview that humanity is not the terminal value
because there exists Someone greater than humanity. 483
Psychic conversion recovers the integrity of the aesthetic dramatic dimension of
human living. It transforms from a repressive to a constructive function “the censorship
exercised with respect to the entire field of what is received in empirical
consciousness.” 484 Not everything that is given is received into one’s empirical
consciousness, whether that be data “from below” (from the neural unconscious, the
fragmentary consciousness of the dream, and from the outside world that we sense in
what is normally meant by “experience”) or “from above” in the form of communally
received meanings and values. 485 Only that which one is open to receive is received. As
explained by Doran, this censorship is exercised by dramatically patterned intentional
consciousness as well as the habitual accumulation of one’s insights, judgments, and
decisions as they join with one’s imagination and one’s mindset.
The emergence of these images and affects is necessary for a subject to live from
a vital connection between what Lonergan in The Triune God: Systematics describes as
being conscious in “two ways,” one way through our sensibility, replete with desires,
fears, joys, and sorrows, and another way through the progressive outworking of
conscious intentionality, in which we experience, understand, judge, and decide. 486 An
integral rather than distorted emergence of these sensible elements into the higher levels
of conscious intentionality is crucial, since these images and affects not only emerge in
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the transition from neural unconsciousness into the psychic consciousness, the transition
whose integral functioning is effected by psychic conversion. These images and affects
also shepherd successful cognitive performance and help prepare our affective and
intersubjective life for its ultimate completion in the vertical finality of interpersonal
love, including divine love. 487
In each and every conversion an about-face occurs, and thus the newly
transcending self is a denial of the transcended self. 488 The “movement from” in each
conversion is not a rejection of the de facto limitation proper to being human; it is a
repudiation of deviation. But the transformed self toward which conversion moves is a
greater self, a new self, the true self. This “greater self” is marked not just by the
repudiation of unauthenticity but by the embrace of authenticity that is selftranscendence. 489 Thus the converted self is the transcending self. But if selftranscendence is the common result of the dynamic, personal, communal, and historical
process that is each different type of conversion, might there not exist a common
waywardness that each type of conversion also overturns in some manner?

Doran, What Is Systematic Theology?, 109-122, especially 115-116 and 167-168. Also see “What Does
Bernard Lonergan Mean by ‘Conversion’?”, 19-20.
488
CWL 14: 105 and 107. In the 1969 Method in Theology seminar at Regis College, Lonergan uses the
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1.2 Conversion as from Lovelessness to Being-in-Love

Doran answers this question in the affirmative, analyzing each of the conversions
through the primary template that is the essence of religious conversion: a movement
from the radical lovelessness or self-enclosure of the isolated individual to the selftranscendence of being-in-love. Doran portrays lovelessness as the fundamental state of
existential being in which one is convinced (whether articulated or not) that one is
ultimately alone in this universe, even if one has human companionship. 490 This isolation
corresponds to sinfulness as distinct from moral evil, sinfulness as the privation of total
loving. 491 It is broken most fundamentally and definitively in religious conversion, which
floods the individual’s heart with the awareness of being loved in a transcendent and
unconditional fashion and empowers him or her to love God in return and to love all
others with the love of God. 492
This reorientation of one’s own self-presence as a being-with-a-TranscendentOther reverberates through the other three conversions. For it is precisely the privation of
total loving that makes the moral criterion of “what’s in it for me” appear as an
unquestioned, normative necessity and keeps us from asking whether some satisfactions
may only be apparently good. And it is precisely the horizon of total lovableness and total
loving that makes us consistently seek the true good, not only for oneself but for all
others. Moreover, it is precisely the self-enclosure of radical lovelessness that
inappropriately constricts the range of one’s interests and concerns, and it is precisely
Doran, “What Does Bernard Lonergan Mean by ‘Conversion’?”, 12.
CWL 14: 228.
492
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other elements of experience are perceived because and insomuch as they are adverted to.
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intellectual conversion that opens up the cognitional field so that we can pursue questions
of meaning and value beyond ruthlessly utilitarian aims. Religious conversion fully
emancipates our desire to know by lifting psychic resistance to asking relevant
questions. 493
But perhaps it is the need for psychic conversion that most directly connects to
religious conversion’s transformation of individualistic aloneness. As outlined below,
Lonergan seems to draws a direct line, pulsating “vertically” up from the unconscious
and the psyche, through intentional operations, to the state of being-in-love, including
otherworldly love. It is through falling and being-in-love that the subject achieves
affective self-transcendence. 494 As Doran conceptualizes it, the vital stream of our
psychic life can be a nourishing source for the affective self-transcendence of love to the
precise degree that it is allowed to flow freely, without undue censorship from
dramatically patterned intentionality and imagination over neural demands, and allowed
to connect with the intentional operations of experience, understanding, judgment, and
decision that likewise support and guide our love for self, others, and God. 495
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2 Successive Degrees of Self-Transcendence

Lonergan distinguishes religious, moral, and intellectual conversion and Doran
has found partly in Lonergan the basis for a psychic conversion. Lonergan conceives of
intellectual, moral, and religious conversion as “three distinct phases in the unfolding of
the human spirit, of that eros for self-transcendence” that goes beyond itself cognitively
in knowledge, effectively in morality, unrestrictedly in religious love. 496 If the
intellectual, moral, and religious are three phases in one single thrust to selftranscendence, phases that harmonize with each other, then the psychic conversion that
helps transform the affects accompanying intentional operations cannot be discordant
with any of these other moments in self-transcendence; rather, it frees the subject to
operate in the sphere of intentionality more authentically. 497
How can this single massive thrust to self-transcendence be specified apart from
conversion, in a way that forms the larger context in which conversion occurs and is
situated both theoretically and methodically? In at least five relatively late works in

“Natural Knowledge of God,” in A Second Collection, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, CWL
13 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016), 110.
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interpersonal love, are not intentional, because they do not refer to objects. (Here what I mean by “psyche”
is the subconscious, what is coming to the fore in the dream, what is more immediately the juncture with
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Lonergan’s corpus—“Mission and the Spirit” (1974), “Natural Right and Historical
Mindedness” (1977), “Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon” (1978), “Horizons
and Transpositions” (1979), and “A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion” (1980)—
Lonergan characterizes the one, unified unfolding of the human spirit in terms of
“successive degrees of self-transcendence.” 498 And he will explicitly claim that these
successive degrees of self-transcendence transpose Thomist wisdom. Let us piece
together from these various sources a fuller picture of the human spirit and where wisdom
resides.

2.1 Horizontal Processes and Horizontal Finality

In “Horizons and Transpositions” and “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,”
Lonergan elucidates the dialectical development of history through an ingenious
appropriation into cognitional-existential terms of Aristotle’s definition of nature as an
immanent principle of movement and rest. A first component of this appropriation is
captured by what Lonergan calls “a series of horizontal processes.” 499 The absolutely
most basic horizontal process is what Lonergan terms the “undifferentiated eros” of our
unconscious. The “hidden root” of our conscious intentional activity is, it turns out, not
conscious or intentional at all. It houses primordial desires and fears but is also
“pregnant” with the dreams and fears, memories and anticipations that will come to
inhabit the fragmentarily conscious psyche as well as the receptivity of fully conscious
experience.
498
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Once the subject begins dreaming, there emerges the distinctly psychic self, the
subject that is only “fragmentarily conscious.” 500 In this most primitive form of
consciousness, the subject has not yet actually achieved any form of self-transcendence;
however, in her pregnant symbolic “dream of the morning,” she is anticipating her selftranscendence in the manner of images. She is concerned with what is other than her,
although not yet even awake. 501
Next come the horizontal processes coincident with the four levels of
consciousness so familiar to any student of Lonergan. Now awake and experiencing, the
subject tends to the larger environment in a movement toward the outer stimuli of
sensations, perceptions, and feelings. After experience, each subsequent horizontal
process manifests our freedom, spiritual exigencies, and potential for self-transcendence
more and more clearly. After experience, each intentional level has its own principle of
movement—the spontaneous emergence of questions—and each has its own principle of
rest—the satisfactory answering of these questions.
In “Horizons and Transpositions,” Lonergan talks about nature as a series of
horizontal processes, but it is not difficult to grasp that at least the conscious intentional
processes in this series—experience, understanding, judgment, and decision—are
instances of what Lonergan described, more than thirty years earlier, as instances of
horizontal finality. In the 1943 “Finality, Love, Marriage,” horizontal finality is the
relation of a thing to its commensurate end, whether that be of an appetite to its
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proportionate motive or a process to its proportionate term. 502 As will be shown
forthwith, this type of finality will be contrasted with vertical finality in Lonergan’s
description of the “ascensional structure” 503 of human subjectivity in general, the
relationship of lower to higher levels of consciousness, and of human being in general to
the divine nature and the gift or self-communication of that divine nature.

2.2 Vertical Process and Vertical Finality

Each horizontal process is distinct, but with each higher one supervening upon the
lower and involving greater self-transcendence. What is more, traversing through these
horizontal processes is a vertical process that
springs from an undifferentiated eros, commonly referred to as the unconscious,
influences in turn each of the horizontal movements, and finds its proper goal beyond
them in a self-transcending being-in-love that begins in the home, reaches out to the
tribe, the city-state, the nation, mankind, and finds its anchor and its strength in the
agape of the New Testament. 504
And so a series of horizontal processes join with a single vertical process to yield an
approximation of how human nature actually operates in the concrete. Conceived in this
way, our concrete human nature, according to Lonergan, is a “tidal movement” that
begins before consciousness, unfolds through experience, understanding, judgment, and
decision, and finds rest only beyond all of these, in the dynamic state of being-in-love.
For example, the varied acts of reflecting, weighing and marshalling the evidence, and verifying that are
“movement” at the level of judgment are commensurate to that level’s term or “rest,” the inner assent or
dissent of an actual judgment. See “Finality, Love, Marriage,” in Collection, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and
Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988), 17-23.
Hereafter Collection is cited as CWL 4. The notions of horizontal and vertical finality return in the 1974
“Mission and the Spirit” as well. See CWL 16: 22.
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From “A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion,” in A Third Collection, ed. Robert M. Doran and John
D. Dadosky, CWL 16 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017), 199.
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What in “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness” was the beginning of a “tidal
movement” is referred to in “Mission and the Spirit” as “the passionateness of being.” 505
The “passionateness of being” is an upwardly directed eros, the aesthetic-dramatic
dimension of human life that underpins, accompanies, and overarches the subject’s
conscious intentionality. This aesthetic-dramatic dimension of human life underpins
intentional consciousness in the transition from the neural unconscious to the psychic
conscious; accompanies intentional consciousness in lending a mass and momentum of
feeling to experience, understanding, judging, and deciding, making “even our exercise
of these operations a dramatic sequence of events,” 506 to quote Doran; and overarches
intentional consciousness to transform the elemental “we” of primordial intersubjectivity
into the interpersonal relations of loving communion. 507
While it is the ultimate term of vertical process, the consummate propter hoc
quod, love itself can be construed as a horizontal process. As a principle of movement,
love is both purgative and illuminative: it withdraws us from selfishness and calls us to
ever more fervent self-sacrifice (purgative), but it does so within a larger clarity of
purpose and strength of commitment to the good of the beloved (illuminative). As a
principle of rest, love stops at nothing until union with the beloved is achieved
(unitive). 508
This “tidal movement” is a vertical process in which each successive moment is,
proximately in relation to the next and remotely in relation to even higher levels, a
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manifestation of “vertical finality.” 509 In cognitional-existential terms, it is selftranscendence. In metaphysical terms, vertical finality is to an end higher than the
proportionate end; like all cases of finality, vertical finality is a relation that is grounded
in potency and thus obscure, known only when actuated to some degree. 510 It
presupposes a hierarchy of entities and ends in which the lower is subordinate to the
higher or, in the language of “Finality, Love, and Marriage,” it is the relation of any
lower being or lower level of appetition and process to any higher being or higher level of
appetition and process. 511
In evolution as in cognitional theory, instrumental and participative vertical
finality conjoin, since nothing stops the lower from not only serving but also entering into
the higher. This mixture of instrumental and participative vertical finality is typified by
the notion of sublation that Lonergan applies to the relationship of one level of
consciousness to another. A sublating set of operations certainly introduces something
new and distinct; it goes beyond the sublated set of operations and represents a new
principle of conscious intentional activity. But sublating operations also integrally
preserve the sublated operations in all their proper perfection and significance, giving
them a higher organization, an extended range, and a higher relevance. 512 Judgment, for
example, is the affirmation or negation of a conception of understanding, not the
wholesale transformation of that conception into something foreign. But understanding

For example, in Insight Lonergan alleges that the unconscious neural level is an upwardly directed
dynamism seeking fuller realization proximately at the sensitive psychic level but also remotely (and no
less truly) on the even higher levels of art, the drama of human community, philosophy, culture, and
religion.
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CWL 3: 479 and 482; CWL 16: 25-26.
511
CWL 4: 20.
512
CWL 17: 36.
509

241
also teleologically serves judgment; the intelligible is incomplete without the true and the
real.
The absolute finality of human being to God is vertical finality in the strictest
sense, since the divine order is beyond the proportion of any possible natural creature.
But the fact that the vertical finality of our nature to God’s glory is absolute does not
limit its telos to the instrumental type by which we are subordinate to and serve the
divine. By faith we also proclaim that, through God’s personal self-communication, we
somehow enter into and participate in the divine life. 513
And as the complexity of the universe almost demands and logic certainly allows,
one and the same thing bears horizontal finality to its commensurate end, vertical finality
to a relatively disproportionate level of being or appetition or process, and absolute
finality to the absolutely disproportionate self-sufficient Goodness. If the entire universe
operates thus, human nature is a microcosm of the order of the universe, since it is a
series of horizontal processes traversed by a vertical process. In each individual human
subject, vertical finality not only names the relation among conscious intentional
operations but also expresses the teleological line Lonergan draws from the neural
unconscious to the psychic conscious and up even further to the conscious state of beingin-love. Running through all our horizontal processes is “the vertical drive from
undifferentiated eros to agape.” 514 But as vertical finality speaks most elegantly to
concrete plurality, in “an aggregate of self-transcending individuals there is the
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significant coincidental manifold in which can emerge a new creation,” 515 the community
borne by love, whether that be a family, a people, or a religion.

2.3 Wisdom as Successive Self-Transcendence Sublated by Love

This distinction between horizontal and vertical finality in human subjectivity
may help contextualize Lonergan’s explicit assertion in the 1974 lecture “Aquinas Today:
Tradition and Innovation” that wisdom is not simply conversion (the implicit claim of
Method) but the entire movement of self-transcendence in human subjectivity.
Considered comprehensively, this movement includes the self-transcending structure of
the subject’s intentional consciousness in multiple linked horizontal processes, which is
sublimated “vertically” by being-in-love, and this most prominently and preeminently in
religious conversion:
For him [Aquinas] theology was not only science but—something better—
wisdom; and this we can retain in terms of the successive sublations observed in
intentionality analysis, where the curiosity of sense is taken over by the inquiry of
intelligence, where inquiry is taken over by rational reflection, where reflection
prepares the way for responsible deliberation, where all are sublimated by being-inlove—in love with one’s family, in love with the human community, in love with God
and his universe. 516
Here the phrase of “successive sublations” calls to mind “the tidal movement”
that is the normative source of meaning in history, for that movement was described in

CWL 16: 29.
“Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation,” in A Third Collection, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D.
Dadosky, CWL 16 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017), 51. Interestingly, in Insight Lonergan associates
sublimation, whose more original context would appear to be depth psychology, with potency as the ground
of finality, confirming his account of love as involving vertical finality in an essential way. See CWL 3:
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similar language as “an ongoing process of self-transcendence.” 517 The emergence of
consciousness from unconsciousness represents a degree of self-transcendence no less
genuine than do the intentional operations, but Lonergan chooses here to highlight the
successive sublations revealed by intentionality analysis.
If we read the passage from “Aquinas Today” in the wider context of “the tidal
movement” of concrete human nature as it mounts from the unconscious to conscious
intentional operations to rest only in love, Lonergan seems to be suggesting that Thomist
wisdom is best transposed as this ongoing process of self-transcendence. And this
ongoing process of successive sublation has what might be termed an intentional
dimension of consciousness in the unfolding of sensitivity, intelligence, reasonableness,
and responsibility, and a more explicitly interpersonal dimension of consciousness in the
state of being-in-love, which sublates everything else. Taken together, these successive
sublations form a sapiential structure in human subjectivity.
The intentional dimension of sapiential self-transcendence—the natural unfolding
of human intentionality as it experiences, understands, judges, and decides in a series of
“horizontal processes” that have their own proportionate terms while also serving and
entering into higher levels according to vertical finality—has already been implicitly
transposed by Lonergan as transcendental method. For transcendental method is the
appropriation of one’s own foundational, consummate, normative, and unitive
cognitional-existential structure. Further, the implicit transposition of wisdom as the lived
experience of conversion indicates the sapiential facets of a vertical exercise of freedom

CWL 16: 169 and 200. Here Lonergan omits what he calls elsewhere the first “stage” or “degree” of
self-transcendence, the emergence of psychic consciousness from neural unconsciousness, especially as it
is first manifested in the dream (but ostensibly not limited to that primeval occurrence).
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from an old horizon of meaning and value to a new one not proportionate to the one
preceding it and, in fact, contradictory with the old one. 518
But here in 1974 the further “vertical” dimension of sapiential selftranscendence—the subject as falling and being-in-love—is introduced as a novel
transposition of what should be “retained” of Thomist wisdom, with the clear implication
that religious love is the most ultimate sublation and thus the must ultimate wisdom. In
the two sections that follow, this dual claim—that both natural and supernatural love are
wisdom in the way that they sublate conscious intentionality—will be evaluated in terms
of the sapiential characteristics of love in Lonergan’s thought.

3 Love as Ultimate Self-Transcendence

Although decision represents a crowning moment of existential selfconsciousness, the level of love goes beyond moral agency and, in fact, ensures authentic
moral agency, for being-in-love provides the horizon in which new values are
apprehended and new patterns of living are hazarded. And especially in the supernatural
love of religious conversion, “our capacity for moral self-transcendence has found a
fulfilment that brings deep joy and profound peace.” 519 It is ultimately the intersubjective
communion—the union that is love—that grounds the authenticity of self-transcendence
in its every form.
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3.1 Love as a Fifth Level

In a 1972 series of lectures titled “The Relationship of the Philosophy of God and
the Functional Specialty, Systematics,” Lonergan argues that the philosophy of God and
the functional specialty of systematics should be held distinct but not separate, since they
have a common origin and a common goal. They both arise from the religious experience
of God’s love and they both aim to discover the meaning of that experience and to
appraise its value, especially by promoting more clearly and deeply into consciousness
the presence of love, which is “the major factor in the integration and development of
persons.” 520
When asked in a question-and-answer session whether love, in and of itself,
intrinsically involves insights, concepts, or judgments, Lonergan answers in the negative:
“You can say it [love] is on the fifth level.” 521 This marks Lonergan’s first recorded
identification of love as a fifth level of consciousness, which is explained, in part, by the
concept of horizon. As Blackwood expands, love is “a new horizon within which
deliberating, judging, understanding, and experiencing are done; it is not simply a new set
of deliberations, judgments, understandings, or experiences; it is the summit of selftranscendence, going beyond these four levels.” 522
In the context of wisdom considered as the entire successive movement of selftranscendence, the basis of considering love as a distinct level is the way it brings the
From the first and third of a series of three lectures Lonergan gave at St. Michael’s Institute, Gonzaga
University, Spokane, on December 9, 1972, entitled “Philosophy of God” and “The Relationship between
Philosophy of God and the Functional Specialty ‘Systematics,’” in Philosophical and Theological Papers
1965-1980, CWL 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 177 and 210-211, with quote on 211.
521
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self-transcendence involved at every other level to an absolute summit. And the
affirmation of love as a fifth level here, as in many other works from 1972 to 1982,
occurs with particular reference to religious love, for the dynamic state of being-in-love
with God is “the ultimate stage in a person’s self-transcendence.” 523
At the level of love, the subject surrenders himself to the good of the other in total
self-gift. Self-surrender in its most mature form may very well be prepared for, in the
way of development, by moral conversion. But moral conversion is not entirely captured
by a wholehearted dedication of self to the good of another. In moral conversion, our
autonomy disposes of itself, deciding who we are to be. 524 But when we are in love, we
put our autonomy at the disposal of the other, allowing our freedom to be molded by
acting for the beloved’s good and helping shape the beloved’s freedom to love self,
others, and God more deeply as well. But the key affirmation of the uniqueness of love
vis-à-vis the other levels is the fact that it comprises a distinct way of being conscious—
that is, of being self-present—that sublates or fulfills other ways of being conscious. 525

3.2 Love as a Way of Being Conscious

How can the state of being-in-love be described and explained as to its immanent
constitution? As for the explanation of its existence, being-in-love has “its antecedents,
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its causes, its conditions, its occasions,” 526 but ultimately it is self-justifying. No one
argues oneself into being-in-love; love simply “proves itself” through the good fruits it
bears. It justifies and explains everything else. 527 As for a description of the state of
being-in-love in terms of intentional consciousness, Doran comments, “If you are really
in love, the one with whom you are in love enters into the very constitution of your
consciousness, even if you are not physically together with that person. Your very selfpresence is a ‘being-with.’” 528
As Lonergan explains in Method, it is by the subject’s intention that the object
becomes present to him or her. In analogy but without the intentional component, it is by
the subject’s loving that the beloved becomes present to him or her. And the concrete,
interpersonal union of love is not completely effected until the beloved returns the lover’s
love, becoming a lover as well, and the lover receives it, becoming a beloved as well. As
Lonergan styles it in Method, if both subjects have not avowed their love, they are not
truly in love. 529 Love is defined by the mutual presence of self-donation, a notion that
applies to the inner life of God as well, for although God is one, God is not solitary.

3.3 Love and the Relationship Between Person and Community

As inchoate wisdom is, in its rational dimension, a primitive but ordered grasp of
undifferentiated being, inchoate wisdom in its existential dimension is the elemental “we”
of pre-individuated intersubjectivity. Likewise, it is from the more developed “we” of
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528
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community that the individual emerges: “In other words the person is not the primordial
fact. What is primordial is the community. It is within community, and through the
intersubjective relations that are the life of the community, that there arises the
differentiation of the individual person.” 530

4 The Sapiential Nature of All Love

In his clear recognition of love as constitutive of an interpersonal, indeed
communal, reality that conditions the subject’s self-presence as a being-with, Lonergan
positions love as the foundational, consummate, normative, and unitive sublation of every
other modality of self-presence and self-transcendence. As with experience,
understanding, judgment, and decision, the meaning of the term “love” can be known
fully only by self-appropriation—in this case, the appropriation of the mutual presence of
self-donation experienced in loving relationship. 531 But the inner coherence of love’s
sapiential nature in relation to other facets of Lonergan’s theory of subjectivity can be
laid out as follows.

530
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4.1 Love as Foundational

In Insight, Lonergan reminds us that no deeper foundation exists than what is
offered by our “pragmatic engagement” 532 as knowers and actors. In Insight, cognitive
foundations largely pivot on the self-affirmation of the knower, which reveals such selfaffirmation as “immanent law,” for any attempt to deny the transcendental structure of
Lonergan’s account of knowing inevitably necessitates that structure. Doran observes that
Lonergan’s treatment of wisdom vis-à-vis the problem of foundations in De intellectu et
methodo contains “resonances (though not yet explicit affirmations) of components to
foundations that are over and above the cognitional, that in a way ground even the
cognitional.” 533 Lonergan himself complains in 1972 that Aristotle’s thought on wisdom,
which seems to inform much of Aquinas’, is “too intellectualist.” 534 For the purpose of
understanding love as existentially foundational wisdom, the question then becomes, in
what way does love ground our moral and cognitional engagement and shape even our
preconscious and barely conscious processes?
One response suggested by Lonergan and elaborated on by Doran has to do with a
major line of orientation and development within subjectivity, the movement “from
above downward” in consciousness. Orientation is a way of organizing one’s inner life as
well as the intersection of that interiority with the outer world; it is, simply put, “the
direction of development.” 535 It is no coincidence that Lonergan uses the word
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orientation in two principal contexts: affectivity and religiosity, with love in the center of
both. Our feelings orient us “massively and dynamically in a world mediated by
meaning”; they are the “effective orientation” of our entire subjective being. 536 By
discerning in consciousness a movement directed “from above downward,” Lonergan
shows how the direction of our development—our orientation in life—is rooted in love
and the affective change wrought by love, which in turn influence every other element of
our human subjectivity.
The self-correcting, onward march of cognitive development, which eventually
culminates in love for the known—thus embodying the traditional adage of nihil amatum
nisi prius cognitum—is situated within a larger context of community and history that is
an inverse movement of development, one expressed in the phrase nihil vere cognitum
nisi prius amatum. And so an individual’s cognitive operations occur, recur, and are
inevitably formed by what and whom one loves, and “this context is all the more complex
and extensive the richer the culture and the more nuanced the social arrangements one
has inherited.” 537

4.1.1 Love as Foundational for Value Recognition

Lonergan portrays development from above as affective, first set into motion by
love, and he portrays love as chronologically and contextually first, as foundational. The
foundational nature of love can be analyzed both abstractly and concretely. At a general
CWL 13: 63.
From the first of three lectures on religious studies and theology given by Lonergan at Queen’s
University in 1976, entitled “First Lecture: Religious Experience,” in A Third Collection, ed. Robert M.
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level, love reveals values, motivates our embodiment of those values, and inevitably
steers one’s cognitive pursuits, sensory perceptions, and psychic life. 538 It does so not
only through the new value it uncovers but also by the tremendous change in affectivity
that intends that value. This alteration in affectivity is one way by which lower levels of
consciousness and even unconscious neural demands are sublated into a higher horizon.

4.1.2 Love as Foundational for Individual Development

Love is even more clearly foundational when considered more concretely, in the
course of human development, and this is how Lonergan usually approaches the issue.
Love takes hold in the affectivity of the infant, the child, the student, the believer; on
affectivity rests the apprehension of values; on the apprehension of values rests belief;
following on belief is growth in understanding, and understanding engenders specific
schemes of experience.
Experiences accrue and are configured toward the confirmation of this beliefdriven growth in understanding, but “with experiential confirmation the inverse process
may set in,” an original appropriation of truth and value by moving “from experience to
understanding, to sound judgment, to generous evaluation, to commitment in love,
loyalty, faith.” 539 The circle continues to turn when the subject who has stood on their
own two feet, who has immanently generated their own grasp of ideas and affirmation of
facts and submitted their belief to a more personal and critical appropriation than before,
From “An Interview with Fr Bernard Lonergan, S.J.,” in A Second Collection, ed. Robert M. Doran and
John D. Dadosky, CWL 13 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016), 188; cf. CWL 16: 101 and CWL 17:
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begins to hand on their own development to their children, community, students, and so
on, acting out of love for those will receive the fruits of their labor through socialization,
acculturation, and education. 540 In both the abstract and concrete analysis, love is
foundational precisely insofar as it is a principle in the movement “from above
downward.” As foundational principle, love is “first” in an ordered set of relationships, 541
both interior and exterior, that together carry along the subject in a determinate direction
of development, orienting her in a larger cosmos of being, truth, value, and love.
In this concrete universe, however, progress is never an uninterrupted line of pure
development. Lonergan is perhaps best known for his emphasis on the necessary order of
cognitive development from below upward. But the healing vector of love operates from
above downward to overcome decline by revealing values and making them effective in
one’s living. Love is the power by which—and loving community is the context in
which—we become capable of actually transforming our human condition.

4.1.3 Love as Foundational for Psychic and Spiritual Wholeness

The medium through which love acts is the relationship between value and
feelings: “So our feelings, whether momentary or deep and lasting, both reveal to us
where values lie and give us the power and momentum to rise above ourselves and
See the 1977 “Theology and Praxis” in A Third Collection, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky,
CWL 16 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017), 192, and the 1976 “Questionnaire on Philosophy:
Response” in Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M.
Doran, CWL 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 362. This movement from above downward can
be traced in a variety of applications: existential (in the determination of who the subject is to be) as well as
interpersonal (in the determination of the subject’s relations to others) and practical (in the determination of
our world as a better or worse place to live in, especially in the creation of social policies affecting the good
of order). See CWL 16: 45.
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accomplish what objectively is good.” 542 Love may be more readily identifiable in
consciousness as the affective fulfillment of yearning for the other, for the dramatically
modified affectivity that almost always marks falling in love is easily located at the fifth
level, above and distinct from moral concerns. But as a transformation of the whole
person, love “seeps down” even into the neural unconscious and psychic conscious and
thus into the sometimes chaotic and mysterious tangle of our emotional lives.
Lonergan holds that the psychic level “ushers into consciousness not only the
demands of unconscious vitality but also the exigences of vertical finality,” 543 the call to
love and be loved. Authentic, lasting, mutually life-giving love never occurs without the
integral cooperation of the symbolic operator. It functions at the juncture between the
neural unconscious and the psychic conscious, releasing the images and affects that help
guide us through vital, undifferentiated intersubjectivity into the individuation process;
through culmination of the individuation process into mutual self-mediation, where
individuation is benevolently shaped and lovingly shapes another’s individuation process;
and through mutual self-mediation to blossom most fully and finally in an interpersonal
state of being-in-love.
This integral cooperation of the symbolic operator is ensured by psychic
conversion, which, although ultimately a function of God’s grace, is drawn into
emergence precisely inasmuch as the whole subject wants to move further and further
away from lovelessness in all its forms to the complacentia of being-with, being loved
by, and loving the beloved. Integral functioning of the topmost level of consciousness—
the mutual self-surrender of love—“pulls” the psychic and neural into integral alignment
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with its own vertical finality even as that love is aided greatly and necessarily by the
“mass and momentum” of spontaneous affect and the fertile potency of neural process for
its very emergence, sustenance, and enrichment. In this way psyche and spirit are
dynamically and harmoniously oriented to one another, and their correspondence is part
and parcel of being-in-love and staying in love; such correspondence embodies both
“from below upward” and “from above downward” movements in human
development. 544

4.2 Love as Consummate

In Lonergan’s anthropology, any significant shift on any level of consciousness
inextricably calls for a change on other levels. If the moral cognizance of the fourth level
is a principle of self-control, then the awareness of being loved and loving in return—the
fifth level of consciousness—is the principle of self-gift and thus provides the first four
levels with their ultimate telos.
Thus love is a distinct way of being conscious that functions as ultimate good and
ultimate telos to everything else in Lonergan’s anthropology. Without denigrating the
intrinsic value of any other component of human living, love makes everything else
desirable and done for the sake of the beloved and for union with the beloved. 545 The
teleological “pull” of love on other components of human life is construed by Lonergan
as the relation between potency and actuation, the fulfillment of intentionality, the
fulfillment of affectivity or complacentia, and a higher systematization or horizon.
544
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4.2.1 Love as Actuation

Lonergan relies on the metaphysical ideas of potency and act to suggest the
finality of individual subjectivity for interpersonal communion. Love actuates the
capacities inherent in consciousness by providing a disproportionate “new beginning”
that overcomes unauthenticity in its most basic and general form—the isolation of the
individual subject. This transformation of individualistic isolation into the togetherness of
love takes on different forms at different places in Lonergan’s corpus.
For example, in the 1943 “Finality, Love, and Marriage,” Lonergan delineates
four aspects of one and the same love. As the act of a faculty in the individual subject,
love can be understood as: (1) the desire for the good in the will of an individual subject,
which is in potency for actually attaining the good, and (2) the act or process of the will
moving toward the beloved, which brings the desire to fruition. As the act of a subject,
love is the principle of union between two different subjects as they are (3) united in their
pursuit of a common end (as in friendship) and (4) united in the enjoyment of the
common end they actually attain together. (1) and (2) are individual potency and act,
while (3) and (4) are social or historical potency and act. The point to this metaphysical
representation is not simply that all four simultaneous aspects of love manage to connect
affective motive with the intelligible self-expression of the principle of this motive, and at
both the individual and social levels. The more profound idea is that, by the participative
vertical finality that operates in both the individual and the group and in both nature and
grace, there results “an intensification of the higher by the lower, a stability resulting not
from mere absence of tension but from positive harmony between different levels, and,
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most dynamic, the integration by which the lower in its expansion involves a
development in the higher.” 546
For example, in the multilayered dynamism of Christian marriage, sexual eros has
a natural horizontal finality to children and a natural vertical finality to a human
friendship that integrates, at the level of reason, a more spiritual actuation of eros and sex.
In turn, by grace, this friendship bears a still further and more profound vertical finality to
the special order of charity between husband and wife, which has as its purpose to enrich
the life of sanctifying grace, which has as its ultimate purpose the beatific vision and
incorporation into the triumphant mystical body in heaven. In this way, Christian
marriage is a natural institution with a supernatural end; it is the process of various
potencies coming to disproportionate and graced actuations. 547
By the time of Method, Lonergan has brought in, alongside actuation, the more
personalist notion of fulfillment to denote love’s impact on affectivity, as well as the idea
of transcending the limitations of individual subjectivity. But Blackwood notes that the
language of “fulfillment” is even somewhat imprecise compared to the later language of
sublation. While it is true that love fulfills individual subjectivity and that fulfillment is
capable of appropriation, especially affectively and retrospectively, it is perhaps more
explanatory (and more expansive) to say that love sublates our subjectivity, for sublation
includes but extends further than the idea of fulfilment.
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4.2.2 Love as the Fulfillment of Conscious Intentionality

Because we are able to transcend ourselves cognitively, what we naturally intend
is the whole universe. If in Insight Lonergan interpreted Aquinas to understand wisdom
as an accumulation of insights that stands to the universe of being as common sense
stands to the particular and imaginable, 548 then this accumulation of insights is, to recall a
sapiential descriptor from Verbum, essentially a development in understanding reality and
especially in understanding the human mind that understands reality. 549
But a problem remains, for which only a more existential wisdom is the solution.
Lonergan frames the quandary, rather provocatively, as a question about the notion of the
real and our tendency to project self: “Is the real to be identified with the universe of
being, or is it to be settled by my autobiography?” 550 Our intention of being is our pure,
disinterested, and detached desire to know, and correlative to this “subject pole” is the
“object pole” that it intends, “a universe of being whose reality corresponds to the totality
of true judgments.” 551 But my world—what objectively corresponds to the horizon of my
interest and values—is not the universe of being, is not the totality of true judgments and
true values. The reasons for this intellectual and existential discrepancy are manifold,
including the dichotomy between animal knowing and fully human knowing, the tragic
interference of moral impotence with the exigence of the pure desire to know and do the
truly good, and the dialectic of psyche and spirit.

CWL 3: 331.
In the 1958 Halifax lectures on Insight, Lonergan also makes oblique reference to wisdom as a
development of understanding and judgment in the subject, a development that brings her horizon into
coincidence with the objective universe of being.
550
CWL 5: 183.
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To return to the initial problem of horizon and its relation to wisdom: if the world
of my interests and values are solely my concerns, narrowly circumscribed by my desires,
fears, sorrows, joys, and so on, my horizon may very well represent a state of psychic
limitation that is aligned neither with my desire to know nor with the real exigence of my
psychic life for the spiritual. For as Lonergan makes clearer in his post-Method works
than in Method, and clearer still compared to Insight, the psyche has vertical finality for
the intentionality of spirit. The tidal movement that begins before consciousness is
teleologically oriented toward spiritual life and the fulfillment of spiritual life in the
altered affectivity of love.
Doran boldly clarifies a nuance in Lonergan’s distinction of psyche and spirit that
is easy to miss. The dialectic between psyche and spirit is not that between
contradictories: one does not need to be overcome for the other to flourish. Rather, true
human flourishing consists precisely in the admission into consciousness of the fruitful
tension between psyche and spirit, the endless navigation of the interplay between the
very movement of life (psyche) and the intentional search for direction in that life (spirit).
Lonergan calls this harmonious cooperation between dual principles of human
development the “law of genuineness.”
Metaphysically, genuineness is the pregnant tension between potency as
limitation and potency as finality. 552 In the subject, it is the appropriation, in and by the
whole person, of the conscious tension between what limits oneself to current patterns of
thinking and living and what propels oneself to new patterns of thinking and living.
Genuineness is not necessarily the successful navigation of limitation and transcendence
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CWL 3: 479.
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in all instances, which is impossible, but the patient and humble “willingness to
persevere” 553 in this intricate, demanding, but incredibly rewarding negotiation.
Here it is tempting to strictly associate the transposition of Thomist wisdom in
Insight with the detachment of the pure desire to know. After all, wisdom as an
intellectual habit is the universal principle of good judgment and global order, and as
fully actuated, it is the apprehension of this universal order. 554 While not negating the
clear but indirect association of wisdom with the self-affirmation of the knower,
Lonergan suggests, in the same text, a further, more existential read of wisdom: wisdom
is the higher principle of synthesis that reconciles the natural and innocent selfcenteredness of psyche with the intellectual detachment of the pure desire to know the
universe of being. For as the human subject develops, the “requirement of genuinenessfor-him shifts from the simple demand of the pure desire for detachment to an ever more
intelligent” and “more wise” exercise of that desire. 555 In other words, the human subject
can guide her own psychic development towards it fulfillment by consciously aligning it
with the universe-intending operation of spirit and the consummate resting of love, which
is the ultimate fulfillment of both psychic longing and intentional striving.

Gerard Walmsley, Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism: The Polymorphism of Consciousness as the Key
to Philosophy (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2008), 77.
554
CWL 6: 40 and 67.
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CWL 3: 502-503. Here in this passage in Insight on the law of genuineness, we first catch glimpse of a
theme that will repeat in Lonergan’s later works, especially the 1959 De intellectu et methodo: the
paradoxical nature of wisdom. The navigation of conscious and unconscious components of one’s
development toward greater genuineness involves asking the right questions about one’s “unconscious
initiatives, their subsumption under the general order intelligence discovers in the universe of being, their
integration in the fabric of one’s habitual living” (CWL 3: 501). The selection of the best questions to ask
of this field requires wisdom, but we cannot become wise and discriminating without focusing on the right
questions. As with all vicious circles of logic, Lonergan encourages us to look to development, which is “a
series of emergent leaps from the logic of one position to the logic of the next” (CWL 3: 502).
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The linchpin to this reading of a more existential aspect of wisdom, present even
in Insight, 556 is the notion of self-transcendence. The pure desire to know is the eros of
the mind, achieving its full term in knowledge of the real. Correct judgment goes beyond
oneself to what is, and “what is” is not conditioned by one’s knowledge. And so the
intentional operations of experience, understanding, and judgment all drive toward
cognitional self-transcendence. The more existential operations of deliberating and
deciding, issuing in judgments of value, beget moral self-transcendence, which Lonergan
sometimes calls “real self-transcendence” or “performative self-transcendence.” 557 In a
good decision, I come to intend, know, and enact what is really good, which transcends
“what is in it for me” and what seems most pleasing to me in this moment.
In love, I leave behind the subject-to-object relationship of intentional operations
and reach the absolute height of self-transcendence, “forgetting myself” in ecstatic union
with the beloved, making the good of the beloved my greatest good and making my selfpresence a “being-with” the beloved. And, finally, in the “complete self-transcendence”
of religious love, I abandon myself with no qualifications, reservations, or limitations to
the belovedness God bestows on me, in the love I return to God and with which I love my
neighbor for God’s sake.
All of these changes in the subject can be trailed back to a shift from lovelessness
to love, and all are successive stages in the single thrust to self-transcendence. 558 Love is
a fulfillment of conscious intentionality because it brings the intellectual self-forgetting
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I would still characterize the overall tenor of Insight’s transposition of Thomist wisdom as intellectual.
Even in the passage laying out the law of genuineness, wisdom is explicitly portrayed as helping us
discriminate between the right and the wrong questions that will help usher into consciousness the tension
between conscious and unconscious components of development. CWL 3: 502.
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of the pure desire to know across the threshold of my subjectivity to reach the
subjectivity of another intelligent and loving being. Intellectual self-forgetting finds rest
in existential self-forgetting. For moving one’s horizon into coincidence with the universe
of being means not just understanding the most expansive possible order of
intelligibility—the goal of rational wisdom—but coming into communion with other
intelligent beings that are also part of the universe of being through the existential
wisdom of love. 559

4.2.3 Love as Affective Fulfillment

Although the pure desire to know bears an affective tension that is markedly
different from the affective tensions of ordinary intersubjective living, our intentional
strivings for knowledge, along with our psychic longing for communion with the other,
find rest in the affectivity of love. How can the affectivity of loving interpersonal
relationship be described, from the standpoint of both a faculty psychology as well as a
cognitional-existential interiority analysis?
For Aquinas, the will is a rational appetite. Just as knowledge arises from a
similitude of a thing’s form coming to be in our intellect, love makes the lover
connaturale and conveniens with the beloved. 560 If our properly voluntary, intellectual
desire is a rational appetite, then the affective affinity between the will and a good is the

CWL 5: 183, 193, 265-266.
In sent. III, 27.1.1 ad 2 and 27.1.3 ad 2. This general structural similarity, however, does not negate
equally significant structural dissimilarities. One of the more important dissimilarities is the fact that in
knowledge, an object proceeds as term within the intellect, but this does not happen within the procession
of love.
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will’s complacentia in that good. This rest is, technically, caused by the object of
appetite, the good itself, while love itself can be called complacentia in the good. 561
In Aquinas there can be discerned a dual meaning to complacentia—love as the
principle of desire (incipient enjoyment) when the beloved or the beloved’s good is
absent or love as the principle of delight (full enjoyment) when the beloved or the
beloved’s good is present. The will rests in the beloved in and through its delight in the
beloved, and this rest is not inactivity but actuation; this enjoyment is full when real
union with the beloved has been reached. 562 Lonergan’s comments on complacentia in
the 1969 Method in Theology seminar, while cursory, closely parallel Aquinas’ binary
emphasis: the subject seeks to rest in the goodness of the beloved when one is interiorly
moving toward the beloved, and achieves this rest once in the state of love. Complacentia
is the affective response to the beloved and is connected with a value judgment affirming
the beloved’s goodness, an affirmation that is, in turn, connected with a more global
value judgment affirming the goodness of universal order. 563
In a series of three brilliant articles from 1959, Crowe argues that prior to its
entirely valid but perhaps relatively overemphasized status as the principle of all activity,
including intellectual activity, the faculty of will is also, for Aquinas, the term of a
process that begins in the attractiveness of the beloved. This term is a quiescence in the
goodness of what is known as existent by the intellect; it is the simple, receptive
complacentia boni. It is prior to and more fundamental than the motion, tendency, or
impulse—the will’s active seeking of the good—that is intentio boni. Under this reading,
ST, I-II, 26, 2 and 23, 4.
See Michael S. Sherwin, O.P., By Knowledge and by Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral
Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 2005), 77-79.
563
Archive entry 52200DTE060, 29-30. See https://www.bernardlonergan.com/pdf/52200DTE060.pdf,
accessed on October 3, 2018.
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complacentia is not the actuation of striving and the affective experience of satisfaction
in finally reaching the good; it is the actuation of a receptive potency to be in harmony or
in “pleasing agreement” with the goodness of all that exists in the universe. 564
If complacentia is rest in the beloved or the beloved’s good that fulfills all
intentional striving and psychic longing, it is the consummate change in affectivity
wrought by the dynamic state of being-in-love. Complacentia is the affective mark of
existential wisdom, the wisdom that Lonergan disengages as the consummate term of a
whole “tidal movement” of successive “stages” in self-transcendence.

4.2.4 Love and Community as a Higher Horizon

Just as interpersonal relations marked by mutual self-gift are love, the horizon of
shared meanings and values, common conceptions and judgments, is community. 565 And
authentic community sublates the needs, wants, and goals of the individual not by
sacrificing them to be lost in some amorphous whole but by sweeping them up into a
larger scheme—the good of ordered interpersonal relationships—in which the
individual’s search for meaning and value at every level finds fulfillment in loving
interpersonal relationship.
If moral conversion means moving beyond individual satisfactions and partisan
group interests to true values, in the language of Lonergan’s emergent probability, a
plurality of morally self-transcending subjects are “ready to snap” into a higher
Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, ed. Fred Lawrence, Supplementary Issue of Lonergan Workshop 16
(Atlanta: Scholar’s Press, 2000); originally published as three articles in Theological Studies 20 (1959): 139, 198-230, 343-395. Also see Blackwood, And Hope Does Not Disappoint, 93.
565
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systematization, a community of love. 566 Just as the intellectual wisdom of rational selfappropriation moves us formally into a universe of being and meaning, the existential
wisdom of love moves us into a universal context of interrelational meaning in which our
self-transcendence is for the sake of others, and community is the consummate
expression of that self-transcendence-for-others. 567

4.3 Love as Normative

Although it is not usually explicitly included in his list of transcendental precepts,
enough work has been done to show that love is a permanently operative, immanent, and
accessible imperative of consciousness for Lonergan. 568 Love is “demanded by natural
right” with no less legitimacy than intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. For
the difference between transcending oneself for the good of the other and remaining in
self-enclosure is a qualitative and verifiable difference in consciousness. By introducing
into a single consciousness a communal “we” that goes beyond the single individual and
binds her in belovedness and commitment with the other, love introduces a new norm for
her subjectivity—the good of the other and the good of “us.”
Dadosky writes that the transcendental precepts of Method (be attentive, be
intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible) are “the application of the habitual
From the June 17th question-and-answer session from the 1974 Lonergan Workshop at Archive Entry
809A0DTE070. See https://www.bernardlonergan.com/pdf/809A0DTE070.pdf, 8, accessed on October 22,
2018.
567
See “The Future of Christianity,” in A Second Collection, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky,
CWL 13 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016), 130-131.
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There is actually at least one place in Method where Lonergan appears to name love as a transcendental
precept: “It [conversion] is total surrender to the demands of the human spirit: be attentive, be intelligent,
be reasonable, be responsible, be in love” (CWL 14: 252). Also see Blackwood’s discussion in And Hope
Does Not Disappoint, 127 and 135.
566
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propensity of wisdom both as foundation and as goal.” 569 In Lonergan’s post-Method
works the declaration of love as a fifth level of consciousness that sublates all others
implies that love is part and parcel of the normative horizon that is wisdom. In fact, love
represents the inbreaking of a new horizon, a transformation of my interests and values to
our interests and values, where the norming value is the good of the other and the good of
“us.” Although falling-in-love is not, strictly speaking, the inevitable outcome of one’s
choice or even the result of two persons’ decisions, it cannot be sustained or enriched
without ongoing decisions and deliberate commitments. 570

4.4 Love as Unitive

Lonergan describes sublation as enacting “a vast simplification” of that which is
sublated, 571 and describes wisdom as the all-consuming sublation of all levels of
consciousness by being-in-love. While the external outworking of love may eventually
involve enormous complexity, struggle, and sacrifice, the way it internally simplifies all
of one’s inner conscious life is readily acknowledged by anyone who has ever been in
love. For love “transforms an ‘I’ and ‘thou’ into a ‘we’ so intimate, so secure, so
permanent, that each attends, imagines, thinks, plans, feels, speaks, acts in concern for
both.” 572 Just as decision sublates sense (experience), intelligence (understanding), and
reasonableness (judgment), thereby unifying feeling, knowing, and doing, love sublates

“Lonergan on Wisdom,” 62.
See the question-and-answer session on June 18th of the 1974 Lonergan Workshop at Boston College,
found in Archive Entry 810A0DTE070, 1-2, https://bernardlonergan.com/pdf/810A0DTE070.pdf, accessed
on October 10, 2018.
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decision, knowledge, and feelings into a new horizon of being and action. Love unifies
all lower levels of consciousness within a higher orientation, a distinct way of being
conscious and of being in the world.
Love itself is union, the unity of a state of interpersonal relations that is verifiable
as the presence of an existential togetherness with another. 573 The unity of persons in a
state of love is described by Lonergan as a “quasi-identification” that can have various
organic and psychic roots: for example, in vital intersubjectivity, sexual eros, and the
“emotional identification” that precedes and undergirds the differentiation of an
individual from his or her family. But these types of identification pertain more to what
Lonergan describes as the “first way of being conscious,” in which we passively undergo
sensitive affects, hopes, dreams, sorrows, pains, and so on. The “second way of being
conscious”—our conscious intentional capacities for responsibly acting on judgments
that we make regarding natural and human realities—is nourished and set in motion by
this sensitive stream of psychic life but also guides its direction and helps us negotiate its
sometimes troubling aberrations. 574
Within this more spiritual way of being conscious, love is a “quasi-identification”
of the lover with the beloved. The known is in the knower by way of intentional
existence; the beloved is in the lover “by way of real inclination and quasiidentification,” 575 but this identification or union is not anything above, beyond, or
Since the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted in and through love rather than produced by
love, love itself is interpersonal union; it does not produce a unity of persons. See Blackwood, 157, n. 60,
as well as CWL 2: 209-210 and CWL 4: 27.
574
See Doran, Trinity in History: Missions and Processions (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013), for an
account of how our participation in and imitation of the divine relations help heal a deeply flawed
dimension of “interdividuation”—the distorted mimesis explored by Girard—that occupies much of the
psychic field.
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formally different in any way from the love itself. In his gloss on Aquinas’ account of
amor procedens from Contra Gentiles, Lonergan stresses the fact that the presence of the
beloved in the lover is exactly the same entity as the act of love in the lover. Although
there is clearly no motion in God, the “dynamic presence” of the beloved in the lover can
be understood as the term of a movement in the movement’s proportionate principle. The
beloved is known in the intellect by the production of an inner word; but the beloved is
present “dynamically” in the will as the term of an inclination toward the value of the
beloved. From understanding’s intellectual self-expression in a judgment of value there is
an intelligible procession of love in the will, and this procession of love constitutes the
presence of the beloved in the lover. By final causality there is the amari of the beloved;
while the final causality of this amari may be operated by the beloved, it is in the lover
rather than the beloved. Here again, love is union: the amari of the beloved in the lover is
one and the same act as the amare of the lover for the beloved. 576
In the early 1960s, Lonergan called attention to the “wise oscillation” among
“worlds” that shifts an individual’s subjectivity from one focus to another, with wisdom
understood as the integration of those worlds by the achievement of an interiority that
allows one to shift consciously and easily among them. From the perspective of 1974,
wisdom is still unitive, but is considered here as the unitive power of love, which sublates
all aspects of conscious intentionality within an individual’s subjectivity and brings that
individual’s subjectivity into union with another in a kind of identification.
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5 Religious Love as the Ultimate Form of Wisdom

All love is self-surrender, but loving God has its origin in God’s own transcendent
love; the self-surrender of religious conversion is ultimate and unrestricted; in all of this it
transcends the natural order. Like the paradox of finite wisdom that can only find
complete fulfillment by wedding itself to infinite wisdom, 577 authenticity of self can only
be attained through going beyond self, and so each conversion is essentially a selftranscendence or self-surrender. But the meaning of self-surrender, especially in the sense
of love for another person, enters into the constitutive meaning of religious conversion
more deeply than in the other conversions, and not solely with reference to God.
The complete self-transcendence of supernatural being-in-love has much in
common with other forms of love, as it involves a subject-to-subject relationship. But
through the grace of religious conversion a radically novel interpersonal situation obtains,
in which the human subject is related to the three divine subjects, to the Father and the
Son through sanctifying grace and to the Spirit by the gift of charity. This communion of
a human person with Eternal Persons is an initiative of unconditional divine love and
invites, implores, and bestows on us a state of unrestricted being-in-love that flows into
self-sacrificing love for our neighbors. 578
In one sense, religious love is the ultimate form of wisdom for a simple reason:
human beings are not the highest beings and we are not the terminal value of the
CWL 4: 86-87.
The gift of God’s love, in and of itself, is something that can be, and often is, initially experienced
without being known. So while the intersubjective situation of grace obtains wherever God’s gift of love is
received, accepted, and returned—and thus a truly religious horizon obtains wherever this divine-human
communion applies—it is entirely possible that one’s relationship with the Triune God can be objectively
constituted but not reflectively objectified and thus not known in an explicit sense of knowledge as a
compound of experiencing, understanding, and judging. See CWL 14: 101-106.
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universe. God is. And so if the natural and the supernatural are truly distinct orders, 579
then the reception and return of divine love are higher than the reception or return of
human love. If even “natural” love is eminently sapiential, then all the more so is
supernatural love. For Lonergan, being-in-love with God is the foundational,
consummate, normative, and unitive source of self-transcendence in every sphere, not
simply that of explicit religious belief or even that of explicit religious experience.

5.1 Religious Love as Foundational

Just as the unconditional intelligibility of God is the ultimate ground and
condition of all intelligibility and the unconditional goodness of God is the ultimate
ground and condition of all goodness, so too the unconditional love that God has for us is
the ultimate ground of our unconditional love for God, other human beings, and
ourselves. And so, as the unconditional self-transcendence of otherworldly falling-inlove, religious love is the supernaturally revitalizing ground of all self-transcendence.
Lonergan conveys this ground as the determinant of a higher horizon in which the subject
is spiritually reborn by the bestowal of divine love. This divine love constitutes the
divine-human interpersonal situation, the mutual indwelling, that is the state or situation
of sanctifying grace. 580

For Lonergan’s discussion of Philip the Chancellor’s breakthrough to the theorem of the supernatural,
see CWL 1: 16-21, 176-178, 184-187; CWL 6: 44-45 and ed. n. 19 on 44; CWL 10: 242; CWL 17: 422423. For thoughts on why Philip’s discovery legitimizes the use of general categories in theology, see
Doran, What Is Systematic Theology?, 82-85.
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5.1.1 Religious Love as the First Principle of Conversion

The distinction among the three conversions Lonergan explicitly treats means that
one can technically be converted in one sphere without being converted in the other, for
they represent three distinct modalities of self-transcendence. However, in the concrete,
one conversion usually leads to another, or at least increases the chances of another
occurring (and vice versa in the direction of breakdown). The normal course of
transformation is from religious to moral and then from religious and moral to
intellectual, but their overall relationship is characterized as much by interdependence as
by direct causation. 581 Still, all three conversions are grounded in God’s grace, and
religious conversion acts as a sapiential “first principle” to intellectual and moral
conversion.
The causative relationship between religious conversion and moral conversion is
perhaps the easiest to appreciate. Even if religious conversion were held to do nothing
else, Christian communities are almost unanimous in affirming that it overcomes moral
impotence. The power of supernatural love aligns good intentions with good
performance. 582
When it comes time for it to inform systematic theology, religious conversion is
greatly aided by intellectual conversion, which guards theology from false controversies,

CWL 14: 226-228; CWL 16: 236-237; CWL 17: 318 and 331; “Doctrinal Pluralism,” in Philosophical
and Theological Papers 1965-1980, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, CWL 17 (Toronto:
University of Toronto, 2004), 86; and “Moral Theology and the Human Sciences,” in Philosophical and
Theological Papers 1965-1980, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, CWL 17 (Toronto: University
of Toronto, 2004), 308-309. One fascinating implication of the dependence of intellectual on religious
conversion, as Doran points out, is that there ultimately exists a religious or theological grounding even of
sciences and disciplines other than theology. See What Is Systematic Theology?, 102 and n. 40.
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anthromorphisms, and stunted objectives. Intellectual conversion is also foundational for
theology. As Doran explains, “with Method in Theology the three dimensions of
conversion that Lonergan affirmed are reciprocally related to two differentiations of
consciousness that provide theology with its foundations, namely, interiorly differentiated
consciousness and religiously differentiated consciousness.” 583
Religious conversion needs moral and intellectual conversion. Without the
discernment afforded by moral conversion, religious experience can be indiscriminately
conflated with eroticism, to destructive effect. And as Lonergan puts it rather frankly in
Method, “Without intellectual conversion, religious experience is not understood, or, if it
is understood, then not correctly.” 584 Intellectual conversion is required to accurately
distinguish the meaning of divine immanence from transcendence in ways not unduly
dominated by animal extroversion, the mythic worldview that being, even divine being, is
the “already out there now.”
Lonergan pronounces, quite reasonably, that “The authentic Christian strives for
the fullness of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.” 585 When all three
conversions occur in the same individual or through many individuals in the same
community, moral conversion sublates intellectual conversion and religious conversion
sublates them both, but they continue to be interdependent. The religiously converted
subject never ceases to intend the transcendentals of the intelligible, the true, the real, and
the good.
Just as the good is beyond the true and the real, intellectual conversion is sublated
by moral conversion. But even at the natural level, love is what fully reveals values to be
Doran, What Is Systematic Theology?, 93.
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apprehended by our feelings and makes them effective in our living, and this truth is even
more emphatic with supernatural love. And so religious sublates moral conversion.
Wherever and whenever it is welcomed, supernatural value and supernatural meaning
become a “new and efficacious” ground for intellectual and moral pursuits.

5.1.2 Religious Love as Foundational for Other Loves

Lonergan contends that religious love grounds both domestic and civil devotion
by reconciling us and committing us to the “obscure purpose of our universe,” 586 which is
the love of God in Christ Jesus. If the obscure purpose of our universe is to magnify
God’s glory by manifesting God’s love (a love that is known “in Christ” by the
Christian), then the reception and return of that love is the highest order of interpersonal
relationship in the universe. To the extent that the social and cultural orders are receptive
to the ever-deeper incorporation of religious value into the fabric of human living, they
become ever more solidly grounded on God’s own faithfulness, which partners with
humankind to overcome the problem of evil with an absolutely supernatural solution.
Where welcomed and embodied, this solution heals and elevates every
interpersonal relationship through a supernatural faith that is founded in the
unfathomably transcendent excellence of the unrestricted act of understanding that is
God; through a supernatural hope that is founded on God’s wisdom in designing our
universe with an order that allows for both good and evil, for progress and decline, and
on God’s goodness in providing for the redemption of what is evil in our universe; and,
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most of all, through a supernatural charity that is founded on God’s own love for the
universe, which redeems it by returning goodness, mercy, and peace in the face of evil,
cruelty, and violence and invites us to do the same. “It follows that love of God above all
and in all so embraces the order of the universe as to love all men with a self-sacrificing
love.” 587

5.2 Religious Love as Consummate

While our capacity for self-transcendence may be clearly revealed by our
unrestricted questioning, only supernatural being-in-love completely fulfills that capacity.
If the enduring ground of our own self-transcendence comes from God’s gift of love to
us, so too does its fulfillment.

5.2.1 Religious Love as Actuation

To explicate the relationship between created subjectivity and the infusion of
God’s love into the very core of that subjectivity, Lonergan leans once again on the
metaphysical language of potency in relation to act. The basic continuity of divine grace
with human capacities—conceived as the supernatural actuation of natural human
potential for a disproportionate end—is cogently framed only through analogy. In the
Thomist stream of thought as well as Lonergan’s, God is understood as the consummate
fulfillment of transcendental strivings but with an acknowledgment of the drastic
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discontinuity between God’s intellect and will and our own, whose wisdom and goodness
are participated.
As unconditional being-in-love, grace habitually “actuates to the full the dynamic
potentiality of the human spirit with its unrestricted reach, and, as a full actuation, it is
fulfilment, deep-set peace, the peace the world cannot give, abiding joy, the joy that
remains despite humiliations and failure and privation and pain.” 588 Insofar as it
intrinsically involves no apprehended object and corresponds to the unrestricted character
of the transcendental notions, religious love is an experience of mystery. 589
Just as grace does not destroy nature but completes it, religious conversion is
complete self-transcendence. It does not abolish the need for human development and
community but instead crowns human development and love with an absolute and
transcendent dignity and beauty, especially when it blossoms forth in love for neighbor.
“It [the gift of God’s grace] is in this life the crown of human development, grace
perfecting nature, the entry of God into the life of man so that man comes to love his
neighbor as himself.” 590

5.2.2 Religious Love as the Fulfilment of Conscious Intentionality

Our capacity for self-transcendence is expressed in our unrestricted ability to ask
questions that touch on all of the transcendental notions. Our cognitional intention of

CWL 13: 110.
Archive Entries 52200DTE060 (see https://www.bernardlonergan.com/pdf/52200DTE060.pdf, 36-37,
accessed on October 3, 2018) and 52400DTE060 (from the second part of the fifth lecture on July 11th at
the Regis College 1969 Institute on Method in Theology, found at
https://www.bernardlonergan.com/archiveitem.php?id=2064, 7-8, accessed on October 16, 2018).
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being is unrestricted, with the entire universe as its ultimate object. Our existential
orientation not only runs parallel to the cognitional in unrestricted extension for what is
unrestrictedly good and unrestrictedly lovable; it is also the condition for intellectual
integrity.
For what is consummately intelligible is also consummately lovable, but that is
not all. All of our cognitional endeavors occur authentically only in a context of loving
community, because love is the efficacy of judgments of value motivating the pursuit of
truth. And so a wholehearted, effective, and habitually constant surrender to the
intelligible and the true good is only possible within the higher horizon of religious love,
which makes consistently possible and consistently actualized a loving self-surrender to
both God and fellow human being.
Our graced, self-transcendent love for God and for neighbor is distinct from either
our natural knowledge or our supernatural knowledge, but it conditions the authenticity
of both. For central to religious conversion is a loving acceptance of the order of the
universe, the order conceived by divine wisdom and willed by divine goodness. This
loving acceptance turns our subjectivity from self-centeredness to selflessness, aligning
our existential (and even our psychic) orientation with our native intellectual thrust for
the entire universe of being and meaning. And, in turn, this existential self-surrender
straightens and strengthens our intellectual self-surrender to all truth.
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5.2.3 Religious Love as Affective Fulfillment

The recognition of transcendent value “consists in the experienced fulfillment of
our unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence, in our actuated orientation towards the
mystery of love and awe.” 591 That fulfillment is complacentia, which is both generically
similar and specifically different from the complacentia of the “lesser” loves of family
and community Lonergan also discusses so often. It is not the fulfillment of a particular
longing but the all-encompassing “fulfillment of getting beyond [all] one’s appetites and
desires and wishes and impulses” 592 in an unrestricted fashion.
It is an affective resting in God, but such a dramatic and supernatural fulfillment
of affectivity can remain a “hidden vector” in one’s life. It is not something that we
achieve but something that we receive, accept, and ratify; it comes “quietly, secretly,
unobtrusively,” and we often know about it only by retrospectively witnessing its fruits in
our lives. 593 Through grace, it is given to all, but this experience of resting in God usually
needs a religious tradition to be encouraged, interpreted, guided, and developed.
Supernatural complacentia is the affective mark of the supernaturally existential
wisdom of receiving and appropriating God’s unconditional love. Whereas the
complacentia of natural love is, more generally, the affective mark of the total selftranscendence of love in which the lover rests in union with the beloved, the
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complacentia of supernatural love is read by Doran as the affective awareness of
receiving God’s unconditional love. 594

5.2.4 Religious Love as Higher Horizon and Kingdom of God

Religious love “determines the horizon of total self-transcendence by grounding
the self and its self-transcendence in the divine lover whose love makes those he loves in
love with him, and so with one another.” 595 This horizon is a concrete plurality of human
subjects whose supernatural relationship to God and each other forms a new whole, the
kingdom of God. In this new good of order, the members are connected through their
love by and for the head, who is Christ. Our supernatural knowing and loving of God,
made possible by the theological virtues springing from grace, are directed to the ultimate
end, which is the essential goodness of God, but are also proximately directed to the
general supernatural good of order, which is the body of Christ. 596
Grace establishes a doubly interpersonal situation, one between the believer and
the Trinitarian God and one between the believer and potentially all of her fellow human
beings, since the gift of grace is universal. An individual human subject is an integration
of the material and spiritual; a community formed through the proportionate love of
family and people is an integration of subjects centered around a common horizon of
common meanings and values. But the kingdom of God consists in a still higher
integration, above merely human community, with an originating value in divine
Doran, “‘Complacency and Concern’ and a Basic Thesis on Grace,” Lonergan Workshop 13 (1997): 5778.
595
CWL 17: 22-23.
596
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goodness and a terminal value in the goodness of the whole universe as it speaks the
divine goodness.
The elevation in central form that is sanctifying grace corresponds to an elevation
to a higher horizon of interpersonal relationships. 597 More proximately, it is the gift of
charity that brings one to love God in return, love one’s neighbor as oneself for the love
of God, and lovingly accept the goodness of the current world order as a sign of God’s
own love. Again, more proximately, it is charity that sets up a new and consummately
good order in this world, the mystical body of Christ. 598 “This ultimate, cosmic, good of
order to which disproportionate love draws human subjects and, through human subjects,
the entire universe, is the kingdom of God.” 599

5.3 Religious Love as Normative

The transformation of the “heart of stone” into the “heart of flesh,” which for
Lonergan is the work of operative grace, bestows on us the very lovableness of God, who
is love by essence. But from this dynamic state of supernatural love flows the
supernatural habit of charity, which loves God with God’s own love and, with faith and
hope, attains God uti in se est. Through the bestowal of God’s love in and through
sanctifying grace, God raises our very being to be “normed” by God’s own being, and
through the theological virtue of charity, we, in return, love God with God’s own love,
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In 2007 Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer argued for the transposition of the scholastic notion of the habit of
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the unity of consciousness (“central form”—the essence of the soul). See “Sanctifying Grace in a
‘Methodical Theology,” Theological Studies 68 (2007): 52-76.
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Blackwood, And Hope Does Not Disappoint, 226.

279
and everyone and everything else for the sake of God. Religious love is “measured” by
God’s own self. 600 Because we are made in the image of God, who is self-transcending,
we are capable of transcending ourselves, reaching authenticity and becoming principles
of beneficence and benevolence to all beings.

5.3.1 Religious Love and the Scale of Values

Religious conversion breaks into human history a “new horizon” of supernatural
love. The state of otherworldly being-in-love provides immanently generated criteria for
authentic moral values, for religious love encounters and affirms God’s own meaning and
values, welcoming their entrance and deeper penetration into every human affair.
If transcendent value is the goodness and truth of God’s own being, knowledge,
and love, then religious values apprehend transcendent value. Religious values are
normative for the entire scale of values developed by Lonergan insofar as schemes of
recurrence at the higher levels condition the recurrence of schemes at the lower. Our
graced apprehension and embodiment of religious values make personal integrity
possible, because religious love is love for the divinely created and willed universe, and
the order of the universe “includes pre-eminently the good that persons are, enjoy, and
possess.” 601 By conditioning the authenticity of personal values, which then authenticate
cultural values, with cultural values authenticating social values, and social values
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authenticating vital values, religious values norm to divine standards the healthy
operation of the whole scale. 602

5.4 Religious Love as Unitive

In the 1964 The Triune God: Systematics, Lonergan distinguishes the habit of
sanctifying grace, which denotes the physical accident received in the soul of the just,
from the state or situation of grace. 603 This divine-human interpersonal state of grace, the
divine indwelling, 604 is a state of union between God and the one whom God loves and
loves God in return. It is a union by way of the beloved in the lover (“quasiidentification”) and the known in the knower (intentional existence).
Mutual indwelling applies not only to the divine-human relationship but to the
intra-Trinitarian life. The divine will is God in God’s self and therefore the Holy Spirit,
who proceeds in God as Love, is God. God’s love of God’s self implies total rather than
602
The relationship among the levels of value runs the inverse way as well: the functioning of the lower
levels sets the scope for the questions and problems that must be answered and solved by the higher levels,
and provokes the operations that will reach a higher synthesis within more inclusive schemes of value. See
Doran, What Is Systematic Theology?, 177-179 and 190-192.
603
Notice that here Lonergan still strongly maintains the traditional idea of grace as an absolutely
supernatural entitative habit received in the essence of the soul. His emphasis here, and later on in his
career, on grace as an interpersonal situation does not negate the traditional emphasis of grace as a habit
that heals and elevates the soul of the individual recipient. It merely calls attention to the interpersonal
ramifications of the gift, which Lonergan will later yoke to the divine-human communal process of
redemption in history.
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It is not incorrect to describe the interpersonal state of grace as the divine indwelling in the soul of the
just—this is the explicit claim that Lonergan makes in The Triune God: Systematics, that “the indwelling of
the divine persons is constituted through the state of grace” (Assertion 18), which appears to be an
interpretation not only of Aquinas’ theology of the divine missions in general but of ST, I, 43, 3 in
particular. However, further qualifications in Lonergan and Lonergan scholarship have and should be
made. First, Lonergan does not mean to imply here that the state of grace is somehow the cause of the
divine indwelling, but rather that what is constituted through the state of grace is a divine-human
interpersonal situation. Again, Aquinas’ and Lonergan’s position is perhaps best understood in reference to
external contingent predication: “if there is the Father’s love because of the Son, if there is the Spirit as
sent, if there are the consequent terms sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, and the other virtues and
gifts that flow from sanctifying grace, then there is constituted a divine-human interpersonal situation”
(CWL 12: 513, ed. n. 119).
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quasi-identity: “the proper object of divine love is the divine goodness which is identical
with God.” 605
But if love is identification in the sense of the mutual self-donation that
constitutes union between lover and beloved, the perfect identity implied by God’s
knowledge and love of God’s self is analogously mirrored in the quasi-identification of
God with humanity in the divine missions. This quasi-identification is expressed most
clearly and visibly in the visible mission of the Son, in which God gives God’s self to the
extravagant point of assuming human nature in the incarnation, almost bringing God “too
close” to us. 606

6 Summary: Wisdom as the Self-Surrender of Love

The exigence for authenticity is “man’s deepest need,” but consistent selftranscendence is only possible through the living wisdom of conversion. Wisdom was
already implicitly identified as conversion in Method, but love as a way of being
conscious quite distinct from and in fact radically conditioning other forms of selftranscendence was left somewhat ambiguous. Wisdom was not yet clearly identified in its
ultimate instantiation as the sublimation of all other forms of self-transcendence by the
unrestricted self-surrender of divine-human love.
Just as what sublates does not abolish what is sublated but complements, fulfills,
and perfects it, these successively higher integrations of wisdom do not repudiate the
lower. In 1976 Lonergan calls wisdom “the comprehensive reasonableness” of sound
605
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judgment and in 1979 he identifies it with the normative horizon of truth and value and
again (as at numerous places in the past) references Aquinas to affirm wisdom’s role as
the intellectual habit that knows the true meaning of being. And he makes all of these
statements without contradiction or confusion, even though he had in 1974 explicitly
claimed that wisdom consists in the successive sublations of the ever-self-transcending
dynamics of human consciousness, with the most ultimate form of wisdom represented
by being-in-love with God and God’s universe. 607
Nor does the explicit identification of being-in-love with God as the highest form
of wisdom in Lonergan’s post-Method works abrogate his implicit identification of
wisdom with transcendental method in Method. For although love was not recognized as
a fifth level in Method, it was included at the fourth level within transcendental method,
with supernatural love acting as both principle and end to all fourth level activities. In
Lonergan’s post-Method works, wisdom is rewritten, beyond its cognitive form sketched
in Verbum and Insight, as the self-appropriation of the psychic, experiencing, intelligent,
reasonable, free, responsible, and loving subject whose authenticity consists in selftranscendence. 608

These three claims are found in the 1975 “Christology Today: Methodological Reflections” (CWL 16:
75), the 1979 “Horizons and Transpositions” (CWL 17: 425-426), and the 1974 “Aquinas Today: Tradition
and Innovation” (CWL 16: 51).
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Conclusion

And so what, finally, becomes of Aquinas’ notion of wisdom in the later
Lonergan? The answer, in brief, is that the traditional Thomist notion of wisdom
becomes, in the more existential terms of the later Lonergan, the potentially fourfold
conversion of the human subject, as this conversion is initiated, deepened, and sustained
by being-in-love. In the more cognitive dimension, wisdom is the development in the
subject, via self-appropriation and ultimately self-knowledge, that serves as the
foundation of any discipline. In this way, Lonergan’s transposition of Aquinas’ notion of
wisdom implies a tremendous transformation in the very foundations of our knowledge of
the world and of ourselves.
In Verbum, Insight, and the Gregorian courses, wisdom resides primarily at the
level of judgment, with some scattered signals indicating a more existential extension
into decision. As Chapter Three made clear, 1959 proved to be an especially critical year
in the transposition, as De intellectu et methodo suggested (but, in my view, did not
demonstrate) an identification of wisdom with transcendental method. Here wisdom was
identified as a cognitional “moving foundation,” while method seemed to be a companion
concept: both were still necessary and relevant to modern demands on theology.
But as time went on, method’s role grew tremendously, not only taking over
many of wisdom’s functions but also manifesting its own unique and legion purposes.
Eventually in 1963 wisdom was understood as included within method, with method in
possession of greater significance and functionality. Chapter Four read Method in
Theology (1972) as the complete (albeit indirect) identification between wisdom and
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transcendental method initiated in an incomplete way in 1959. Method was also analyzed
as Lonergan’s implicit re-interpretation of wisdom as the lived experience of conversion
and thus his transposition of wisdom at the “fourth level” of consciousness. More
specifically, in terms of functional specialization, wisdom shifts into the dialectical
decision that brings the mediating phase of theology to the clear-headed conflict between
conversion and lack of conversion and the foundational decision that objectifies
conversion to ground the mediated phase of theology.
When Method underscores the existential component in all human knowledge and
activity, the prior emphasis on wisdom as sound judgment is not repudiated but
complemented. If wisdom as decision sublates wisdom as judgment, then wisdom as
conversion sublates wisdom as decision. Wisdom as conversion denotes the foundational
reality of radically transformed subjectivity, but the ultimate principle of this radically
transformed subjectivity is the mutual self-mediation of love, both human and divine. As
early as 1972, Lonergan recognized this love as a “fifth level” of consciousness, the
existential sphere of self-surrender to the other.
If religious conversion—the gift of God’s love—acts as a principle to moral
conversion and intellectual conversion, there is a sense in which wisdom as love sublates
wisdom as conversion, although in the case of religious conversion one could still
reasonably argue for their coextension as well. Hence in the post-Method works reviewed
in Chapter Five, wisdom is identified precisely as the sublation of all forms of selftranscendence by love.
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1 An Avenue for Further Research: Love of Divine Wisdom as Participation in the
Inner-Trinitarian Life of God
Doran has recently advanced a position building on Lonergan’s Trinitarian
systematics and affirmation of the universal mission of the Holy Spirit that allows for a
real relation to the Son even in those who do not know or accept the divine revelation of
the Son’s visible mission. Building on what has become known as Lonergan’s “fourpoint hypothesis,” Doran hypothesizes in his The Trinity in History that these persons
might be related—through the habit of charity that participates in the passive spiration of
the Spirit from the Father and the Son—to the Second Person of the Holy Trinity in
knowing and loving divine wisdom. Further research might explore how Lonergan’s
transposition of Aquinas’ notion of wisdom could shed additional light on the
relationship we have to the Word, which Doran elaborates as being (among other things)
a relationship to divine Wisdom through charity. Here I can only sketch a (very)
preliminary outline of a possible future enlargement of Doran’s thesis. 609

1.1 The Invisible Mission of the Son

According to Doran’s expansion of Lonergan’s later Trinitarian analogy, memoria
and faith share in divine active spiration, which is the active loving of the Father and Son
for each other. This very love is the Holy Spirit, the Amor procedens of passive spiration;
charity participates in passive spiration. The self-presence of one who knows herself to be
unconditionally beloved is the analogue for the Father; the word that is an expression of
For the sake of brevity, here I will assume a theological context formed around Lonergan’s four-point
hypothesis; Doran’s extension of Lonergan’s later Trinitarian analogy; and Doran’s work on the invisible
mission of the Son and its connection to faith, cultural values, and social grace.
609
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the goodness of being loved this way is the analogue for the Son; and the charity that is
the love of God in return is the analogue for the Holy Spirit. Because charity is a share in
the Holy Spirit, who is related by a relation of origin to the Father and the Son, it serves
as a created base for a created relation to the Father and Son, who dwell in us as
uncreated terms of this distinct, created relation.
Can we say more about the invisible mission of the Son? Doran and the later
Lonergan both understand the Son as generated from the Father’s being-in-love with the
very goodness of the divine essence. And so the Son is the eternal judgment of value
affirming the very lovableness of God, an inner word that, in expressing this mutual love
of the Father and Son, actually “breathes” the Spirit of love together with the Father. In
us, our recollection of having received the life-long and life-transforming gift of God’s
unconditional love (memoria) speaks a judgment of value (faith) affirming the goodness
of such a remarkable gift. Consequently, faith is a participation in the invisible mission of
the Word, because faith acknowledges the goodness of God’s love, just as the Word is a
judgment of value expressing the Father’s love. As a response to the universally given
gift of God’s love in the Holy Spirit, faith itself also becomes universal, although
sometimes as hidden as the original gift of divine love.
Because the Word is an expression of the goodness of a Father that has mercy on
the good and the bad and breathes a Spirit that has power even to raise the dead, even the
universalist faith that participates in the invisible mission of the Word contains the seeds
of the nonviolent triumph of good in return for evil. And because the very analogue for
the Word is a judgment of value spirating love, the further articulations or manifestations
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in human history that are “spoken” from the heart of this universalist faith are judgments
of value as well, Trinitarian participations of the verbum spirans amorem.

1.2 Reading De redemptione (1958) through the Lens of The Trinity in History

From Doran we learn about the way that memoria and faith ground a nonviolent,
self-sacrificing charity, and charity gives way to acts of loving that change, through
individuals and communities, the course of human history. The way memoria and faith
ground charity is a participation in active spiration, and the way charity proceeds from
this awareness of being divinely loved and the consequent judgment of value is a
participation in passive spiration, the Love that is the Holy Spirit. According to Doran,
such participation in the Spirit relates us back to the Son in love of divine wisdom. But
one of Lonergan’s own texts, the 1958 De redemptione manuscript, gives us more detail
on how this might be the case, discussing the ability of wisdom to order the whole
tapestry of our internal life by mirroring the way God’s wisdom redemptively restores the
universe. De redemptione is exceptional in relation to other works from the 1950s, as it
represents an early attempt by Lonergan to cast wisdom in a more existential light, and
does so with a focus on supernatural wisdom that is exceptional in relation to all of
Lonergan’s corpus. 610

Most likely completed one year after the publication of Insight, De redemptione also serves as
confirmation of the transposition of wisdom into self-appropriation that Insight effected: “It remains,
therefore, that one attains human wisdom to the extent to which through an understanding of what
understanding is one grasps at least the broad lines of all things and by them knows their order and mutual
interdependence…” (CWL 9: 305).

610
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1.2.1 Current World Order

As with Doran, Lonergan fixes the redemptive role of human wisdom cooperating
with divine Wisdom at the level of cultural value and against the staggering backdrop of
the entire universe of being. Above all, in De redemptione Lonergan affirms the
sovereignty of divine wisdom in the enactment of current world order. Current world
order is a supernaturally righteous order: it is the order of divine justice that is conceived
by divine wisdom, chosen by God’s will, caused by God’s power, and able to be
discerned in created things. It is defined by a number of key components, many of which
Lonergan takes directly from Aquinas, but tinged throughout by the generalized emergent
probability of Insight. The order of divine wisdom is characterized as follows: God
directly wills everything good, God indirectly wills natural evil and the evil of
punishment, and God merely permits culpable evil; natural forms and laws inhere in
created things by which they spontaneously move to their proper ends; there operates an
interconnected, circular conjunction of laws that ensure a sure course of events, including
the rhythm of human life; God solely effects this “common course of events and order of
the universe” by leading each creature to its proper end as through secondary,
instrumental causation; and every event depends on God, since God alone is the
proportionate cause of the universal order on which every event depends.
Most importantly, the purpose of the universe is to manifest the goodness of God,
and does so most preeminently in the way God draws good from evil. Since everything
exists for the sake of the perfection of the universe, and the perfection of the universe for
the sake of magnifying God’s glory, everything that is speaks the goodness of God. In
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our current world order, evils are allowed to occur, but through Christ, the order of divine
justice is so well integrated into the current world order that God draws good from evil,
and the greatest good of order comes about in the body of Christ. 611

1.2.2 The Exterior and Internal Orders and the Order of the Universe

In De redemptione, Lonergan establishes three levels of the human good: (1)
particular goods, which are objects of desire; (2) the external good of order, which is the
concrete dynamic scheme by which, through a repetition of coordinated operations, there
flows a continuous stream of particular goods (as examples, Lonergan references the
domestic, economic, and political orders); and (3) the cultural good, which pertains to the
perfection of intellect and goodness of will by which human beings are interiorly ordered,
a perfection that conditions the external order of society.
And so all three levels are interconnected with one another as well as dependent
on grace. Particular goods flow freely to the extent that there exists a structure, a good of
order, that ensures continuity and equity in their delivery. In turn, the good of order is
shaped by the cultural values that decide the form that order should take and guide any
changes made in that order toward the highest and truest possible good. Finally, if by
reflection, judgment, and will we choose the good of order, our deliberations to this effect
are only consistently beneficial when they are the fruit of an interior ordering of our
reason, and everything else through our reason, to divine wisdom as to supreme norm and
ultimate end.
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Furthermore, Lonergan understands all three levels of human good, but especially
the connection between the interior order of the human being and God’s grace, in relation
to universal order. To the extent that we are well-ordered in our interior and exterior
lives, we are well-integrated with the order of the universe and, through that order,
“intelligibly linked to God and the rest of humanity and all other creatures.” 612 For when
the image of God within us is violated through the reign of sin, the order of the universe
is disrupted. The constantly evolving order of the world, if it is to genuinely mirror God’s
own goodness and wisdom, emerges in true historical progress and is disrupted by the
decline wrought by sin. It takes the ultimate spiritual wisdom, the law of the Cross most
clearly revealed and effected in the life and death of Christ, to repair and reintegrate
universal order in line with God’s love and justice.

1.2.3 Cultural Value and Wisdom

Never one to neglect cognitional theory or metaphysics, Lonergan naturally links
particular goods with the potency correlative to experience; the good of order with the
form correlative to understanding; and cultural good with the act correlative to judgment.
And so wisdom, the perfector of judgment and the establisher of order, is connected with
the cultural good. Just as it is foolish to choose false cultural values—whatever ultimately
darkens our intellect and makes impotent our wills—it is wise to choose true ones.
Cultural good is the wisdom whereby we choose authentic values and the goodness
whereby we will them. While Lonergan has perhaps not yet fully disengaged judgments
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of fact and judgments of value at this point in his corpus, it appears that he associates
wisdom with judgment and goodness with will. Perhaps, Dadosky suggests, the desire to
carry out wise judgments is what makes the will good, so that wisdom also practically
penetrates into the will. 613
John Volk expounds at greater length on the nature of cultural wisdom in terms of
value judgments in De redemptione. Speaking of the Trinitarian ramifications of human
wisdom, Lonergan comments that “it is the mark of a wise person to utter a true word on
the basis of evidence clearly grasped, and of a good person to breathe love on the basis of
a good truly affirmed.” 614 Comparing this language to similar language in the earlier
Verbum and the later The Triune God: Systematics, Volk contends that although wisdom
is not precluded as belonging to true judgments of fact in De redemptione, it
predominately pertains to judgments of value. The evidence grasped by the one who
wisely understands and speaks a word regarding the best good of order is the evidence of
goodness. 615 And in contrast to understanding, which by definition can only grasp
possible intelligibilities, wisdom orders both intelligibility and nonintelligibility: the
vision of wisdom sees beyond what is toward what is not but what ought to be, which is a
function of value. 616
Here Lonergan clearly still distinguishes between the wisdom necessary to choose
truly beneficial social orders and the goodness of will necessary to enact them, thus still
speaking in the language of faculty psychology. Nevertheless, in this 1958 work
Lonergan begins to pioneer a more existential reading of sapientia. As already realized
“Lonergan on Wisdom,” 54.
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615
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by Aquinas, sapientia can be practical and, Lonergan here adds, wisdom yields
judgments of value that discern which good of order is truly good.

1.2.4 Cultural Value and the Wisdom of the Word

In any case, the relationship of wisdom to the social order is clear: “…particular
goods increase with the good of order, and order grows in accordance with the wisdom of
those who make judgments and the goodness of those who make decisions.” 617 In turn,
our wisdom grows in proportion to the depth of our relationship, established in
sanctifying grace, to the Father through the Son in the Spirit. And because Christ
communicates not only what belongs to human nature but also what belongs to the Word
of Wisdom, Christ’s signs can be sourced for developing our judgment, strengthening our
will, and even transforming our social and particular goods. In the incarnate Wisdom of
God, the Word made flesh, we witness the inauguration and perfection of the kingdom of
God, the greatest and wisest order to emerge in history.

2 Our Relationship to the Divine Word through “Love of Wisdom”: A Few
Questions
But if the created relation to the Son that the theological virtue of charity grounds
is, for non-Christians, a created relation of love for the invisible Word understood
specifically as divine wisdom, can Doran’s assertion be further mined with the analogy
between human wisdom and divine wisdom as the touchstone? Three questions come to
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mind. First, (2.1) how exactly does our share in the proceeding Love of God (the Spirit),
given in charity, ground a love for divine wisdom? (2.2) And how might wisdom
conceived as knowledge and love of the universe connect us in loving relationship to the
Word? (2.3) Finally, how does this theme—love of divine wisdom through love of the
universe—manifest in our consciousness and in our world, in ways additional to the work
Doran has already done around self-sacrificing charity, the law of the cross, and social
grace? In what follows, I will attempt a (very) preliminary answer to these linked
questions, instigated by Doran’s pioneering refinement to the four-point hypothesis.

2.1 The Spirit of Love and the Word of Wisdom

First, how exactly does our share in the proceeding Love of God (the Spirit),
given in charity, ground a love for divine wisdom? An answer to his question is fairly
clear from Doran’s emphasis on the nonviolent and forgiving nature of charity as it is told
in the Gospel and Lonergan’s position in De redemptione. To the extent that the
meanings and values defining our respective cultures encourage or repel the selfsurrender of love that returns good for evil, to that extent do we not only share in the
Spirit (participated by charity) but also illuminate or deface the Word of Wisdom. That
Word of Wisdom is revealed definitively in Christ, who pleaded with the Father on the
cross to forgive His murderers and told us to forgive our enemies in kind.
But true cultural good, promoted by the wisdom of self-surrender, still
authentically relates us back to the Word of Wisdom, even those of us who do not know
or accept Christ. For the Word is called Wisdom not solely because it is the verbum
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expressing all that the Father knows. The Word is also the verbum spirans amorem, a
judgment of value giving way to an act of love in response to the goodness of all that the
Father knows and loves, and, most of all on Lonergan’s later account, in response to the
unoriginated Agape that the Father is. What is lovingly spoken, lovingly judged of value
in the spoken Word, is the goodness of the Father’s love for all, not simply the Word.
And this love is, for us, undeserved love that is also undeserved mercy.
Again, according to Lonergan’s later Trinitarian analogy, the Father is not just
understanding speaking a word but originating love; the Son is judgment of value
expressing that love; and the Spirit is originated loving. The Word of Wisdom is spoken
love, who, in turn, breathes love. Then any act of love that ultimately flows from our
recognition of our undeserved reception of merciful love (understood by Doran in its
reception as memoria and in its recognition as faith), which then gives way to a desire to
share the goodness of this love with others, even our enemies (understood by Lonergan
and Doran as charity), mirrors the Word of Wisdom, where the human analogue for
wisdom is read as the self-surrender of love. Thus the habit of charity can be construed,
along the lines of Doran, as a love for divine Wisdom.

2.2 Love for God and Love for the Universe

And how might wisdom conceived as knowledge and love of the universe connect
us in loving relationship to the Word? Love of God and love of the universe comprise a
remarkably consistent dyad in Lonergan’s work; knowledge of the universe (an important

295
form of wisdom, on both Aquinas’ and Lonergan’s accounts) and self-knowledge are also
intertwined. 618
Lonergan often discussed love for God’s ordering of the universe as an essential
element of religious conversion, an idea that seems especially fertile for our interreligious
(and nonreligious) times as well as consonant with Aquinas’ idea of wisdom vis-à-vis the
universe. Just as Doran postulates faith as the global judgment of value saying “yes” to
the goodness of God’s love, with the doctrinal affirmation of social grace as a further
judgment of value, a further articulation of this universalist faith, we may suggest that
any and all judgments of value affirming the goodness of universal order are also
extensions of faith. The ways that all of the various parts of the universe contribute to the
beauty of the whole shine forth a divine pattern, and wisdom discerns this template. For
the world has been designed by the Master according to the “pattern” of the Word
through which it was created, the Word of Wisdom that is spoken as a superabundant
Expression of Love, a supreme pronouncement on the goodness of divine love that is
mirrored by our own recognition of the universe as a pronouncement of this same divine
love. And so a knowledge and appreciation of universal order relates us to the invisible
Word. Indeed, in Doran’s analogy of grace, the divine love that, in us, is appropriated in
memoria, interiorly spoken in faith, and returned to God and others in charity “has about
it something that seems to emanate from the foundation of the universe.” 619

618
Textual references to these dyads are abundant. In Insight, charity wills the order of the universe for love
of God, and everything and everyone that is in the universe. In Method, faith shifts our terminal value from
simply the human good to the good of the entire universe. Also in Method and later works, the question
about the goodness of the universe inevitably turns into a question about God, and a loving acceptance of
the universe leads to a loving acceptance of someone responsible for the universe.
619
Trinity in History, 34.
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3 Final Thoughts: Wisdom as the Humility, Patience, and Autonomy of Love
Finally, how does this theme—love of divine wisdom through love of the
universe—manifest in our consciousness and in our world? We might point to humility,
patience, and respect for autonomy as auxiliaries to the self-sacrificing charity already
underlined by Doran. Articulating the connection between genuineness and wisdom in
the struggle for self-transcendence, Gerard Walmsley remarks, “Genuineness involves a
developed wisdom and a commitment to properly human development.” 620 In light of
Lonergan’s later identification of wisdom as successive degrees of self-transcendence, I
would revise this to read, more simply, that such genuineness, such basic and dialectic
growth in the human subject, is wisdom. Wisdom is the development, the movement,
toward greater and greater degrees of self-transcendence. To borrow a description from
“Christology Today,” wisdom can be described as the “truly human development…of
conscious subjects moving cumulatively through their operations to the selftranscendence of truth and love.” 621
The genuine human development that is wisdom calls for humility at an
intellectual and existential level. Speaking of the unrestricted field intended by the
transcendental notions, Lonergan notes that “it is only because we can ask more questions
than we can answer that we know about the limitations of our knowledge.” 622 Put another
way, the fool can ask more questions than the wise man can answer; however, unlike the
fool, the wise man knows exactly what this lacuna means. In Lonergan’s cognitionalintentional anthropology, the wise one is the subject with the greatest awareness of—the
Lonergan on Philosophical Pluralism, 77.
CWL 16: 73.
622
CWL 23: 26 and 33.
620
621
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one most at home in—the unrestricted questioning of the transcendental notions. She
humbly realizes that the depth and breadth of her knowledge of the universe of being is
quite limited, and yet has the fullest and most certain grasp of the unrestricted nature of
her own questioning.
But the wisdom of the whole and holistic human being is also an appropriation of
our existential orientation open to grace. Just as cognitional wisdom recognized not only
the limitations of our actual, present knowledge of the universe but also the unlimited
nature of our conscious intentionality, existential wisdom recognizes not only the
distortions of our freedom and irresponsibility, their consequent contribution to decline
and need for redemption, but also our unrestricted longing for unlimited goodness and
unconditional love.
In addition to humility, the demands of existential wisdom call for patience as
well as a deep respect for the autonomy of the other, for “to will the order of the universe
…is not to demand that all things be perfect in their inception but to expect and will that
they grow and develop.” 623 To love a universe that has been growing and developing for
billions of years, and to love a God that patiently guides and delights in such a process, is
to call upon our own patience.
The divine bestowal of freedom is so generous that it allows us to “co-create”
ourselves along with God’s interior action. Respect for one’s own freedom and the
freedom of the other, including the respect that comes with the acknowledgement that
growth is dialectical and, in this current world order, includes mistakes, sins, corrections,
and constant conversion, is a sign of love for the universe and, indirectly, love for God.

623

CWL 3: 721.
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The truly wise humbly and patiently embrace the healing of their sinful distortions
and the elevating of their natural limitations, surrendering them both to grace. 624 The
“wise one” conquers her natural limitations and sinful distortions not in inauthentic
drifting or withdrawing from life or in the equally blind striving of alienated subjectivity
to conform to an inauthentic culture, religion, or theology but in the paradoxical
surrender to self-transcendence in all its forms, especially that of love, which acts in
human history as the power of conversion.
Even more paradoxically, the supernatural wisdom of religious conversion lies
not in striving but in surrendering: not in striving to conquer evil with more evil but in
surrendering to the law of the cross, which counsels and demands a nonviolent return of
good for evil. For Christians, the incarnate Wisdom of God is the surest sign of a humble,
patient, freedom-respecting love that invites but does not force love in return. It is a love
that asks for acceptance and self-surrender even when knowledge “fails” and must bow to
mystery.
As both truth and praxis, the law of the cross is perhaps the most divinely
psychodramatic, and the most clearly supernatural and redemptive embodiment, of the
more general principle of nonviolence. This principle of nonresistance—that is,
acceptance—can be found in many other world religions, and even in the personal
philosophies of those who identify as “nonreligious.” In Lonergan’s beautiful words, if
For a creative excursion into the connection between humility and wisdom in Aquinas, see Alina Beary,
“The Curious Case of Ivan Karamazov: A Thomistic Account of Wisdom and Pride,” HeyJ LIX (2018):
34-44. Also worthy of special mention in this vein is Dadosky’s article “Woman without Envy:
Reconceiving the Immaculate Conception,” Theological Studies 72 (2011): 15-40. Therein he discusses
humility and gratitude as crucial antidotes to the pride and envy that often erupt into internal and external
violence and threaten our spiritual peace. The article speculates on the example that Mary’s freedom from
such violent dynamics (flowing from her immaculate conception) sets for our grace-filled imitation of the
divine. In the Catholic tradition Mary is known as sedes sapientiae; it may be worthwhile to explore the
connection between Mary’s humility and her wisdom and her uniqueness among feminine representations
of supernatural wisdom.
624
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in humility and simplicity we accept things as they are, we can advance to a
knowledge of God and an intimacy with God that will leave us convinced that what,
as philosophers, we may call his wisdom and goodness are in truth wisdom and
goodness—surpassing wisdom and surpassing goodness. 625

625

CWL 5: 376-377.
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